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 Many U.S. women’s narratives of mixed race mother-daughter conflict suggest race-
based abjection as a primary factor. Mothers and daughters develop a horror—sometimes 
obvious, sometimes subtle—of their respective others’ racial identifications and try to reject 
them, but often prove unable to separate entirely, remaining instead in fraught relationships. 
 This study examines race-based abjection between mothers and their differently raced 
daughters in multiple iterations. “Chapter 1: Secret Mother” begins in the Jim Crow era and tells 
the story of Norma Storch, an aspiring actress who had a daughter with a black comedian. 
Fearing the socioeconomic consequences of being a white woman known to have non-white 
offspring, Storch sent the girl to live with a black family. Storch remained part of her daughter’s 
life, but refused for nearly forty years to acknowledge their biological relationship publicly. 
“Chapter 2: Secret Daughter” flips the narrative and explains how that daughter, acclaimed 
journalist and documentarian June Cross, responded to her mother’s abjection with race-based 
abjection of her own.  
 “Chapter 3: Secret Genealogy” turns to Louise Erdrich’s iconic Pauline “Sister 
Leopolda” Puyat character and shows how she simultaneously embodies both maternal and filial 
race-based abjection. Puyat constructs a racial identity that rejects both her mother and her 
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daughter as Indian, but considers herself white. Finally, “Chapter 4: Secret Abjection” 
demonstrates how race-based abjection between mother and daughter evolved after Loving v. 
Virginia, the 1967 Supreme Court ruling that legalized interracial marriage. After Loving, mixed 
race mother-daughter dyads had little need to separate physically. Instead, in the cases of 
Elizabeth and Ruby in Joan Steinau Lester’s Mama’s Child, Sandy and Birdie in Danzy Senna’s 
Caucasia, and real-life author-activists Alice and Rebecca Walker, race-based abjection led 
mothers to objectify their daughters and vice versa. 
 This project problematizes both long-standing and contemporary narratives that mixed 
race people and relationships inevitably lead to greater racial harmony. It rejects romanticization 
and deepens current conversations in Critical Mixed Race Studies, Women’s Studies, and 
Contemporary American Literature by highlighting the significant societal and psychological 
obstacles facing women who raise differently raced daughters, and those facing the daughters 
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 In 2008, the United States elected a president who self-identified as both African 
American and mixed race. Barack Obama’s ascendancy signaled to many people the dawning of 
a “postracial” era (Hannah-Jones). During the 2008 campaign, then-candidate Obama had 
attributed part of the hope he offered to his mixed racial heritage, which gave him “a story that 
has seared into my genetic makeup the idea that this nation is more than the sum of its parts—
that out of many, we are truly one” (17). Many believers in a “postracial” U.S. thus interpreted 
Obama’s election as a signal that mainstream society was finally ready to adopt—or at least rally 
behind—his message of racial reconciliation. Some people extrapolated the hope of racial 
harmony, represented by Obama, to other mixed race individuals; others had pointed to 
interracial unions and offspring as a path to racial utopia long before Obama came on the scene.1 
 In the early 20th century, people with multiple racial heritages had largely been viewed in 
the U.S. with disgust or pity, dreams of racial utopia notwithstanding; literary representations 
tended towards negative stereotypes like that of the Tragic Mulatta/o, in which the mixed race 
individual lives in torment and psychological distress and eventually dies because s/he cannot fit 
into a single racial category and thus cannot find a place to exist within society. Such negative 
narratives have never fully vanished, as Ralina L. Joseph points out in her discussion of black 
                                                          
1Indeed, this line of thinking had been argued a century before. See, for example, Charles W. 
Chesnutt’s “The Future American” (1900), Sui Sin Far’s “Leaves from the Mental Portfolio of 
an Eurasian” (1909), José Vasconcelos’ The Cosmic Race (1925), and Nella Larsen’s Passing 
(1929). 
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and white mixed race: even today, “[s]ome representations equate mixed-race with pain: the 
multiracial individual is mired in the confusion and problems imagined to be inherent in the 
racial mixture of black and white” (1). By contrast, by the early 21st century, mixed race people 
were starting to be seen more frequently as the wave of the future, associated with youth and 
beauty, and viewed with widespread interest and admiration—or so the prevailing narrative 
went. These mostly recent “representations,” Joseph continues, “equate multiraciality with 
progress: the mixed-race person functions as a bridge between estranged communities, a healing 
facilitator of an imagined racial utopia, even the embodiment of that utopia” (2). Granted, pain 
might be involved even in the most optimistic portrayals, but at least it had transformed from 
needless agony into pain with a purpose, the sacred suffering of racial saints and messiahs. 
 Ten years later, few people believe that the U.S. is anything approaching “postracial.” 
Racial conflicts persisted throughout the Obama presidency. They worsened and became more 
visible during the 2016 presidential campaign and the subsequent Trump presidency. For at least 
the foreseeable future, the illusion of a “postracial” society ushered in by mixed race 
ambassadors is gone; indeed, the idea of a “postracial” anything seems a dubious dream, 
relegated to a far-distant future. At the same time, other similarly simplistically positive ideas 
about mixed race families and individuals are also being challenged. Mixed race identity has 
never been more popular or widespread in the U.S. than in the 21st century, but this increased 
recognition and marked lessening of social stigma have not erased the challenges that mixed race 
people and families face. Prominent scholars in Critical Mixed Race Studies have warned against 
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the temptation to embrace the current popularity of mixed race identities and, in that hopeful 
embrace, to gloss over the problems and complications that they can still entail.2  
 Both the “multiracial people as utopian future” and the “present utopia for multiracial 
people” narratives, while understandably hopeful, inflict harm upon mixed race individuals and 
their communities. They exemplify what Lauren Berlant calls “cruel optimism”: “when 
something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. […] These kinds of optimistic 
relation are not inherently cruel. They become cruel only when the object that draws your 
attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially” (1). The desire to achieve a 
racial utopia of some sort is not inherently bad, despite being arguably impossible. When the 
rush to have achieved that goal silences the reality of not having yet achieved it, however, the 
result is a cruel optimism. As with the “model minority” stereotype of Asian Americans, such 
unwarranted positivity can place extreme pressure on group members to uphold the unrealistic 
expectations, allowing problems to fester silently, and can also shame members who fall short of 
the stereotype. 
 My project contributes to Critical Mixed Race Studies by focusing on one of these 
underdiscussed problems. I examine a way in which racial/ethnic difference has historically 
complicated relationships in a mixed race family—specifically, how that difference can create or 
increase conflict between a mother and her mixed race daughter. I argue that the combination of 
                                                          
2Canadian academic Minelle Mahtani, in particular, has called for “Resisting the 
Romanticization of Multiraciality” in the subtitle of her 2015 book, Mixed Race Amnesia. 
Meanwhile, Ralina L. Joseph in Transcending Blackness: From the New Millennium Mulatta to 
the Exceptional Multiracial (2012) and Habiba Ibrahim in Troubling the Family: The Promise of 
Personhood and the Rise of Multiracialism (2012) argue that the multiracial movement, begun in 
the 1990s by mostly white mothers, was not simply an innocent fight for the freedom to self-
identify racially as one desires, but also masked an insidious racism that viewed blackness as bad 




racial/ethnic difference in the racially stratified U.S. society with the traditionally close, intimate 
proximity of a mother-daughter relationship3 can arouse intense feelings of racial abjection in 
one or both of these parties towards her racial Other; I then trace the abjective cycle through a 
series of mixed race4 novels and memoirs to show how such abjection, driven by the family’s 
racial/ethnic difference, can result in painful physical and/or emotional separations, often with 
devastating lifelong consequences. 
 The narratives that I analyze here end with their racial abjections and hostilities intact; 
yet, as I demonstrate in the conclusion of this project, the stories of real-life mixed race mothers 
and daughters need not be doomed to such a permanently painful end. Although race-based 
abjective separations and the racial anxiety that prompts them cannot be resolved simply through 
a fact-based education or, as Kelly Oliver would argue, mere recognition that such racial 
disconnect exists, awareness does offer a measure of help. An even more effective solution 
combines awareness/recognition with adjustments in expectations. Reframing each woman’s 
relationship to the racial difference between them allows both to bypass the need for an 
impossible racial empathy and to instead approach one another with open-mindedness and love. 
                                                          
3In a biological mother-daughter relationship, this means, at a minimum, intimate physical 
proximity during pregnancy and birth. After the birth-separation, many mothers and daughters 
maintain close physical and/or emotional proximity in the ensuing years. 
 
4See “mixed race” in the Terminology section. I am using this broad definition to re-read several 
texts that contain a major character whose ancestry contains multiple races or ethnicities, and/or 
that were written by a person who fits this definition. Not all of these characters or individuals 
claim a mixed race identity; some do, but only as a secondary identity, while they prefer to self-
identify first as belonging to a single racial or ethnic group. My decision to read these through a 
mixed race critical lens is not intended to (nor can it) in any way negate their primary 
categorization outside of mixed race literature, in the past, present, or future. Rather, my analyses 
are meant to shed new light on certain aspects of the texts/individuals in order to enhance our 




By letting go of the socially normative goal of mother-daughter racial identification with one 
another, each party frees herself to listen to, believe, and support the other’s racial identification 
that differs so radically from her own—to embrace that which she can never fully understand 
from her own experience. 
“Critical Mixed Race Studies” in the Academy 
 The scholarly roots of Critical Mixed Race Studies run long and deep within what the 
Western academy has divided into various “ethnic studies” fields. The intervention of Critical 
Mixed Race Studies has been to bring all of these previously existing, robust strains of 
scholarship into conversation with one another as part of a single category, foregrounding 
multiplicity and mixedness as opposed to any specific race(s) or ethnicity(-ies). Each strain of 
scholarship remains fully part of the original ethnic studies fields, but gains a wider audience 
through also being part of Critical Mixed Race Studies. Without the rich, ongoing heritage from 
scholars in individual ethnic minority studies programs, and without continuing conversations 
among and with them, today’s Critical Mixed Race Studies would not—could not—exist. 
 Critical Mixed Race Studies has grown into its current formal pan-ethnic academic 
configuration over the past 5-10 years, primarily through the organization of the biennial, 
international, interdisciplinary Critical Mixed Race Studies Conference in 2010, an effort that led 
to the founding of the Journal of Critical Mixed Race Studies5 in 2014 and the formation of the 
                                                          
5This journal was preceded by MELUS, a well-known journal founded in 1974 by the Society for 
the Study of the Multi-Ethnic Literature of the United States. The two overlap significantly, but 
not completely. MELUS publishes literary criticism by scholars working on any ethnic American 
literature. Some articles address mixed race U.S. literature, while others might deal only with 
African American literature, Irish American literature, Italian American literature, Jewish 
American literature, etc., or any combination of the above, none of which need include a mixed 
race text. The Journal, on the other hand, deals exclusively with mixed race texts and topics, but, 
like the Critical Mixed Race Studies Association and its conferences, is both interdisciplinary 
and international in its scope. 
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Critical Mixed Race Studies Association in 2015. In the Journal’s inaugural issue, founders G. 
Reginald Daniel, Laura Kina, Wei Ming Dariotis, and Camilla Fojas explain, “We have added 
the term ‘critical’ to the rich and complex field of mixed race studies to indicate both a new 
direction and to bring together the various tributaries of the field in a new light, one that is 
recursive and self-reflexive” (7). While still accepting and valuing personal narratives and 
experiences, the field is maturing beyond simply asking, “What is mixed race identity?” Daniel 
et al. continue: 
Critical mixed race studies places mixed race at the critical center of focus. 
Multiracials become subjects of historical, social, and cultural processes rather 
than simply objects of analysis. This involves the study of racial consciousness 
among racially mixed people, the world in which they live, and the ideological, 
social, economic, and political forces, as well as policies that impact the social 
location of mixed-race individuals and inform their mixed-race experiences and 
identities. […] CMRS also emphasizes the interlocking nature of racial 
phenomena with gender, sex, sexuality, class, and other categories of difference. 
In this intersectional framework, […] these and other categories of difference […] 
are ongoing phenomena that are accomplished in interaction with others and must 
be situated in social situations and institutional structures. (8) 
 
Recent trends in Critical Mixed Race Studies include renewed emphases on anti-colonialism,6 
mixed race feminisms, and political activism, generally from a coalition-oriented mindset. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Beyond these two journals, numerous other books, journals, and other media have long 
been publishing major scholarship that deals with mixed race issues. These outlets are often part 
of individual ethnic studies fields or more broadly generalist projects, such as American 
Literature, and demonstrate that, just as Critical Mixed Race Studies claims portions of all 
individual ethnic studies fields, so can scholars focusing exclusively on each of these fields claim 
Critical Mixed Race Studies. 
 
6Many in the Critical Mixed Race Studies community assume decolonization as one of the 
community’s shared goals. While not a focus of this study, decolonization—dismantling the 
values, mindsets, knowledge, beliefs, traditions, etc., that European colonizers forced upon the 
people they colonized, replacing what had previously been held by the colonized—is relevant to 
my project. The racial hierarchy that privileges whiteness over other races and non-mixed racial 
identifications over mixed racial identifications is a colonial legacy that can interfere greatly with 
mixed race mother-daughter relationships—privileging European history over African, for 
example—and leading to resentment over the inequality in perceived values.  
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  The cross-racial emphasis of Critical Mixed Race Studies has not been without 
controversy; its history in the academy is politically fraught. As Naomi Zack noted in 1995, “The 
subject of mixed race is itself constituted across the prevalent categories of ethnic or racial 
studies in contemporary scholarly culture, […]. [M]any writers who work in mixed black and 
white race, Native American mixed race or Asian mixed race, have not considered giving up the 
particularity of their own racial parameters to identify in a broad sense, as racially mixed” 
("Introduction" xviii). In the same anthology, Carol Roh Spaulding lamented the trend of mixed 
race literary texts and criticisms being “confined within the bounds of their individual ethnic 
fields” and pointed out that, “[i]rrespective of their ethnic particularities, mixed bloods in 
American literature share important commonalities that traverse current racial and ethnic 
formations called African-American, Asian-American, Latino-Latina, and American Indian 
literature” (97-98). Spaulding tried to forestall negative reactions by adding, “these distinctions 
have great political and social importance to these ethnic literatures, and I do not mean to suggest 
that they be discarded; but neither should they preclude other ways of reading race” (100). The 
timing of Spaulding’s article coincided with increased political activism in the U.S. demanding 
government recognition of multiply raced identities, as opposed to creating a single “multiracial” 
catch-all category or continuing the rule of hypodescent; this fight would culminate in the “check 
all that apply” formulation of the 2000 Census. As with these contemporaneous calls to 
recognize mixed race identities in life as both/and, Spaulding argued that mixed race identities in 
fiction need not belong exclusively to any single racial category or community. Instead, they can 
co-exist in both multiply raced and singly raced identity-based scholarship. 
 Jonathan Brennan wrote of similar academic resistance in 2002, describing “scholarly 
fields that often ultimately prove hostile to the idea of mixed race by insisting on a reductive 
8 
reading of multiple identities” (17). Rejecting this erasure of intersectionality, Brennan states in 
the introduction to his Mixed Race Literature anthology that “it is crucial for literature scholars 
to engage the numerous mixed race American literature texts as hybrid literatures that reflect acts 
of cultural merging” (17). He explains his reasoning further: “For instance, because most 
literature scholars tend to follow distinct racial categories while explicating literary texts, and 
because they also often follow the long-established one-drop rule, writers of mixed heritage who 
are part African are examined in the light of an African American literary, cultural, and social 
tradition” (19). This singly-raced critical strategy is valid, Brennan hastens to add, but 
insufficient; the problem lies in refusing to entertain any other framework or interpretation. 
“Many of [these writers of mixed heritage] do belong to an African American community,” 
Brennan notes, “and if they are simultaneously members of other communities, this does not 
deny them their claim to an African American community. Yet in order to really understand the 
tradition from which these writers create their literary works, one must also examine their 
parallel heritage without denying either one” (19). According to Brennan, then, failing to 
examine mixed race texts from a mixed race perspective (as opposed to monoracial alone) can 
prevent scholars from gaining an accurate picture of the text, potentially causing their 
scholarship to be incomplete. 
As difficult as crossing racial boundaries to construct a mixed race scholarly perspective 
is, accepting the concept of mixed race identity as equal to other racial identities can be even 
more so. In chronicling the history of Critical Mixed Race Studies in the 1990s, Daniel et al. 
state, “In the field of ethnic studies, the topic of mixed-race identity was largely marginalized, if 
not ignored. Black studies scholars specifically were ambivalent, if not unreceptive, to the topic 
of multiracial identity” (11). This impulse towards academic territorialism was/is understandable, 
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Daniel et al. concede. Accepting a border-crossing mixed race identity “was considered 
incompatible with and inimical to the canonical boundaries of the field as well as deleterious to 
the struggles of traditional communities of color and their monoracial imperatives. These were 
key founding principles that have served as a means of maintaining racial solidarity in the face of 
white oppression” (11). Michael Omi reports a similarly “intense and bitter debate between 
Asian American civil rights groups and multiracial Asian Americans over a proposed multiracial 
category for Census 2000” (“Foreword” xi). Mixed race studies have been—and still are to some 
degree—seen as a neoconservative strategy used to weaken the already-limited political power of 
minority communities by siphoning away members and resources, both within the academy and 
without. The emerging field has thus threatened the “profound investment communities of color 
have in preserving monoracial identities, a mindset that overlooks, or outright rejects, the 
possibility of a multiracial identity formulated on egalitarian or antiracist, that is, critical, 
premises” (13). The simultaneous cause and result is an ideology that privileges 
“[m]onoraciality, along with rules of hypodescent, [which] has suppressed multiracial identities 
through macro-aggressions and meso-aggressions involving institutions and organizations 
respectively. […] [as well as] micro-aggressions in the sphere of interpersonal relations, where 
individuals are perpetrators” (13). Sometimes consciously, and sometimes not, some (though 
certainly not all) members of singly raced minority communities have fought to keep their hard-
won cultural power by reproducing against mixed race communities less extreme versions of the 
repressions that the dominant white culture had originally placed upon them. This exercise of 
singly raced minority dominance among racial scholars and activists has ironically both 
demonstrated and reinforced the degree of power (particularly in the academy) that traditionally 
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recognized ethnic studies groups have attained, but Critical Mixed Race Studies is still working 
to achieve. 
 According to Ranier Spencer, the fears and negative reactions of members of singly raced 
minority communities should not be dismissed as paranoia. Spencer argues that when the media 
touts, in cruel optimism, the U.S. mixed race community as the gateway to a postracial era, “The 
hope is that the nation’s oldest and foremost race problem—the black problem—rather than 
being solved by the racial state, will instead simply be stepped over on the way to that postracial 
goal, and black people’s justified complaints will therefore vanish as a result. In other words, 
what is desired is not so much postraciality as post-blackness” (166). Paying attention to mixed 
race communities, especially if employing the one-drop rule and treating mixed race individuals 
as the sole representatives of their minority racial communities, allows the media to ignore the 
non-mixed individuals in these same communities in favor of individuals whose skin colors rank 
higher in the colonizers’ racist color hierarchy, and whose racial experiences can therefore differ 
greatly from those of individuals whose skin colors rank lower. Spencer later continues, “If this 
is how mixed-race identity is moving the nation toward postraciality—by a diminishing 
whiteness expanding to include some persons of Asian and Hispanic ancestry while black 
ancestry remains stigmatized—then we should all be concerned” (169). In recognizing and 
validating mixed race identity and mixed race studies, then, scholars and activists must be careful 
not to allow monoracial minority identities and ethnic studies to be marginalized in favor of the 
emerging field. 
 Because it is still so young, the field we now know as Critical Mixed Race Studies is full 
of unresolved questions and not-yet-explored possibilities. Many of its scholarly antecedents 
have done groundbreaking work in areas such as Critical Race Theory and mestizaje, making 
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Critical Mixed Race Studies itself possible, but much work remains. Minelle Mahtani notes, 
“The literature on multiraciality in the academic context has focused mostly on the American 
experience of mixed race identity, which has been primarily seen as a black-white or Asian-
white issue” (4-5). For a field devoted to multiplicity, Critical Mixed Race Studies reflects and 
replicates the colonizing influence of U.S. whiteness to a surprising extent. It also has a 
somewhat ironic history of being limited and defined by others, particularly before its 
recognition in the twenty-first century as an academic field in its own right.7 (Paradoxically, 
scholars in the field often still rely on these imposed mainstream systems and definitions in order 
to expose and explode them, as will be addressed later.) One result of these legacies, combined 
with the newness of the field’s resistance to them, has been a relative lack of diverse viewpoints. 
In writing about traditional academic and cultural treatments of mixed race women, for example, 
Mahtani explains, “the mixed race woman has been made intelligible through the prism of 
racialized hierarchies that have historically positioned her as out of place. Nonbelonging is the 
dominant framework for mixed race identity. The supposed desire for assimilation into her 
parents’ ethnic groups is popularly read as the trademark of the individual’s experience of mixed 
race” (166). Long-standing conceptions of mixed race women as exotic, sexually licentious, 
tormented, and/or doomed are built on this framework, yet the only reason the framework 
exists—the only reason mixed race people have ever been seen as racially abnormal—is that 
their dominant society has arbitrarily defined “normal” specifically to exclude them. 
 The irrationality of mixed race people’s exclusion by the dominant society does not make 
that exclusion less real or powerful or painful. Persistent nonbelonging results in a sense of 
                                                          
7In response, many in the field have turned to womanism and intersectionality as models of self-
voicing and inclusiveness. See Andrew Jolivétte’s “Critical Mixed Race Studies: New Directions 
in the Politics of Race and Representation” (154-157). 
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isolation; isolation often brings increased attention to the individual so isolated; increased 
attention to an individual, if maintained long enough, inevitably delves into that individual’s 
interiority. These principles have historically held true in both academic and cultural contexts for 
mixed race people. From the historical literary trope of the Tragic Mulatta/o to today’s 
continuing focus on strengthening mixed race children’s positive racial identity development, 
dealing with mixed race people and issues has typically meant addressing individual self-
concepts regarding racial identity, perhaps trying to tease them into what is deemed a coherent 
whole. This work has been good and necessary, but it has left many other mixed race-related 
avenues of inquiry untouched.  
 If we explore mixed race identity/-ies solely in isolation, mixed race studies itself risks 
being fundamentally isolated. One way to advance the field is to devote more attention to 
analyzing how mixed race identity functions in relation not to itself, but to others. This effort 
motivates much of my research into how mixed race daughters relate to the women who, 
initially, are most important in their lives—their non-mixed or otherwise differently raced 
mothers—and vice versa. Noting that “much of multiracial rhetoric has been developed by white 
women and therefore centralizes white motherhood,” Habiba Ibrahim argues that “multiracial 
discourse has not adequately theorized motherhood or family” (66). My project does not attempt 
to theorize the family as a whole, but I do address how mixed race identities can shape mother- 
and daughterhood, most often as seen through the eyes of the mixed race daughter, as opposed to 
the mother.  
Theorizing Race-Based Abjection among Mixed Race Mother-Daughter Dyads 
 
 Abjection, in the Kristevan psychoanalytic sense, is a feeling of revulsion combined with 
simultaneous magnetic attraction, both in response to the same thing. Many U.S. women’s 
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narratives of mixed race mother-daughter conflict suggest race-based abjection as a primary—
though not exclusive—cause of the conflict. Mothers and daughters develop a horror of their 
respective others’ racial identifications and try to reject them as a result, but ultimately prove 
unable to quit them completely and instead remain in fraught relationship with one another.  
 This pattern sheds light on the socially formed expectation that mothers and daughters 
will have total racial/ethnic continuity with one another: one of the duties of stereotypical 
motherhood in the U.S. is to teach one’s daughter how to be not just a woman, but a woman 
racialized in certain ways. Mothers are assumed to be able to convey this knowledge to their 
daughters in large part due to the mothers’ own experiences with being racialized in the same 
ways. For mothers from racial, ethnic, and/or other cultural minorities, there tends to be greater 
awareness of this maternal role, because these mothers must take steps counter to the majority in 
order to raise their daughters with a non-majority identity. For white mothers of white daughters, 
however, white privilege can blind the mothers and daughters alike to the fact that they, too, are 
performing this mothering work of preparing their daughters not just for womanhood, but for 
white womanhood, specifically. 
 Kelly Oliver explains how and why racial difference in such an important, intimate 
relationship can have extreme results. “If we conceive of ourselves as self-identical,” she writes, 
“and we conceive of identity as opposed to difference, and we conceive of anything or anyone 
outside of the boundaries of ourselves as different, then we will conceive of anything different or 
outside of ourselves as a threat to our own identity. Identity will be pitted against difference. 
Relations will be hostile. Hostile relations will lead to hostile actions” (Witnessing 2-3). If a 
mother thinks of herself as, for example, wholly white, and if she considers her daughter—
biological or adoptive—as not being wholly white, then, even if she thinks of the daughter as 
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being partly white, her conception of the daughter’s partial whiteness being opposed to her own 
supposedly pure and whole whiteness makes the daughter a threat to that undisputed, unqualified 
whiteness. Given the strong (and even stronger in the past) social value of whiteness and white 
“purity” in the U.S., the prospect of irrevocably losing so much social capital can understandably 
terrify the mother, even if she harbors no conscious racial prejudice against the daughter. The 
magnitude of this threat can taint the mother’s relationship with and behavior towards the 
daughter with a fear-driven hostility that she might or might not consciously intend. Meanwhile, 
a daughter who conceives of herself as multiply raced might see in her mother a model or 
reflection of part, but not all, of her racial self. She identifies her mother with the part of her 
racial heritage that they share, but not the remaining portion(s) of her racial heritage; thus, her 
concept of her mother is that of her own self in incomplete form. The existence of a whole self 
that is not her whole self, yet is her physical source, threatens the daughter’s multiply raced 
identity: the fact of the mother’s whole self seemingly demonstrates that the daughter, too, can 
exist without a part that she might consider essential to her own identity. 
Methodology: Mixed Race Feminist Psychoanalysis 
 My methodology in this project prioritizes the experiences of women and interprets them 
through a Critical Mixed Race Studies lens. My methodological framework relies on three major 
components: lived experiences as valid epistemological artifacts; intersectionality, which 
includes mixed race positionality and potentiality as delineated in U.S. Third World feminist 
theories; and established methods of feminist psychoanalysis, particularly feminist theories of 
abjection, which I apply to a heretofore-understudied site of racial conflict. 
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1. Lived experience as epistemological artifact 
 In keeping with identity politics and scholarship in both feminist and racial identity 
theories, this project embraces lived experience as a valid, critically valuable epistemological 
artifact. The theories of identity and social positionality8 underlying this approach emanate 
largely from Latina/o/x Studies, which holds that common personal experiences, if shared by 
enough people, can themselves be evidence of previously unrealized or unacknowledged 
phenomena. As Alcoff and Mohanty note, “Social identities can be mired in distorted ideologies, 
but they can also be the lenses through which we learn to view our world accurately. […] Often 
we create positive and meaningful identities that enable us to better understand and negotiate the 
social world. They enable us to engage with the social world and in the process discover how it 
really works” (6). Alternatively, personal observation or experience of negative or meaningless 
identities, identities that hinder our function in the world, can be just as instructive in leading us 
to discover the unspoken rules of society, what it does (not) accept, and how it does (not) work. 
 Turning to knowledge gained directly from lived experience is especially appropriate for 
this project for a number of reasons. First, many of my primary texts are memoirs and/or semi-
autobiographical fiction—popular genres in mixed race literature. In accepting these works as 
                                                          
8Like Paula Moya, I hold a Post-Positivist Realist view of identity: a person’s identity is made up 
of a combination of the person’s own concept of herself and others’ concepts of her. Often, these 
two (or more) views of who the person is can interact with and influence one another, as well as 
with external factors. Mariana Ortega summarizes this viewpoint thus: Post-Positivist Realism 
“underscores the links among identity, knowledge, and social location understood as the material 
conditions of race, class, sexuality, culture, and history, and takes these links as having important 
consequences for how we understand ourselves and interpret our worlds” (175). These 
“conditions of social location, […] are neither completely fixed nor completely constructed” 
(Ortega 173). This reasoning overlaps with the intersectional framework I shall discuss in the 
next section and provides the basis for, among other things, grounding my textual analyses in 
their respective sociohistorical contexts. 
 For further discussion of Post-Positive Realism, see “Identity/Identification/Subjectivity” 
in Appendix 1: Key Definitions. 
16 
primary texts, I am already accepting the authors’ lived experiences as sources of knowledge, 
since they are a large part of what inform the authors’ respective texts. Second, my project 
focuses on the theory and politics of individual identities in relation to one another and examines 
how they shape a relationship’s trajectory and nuances. In non-fiction work, personal experience 
is the medium through which many of these relationships unfold. Drawing insights from textual 
records of lived experience thus lends itself particularly well to this project, due to the prevalence 
of memoirs in mixed race literature, especially memoirs that explore questions of lineage and 
heritage. Ibrahim explains, “In general, the multiracial memoir […] contemplate[s] cross-racial 
intimacy through the central domain of mother/child relationships, thereby downplaying 
husband/wife relations” (85). Multiracial memoirs often drape their theoretical contributions to 
Critical Race Theory and Critical Mixed Race Studies in the guise of contemplation and 
interpretation of their personal mother-child relationships, including mother-daughter conflict. 
Part of my project is to illuminate these relationships and thereby draw these theoretical 
contributions out. 
 Third, lived experience has long inspired feminist theorization and activism. Second 
Wave feminism famously developed the idea that “the personal is political.”9 Third Wave and 
Third World feminisms have both demonstrated that the personal can be not only political, but 
also academically illuminating. Rebecca Walker, who co-founded the Third Wave Foundation in 
1992 and edited what would become one of the most influential anthologies of emerging Third 
                                                          
9According to Dent, this position held “that there were significant things that happened in 
interpersonal relationships that had profound political ramifications because they affected large 
numbers of similarly situated people at the same time” (70). This recognition led to organizing, 
understanding, and “theorizing” so “that more women (and even men) could get hold of this 
information and try to incorporate it into their lives. It was the pedagogy of the oppressed” (70). 
Through “the personal is political,” sharing personal experiences became not only a source of 
new information and insight, but also a way to disseminate what was learned. 
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Wave feminist writing, To Be Real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism 
(1995), writes in her introduction to To Be Real that her “requirement was that the [anthology] 
pieces be personal, honest, and record a transformative journey taken” (xxxvii). Walker’s 
reasoning behind this editorial stipulation is that “personal testimonies […] build empathy and 
compassion, [and] are infinitely more accessible than academic tracts,” as well as the belief that 
“our lives are the best basis for feminist theory, and […] by using the contradictions in our lives 
as what Zen practitioners have called the ‘razor’s edge,’ we lay the groundwork for feminist 
theory that neither vilifies or deifies, but that accepts and respects difference” (xxxvii). Objective 
evidence and depersonalized scholarship can result in distancing, dehumanizing theory, a result 
that Walker seeks to avoid by (re-)privileging personal, lived experience.  
 Third World feminism follows a similar impulse, using real-world experiences to effect 
real-world change. Moraga and Anzaldúa call this strategy “theory in the flesh,” stating that “[a] 
theory in the flesh means one where the physical realities of our lives—our skin color, the land 
or concrete we grew up on, our sexual longings—all fuse to create a politic born out of 
necessity” (This Bridge Called My Back 23). Like Walker, Moraga and Anzaldúa find sites of 
experiential contradiction to be among the most difficult and painful, but also the most valuable. 
They write, “There is nothing easy about a collective cultural history of what Mitsuye Yamada 
calls ‘unnatural disasters’” like enslavement and unjust imprisonment (23)—but the aching 
layers of complexity are exactly why the history must be made known, told and retold through 
the years and generations. “This is how our theory develops. We are interested in pursuing a 
society that uses flesh and blood experiences to concretize a vision that can begin to heal our 
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‘wounded knee’ (Chrystos)”10 (Moraga and Anzaldúa 23). Because the impetus for this 
theorizing is the pain of personal lived experience, and because the goal of the theorizing is to 
assuage that pain and promote social justice, peace, and healing in one’s own life and in the lives 
of others, working in and through lived experience keeps the theorizing grounded and connected 
to real life, in the real world. Thus, my theorizing on the basis of lived experience, and my 
application of such theorizing to real life, comes from this theoretical underpinning in Latina/o 
Studies. 
 The fourth major reason for using personal, experiential knowledge in this project is that 
this strategy is in keeping with not just feminist identity politics, but also minority identity 
politics in general. Alcoff and Mohanty point out that “[m]inoritized peoples often use subjective 
experience to criticize and rewrite dominant and oppressive narratives. […] [I]n many crucial 
instances, ‘experiences’ are not unfathomable inner phenomena but rather disguised explanations 
of social relations, and they can be evaluated as such” (4-5). Elsewhere, Alcoff writes, “Raced 
and gendered identities are socially produced, and yet they are fundamental to our selves as 
knowing, feeling, and acting subjects. Raced and gendered identities operate as epistemological 
perspectives or horizons from which certain aspects or layers of reality are made visible” (Visible 
Identities 126). Through examining the raced and gendered identities, alone and combined, of 
ourselves and others, we gain insight into (social) reality—insight that might well be hidden 
those who do not share our experiences and perspective. In sharing this insight, however, we can 
partly correct the limited views of our own individual perceptions. 
 Such thinking grounds the rhetorical strategy of Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, who 
embeds his scholarly research and personal reflections within the stories of nearly a dozen 
                                                          
10A reference to “I Walk in the History of My People,” a poem by Chrystos that concludes the 
“Entering the Lives of Others: Theory in the Flesh” section of This Bridge Called My Back. 
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multiethnic Asian Americans. “The stories that I present,” he writes, “bring greater 
understanding to how identities today are flexible, inclusive, and multiple, and challenge the 
meaning of national and racial categories and boundaries. These lives demonstrate how the 
tensions in the borderlands and margins contain powerful currents that can illuminate and alter 
the mainstreams” (Murphy-Shigematsu 6). While not sharing Murphy-Shigematsu’s style or 
organization, this project does share his hope that analyzing stories—in this case, stories of 
mixed race U.S. women—can provide similarly strong enlightenment. 
2. Intersectional framework 
 The second major component of my critical methodology in this project is 
intersectionality. Teresa Kay Williams writes, “Why must we assert our multiraciality to the 
exclusion of our age, gender, class, sexuality, physical abilities, or documented status in a 
country? As the biracial population continues to grow and a biracial-multiracial consciousness is 
heightened, these questions and the need for their solutions become more stubbornly pertinent” 
(96). Intersectionality directly answers Williams’s question, contending that human beings are 
not one-dimensional, but rather that each individual exists at the intersection of a multiplicity of 
dimensions or identities. Jennifer C. Nash defines “intersectionality” as “the notion that 
subjectivity is constituted by mutually reinforcing vectors of race, gender, class, and sexuality” 
and notes that it “has emerged as the primary theoretical tool designed to combat feminist 
hierarchy, hegemony, and exclusivity” (2). In “Re-Thinking Intersectionality,” Nash considers 
three major contributions that intersectionality has made to race studies and women’s studies 
since the popularization of the term and the concept by critical race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Nash, intersectionality “subverts race/gender 
binaries in the service of theorizing identity in a more complex fashion”; it “aspires to provide a 
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vocabulary to respond to critiques of identity politics”; and it “invites scholars to come to terms 
with the legacy of exclusions of multiply marginalized subjects from feminist and anti-racist 
work, and the impact of those absences on both theory and practice” (2-3). Intersectionality 
counteracts the temptation to oversimplify identity, particularly in cases in which the identity or 
identities in question are shaped by multiple, simultaneous oppressions, such as those historically 
experienced by many mixed race U.S. women. 
 Nash notes that, despite the positive contributions of intersectionality to identity politics 
and theory, intersectionality can be problematic as a methodology, mostly because its actions and 
functions as a methodology have remained largely (but not completely) undefined. Nash draws 
heavily on the work of Leslie McCall to explore three versions of intersectional methodology: 
anticategorical complexity, intracategorical complexity, and intercategorical complexity (Nash 5-
6). In anticategorical complexity, “scholars […] call attention to the social processes of 
categorization, and the workings of exclusion and hierarchy that mark boundary-drawing and 
boundary maintenance” (Nash 5). In intracategorical complexity, “scholars […] problematize the 
exclusionary repercussions of the act of categorization and use multiply marginalized subjects’ 
experiences as ways of demonstrating the inadequacy of categories” (Nash 5). In intercategorical 
complexity, scholars “expose the relationships between inequality and the categories themselves, 
and […] use categories strategically in the service of displaying the linkages between categories 
and inequality” (Nash 6). All three of these intersectional methodologies focus on critiquing 
categories and highlighting the oppression and insufficiency of categorical systems. In this way, 
they overlap heavily with the goals of Critical Mixed Race Studies, Third World feminisms, 
Third Wave feminisms, and synthetic feminism, all of which seek to change or dismantle 
inadequate, confining systems of racial and/or gender categorization.  
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 As a corollary to intersectionality, this project recognizes not only that identity is made 
up of many interconnected layers, but also that a person’s positionality within those layers—her 
point(s) of intersection—is not fixed, but rather remains in continual flux. Describing her theory 
of identity according to mestiza consciousness, Anzaldúa writes, “La mestiza constantly has to 
shift out of habitual formations; […]. [She] copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a 
tolerance for ambiguity” (Borderlands 101). Rather than conforming to duality, to a black-white 
binary that has no room for the third space she claims, “She has a plural personality, she operates 
in a pluralistic mode—nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, 
nothing abandoned” (Anzaldúa, Borderlands 101). This pluralism requires an inherently 
intersectional mindset, argues Mariana Ortega: “Recognition of the multiplicity of the self 
requires an understanding of the complex ways in which the self’s various social identities 
intersect or intermesh, recognizing the manner in which different axes of oppression are 
intertwined, and considering this self’s flexibility” (71). Anzaldúa theorizes that mestiza 
consciousness goes beyond merely tolerating multiplicity and paradoxes: “Not only does [the 
mestiza] sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else” (101). Denied a 
place by others, she carves it out herself from the existing exclusive structure. 
 Chela Sandoval points out that the individual inhabiting mestiza consciousness can 
manipulate her positionality and consciousness to suit her changing circumstances. This 
“oppositional consciousness […] travels differentially but with literacy across and through 
cultural spaces: it is a mobile, flexible, diasporic force that migrates between contending 
ideological systems” and “functions like a compass: a pivoting center capable of drawing circles 
of varying circumference, depending on the setting” (30). Ortega expresses a similar idea, 
writing that “The multiplicitous self is intersectional, flexible, and tactical” (71). Through 
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exclusion and constraint, the oppressed have learned to take differences that the dominant culture 
used to justify oppression, and to repurpose these differences into sources of creativity and 
empowerment. 
3. Feminist psychoanalysis 
 Understanding individuals’ racial identifications and the effects of these identifications 
on their relationships requires close attention to and analysis of the attending psychological 
dynamics. In adopting feminist psychoanalysis, I eschew the outdated, patriarchal, strictly 
Freudian or Lacanian models. Instead, I am turning to more recently theorized feminist 
psychoanalysis as a continually evolving contemporary lens with which to focus on 
psychological factors at work in a given situation. Specifically, as noted previously, I am 
applying Kristeva’s theories of abjection—supplemented by Kelly Oliver, Linda Alcoff, Judith 
Butler, Sara Ahmed, and others—to sites of racial conflict. 
 Psychoanalysis offers numerous insights into racial identification in general, and to 
mixed race identifications in particular. Race mixing, in addition to blurring the boundaries of 
traditional racial categorizations (regardless of the exact schema), has also complicated 
traditional visual/phenotypical signifiers of racial identity. Badia Sahar Ahad contends, “To 
remove racial meaning from its visual trappings necessitates that race be reassessed as a largely 
psychic mode of subjectivity” (134). If race, like gender, is, in a certain sense, performative, then 
understanding a person’s racial identification(s) entails understanding the stage directions for 
that performance—the conscious and unconscious ideas and motivations underlying the person’s 
race-performing behaviors. Use of psychoanalytic critique in this way yields positive results for 
this project, in that it both plausibly explains the complexities of the situations examined, and it 
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provides a viable model that can elucidate similar narratives of mixed race mother-daughter 
conflict. 
Structure 
 In this project, I examine race-based abjection between mothers and their differently 
raced daughters in multiple iterations. Within the context of each relationship, I have chosen to 
address abjections by mothers before turning to their daughters: as the only adults at the onset of 
the relationship, these mothers start out with far greater power than their not-yet-grown 
daughters; often, the daughters’ later abjections of their mothers are at least partly a response to 
things the mothers have said and done. Furthermore, daughters, depending on their age, might 
not yet have formed a concept of “race” or even difference by the time the mothers begin 
enacting their abjections. The project follows a loosely chronological organization, beginning in 
the Jim Crow era, specifically 1950s segregation. I start with the most physically extreme and 
visible of my examples, in Chapter 1: Secret Mother.  This chapter tells the story of Norma 
Storch, an aspiring white actress who had a daughter with a black comedian and who, according 
to the subtitle of that daughter’s 2006 memoir, “Gave Her Away” (Cross, Secret Daughter). 
Unwilling to give her daughter up fully, Storch feared the socioeconomic consequences of being 
known to have a daughter who was not wholly white. Storch acted on feelings of race-based 
abjection by sending the girl to live with a black family and, while remaining a part of the 
daughter’s life, refusing for nearly forty years to acknowledge that they were biological mother 
and daughter. Chapter 2: Secret Daughter flips the narrative and explains how that daughter, 
journalist and documentarian June Cross, responded to her mother’s abjection with race-based 
abjection of her own.  
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 Chapter 3: Secret Genealogy begins in the same early/mid-twentieth century time period 
as Chapters 1 and 2, so the social context that forms the basis for the first of its abjections is, 
broadly speaking, somewhat similar to that of the chapters immediately preceding. In Chapter 3, 
I turn to Louise Erdrich’s iconic Pauline “Sister Leopolda” Puyat character and show how she 
simultaneously embodies both maternal and filial race-based abjection, constructing a racial 
identity that rejects both her mother and her daughter as being Indian, while viewing herself as 
white. In addressing three generations of Puyat women, though focusing on the middle 
generation, this chapter spans the twentieth century, thus providing a bridge between rather 
different social climates for what we now call “mixed race” identity in the U.S. Finally, Chapter 
4: Secret Abjection takes up the idea of race-based abjection between mother and daughter after 
Loving v. Virginia, the 1967 Supreme Court ruling that legalized interracial marriage and, 
through the offspring of these now-legal unions, opened the door for modern notions of 
multiracialism and mixed race identity. Absent the legal constraints and the degree of social 
pressure that had led Storch to abject Cross, mixed race mother-daughter dyads after 1967 had 
little need to separate physically from one another as racial contaminants. Instead, in the cases of 
Elizabeth and Ruby in Joan Steinau Lester’s Mama’s Child, Sandy and Birdie in Danzy Senna’s 
Caucasia, and real-life author-activists Alice and Rebecca Walker, race-based abjection led to 
objectification of daughters by their mothers and vice versa.  
 I conclude by asking what the implications of this intimate, race-based abjection might be 
for mothers and their differently raced daughters. Here, I take Oliver’s Witnessing as a guide to a 
potential solution: specifically, Oliver’s call to “Love, born from critical reinterpretation, [that] is 
the affirmation of our relationship to the world and other people” (Witnessing 221). Contrary to 
historically prevailing social attitudes, claiming a different racial identification from that of one’s 
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mother or daughter need not threaten anyone’s identity, racial or otherwise. By re-viewing racial 
difference as an opportunity for closeness, rather than a loss of what, in singly raced contexts, is 
expected or assumed sameness, mixed race mothers and daughters provide themselves a means 
of weathering race-related crises provoked by a society still enmeshed in racial hierarchies and 
the false dichotomy of racial “purity.” 
 The spectrum of possible responses to race-based abjection ranges from the least healthy 
and least successful to the most. This project presents a range of options, from traumatic 
rejections and physical separations to reliance on imperfect racial awareness that keeps one 
intellectually informed about, but not necessarily emotionally tuned in to, the differing racial 
realities of one another. These are by no means the only ways to address our unconscious, 
socially engendered racial biases. Radical love, specifically radical love that bears witness,11 
                                                          
11Numerous acclaimed scholars and writers, particularly in the fields of Women’s Studies and 
Critical Mixed Race Studies, have pointed to “love” or “radical love” as the ideal motivation and 
methodology for their work. By “love,” they typically mean some sort of willing connection 
between the self and that which is not the self.  
 In addition to her previously cited description of love as “the affirmation of our 
relationship to the world and other people” (Witnessing 221), Oliver defines love as “an 
openness to otherness” (Witnessing 220). Chela Sandoval, meanwhile, finds a consensus among 
key thinkers in her Methodology of the Oppressed: “Third world writers such as Guevara, Fanon, 
Anzaldúa, Emma Pérez, Trinh Minh-ha, or Cherríe Moraga, to name only a few, similarly 
understand love as a ‘breaking’ through whatever controls in order to find ‘understanding and 
community’: […] it is defined as Anzaldúa’s coatlicue state, which is a ‘rupturing’ in one’s 
everyday world that permits crossing over to another” (140). For these latter writers, love is 
indeed Oliver’s “openness to otherness”; however, as Third World and postcolonial critics, they 
also believe that some measure of decolonization must take place before that openness can be 
fully achieved. According to them, the enduringly oppressive society bequeathed by the 
colonizers has divided people into rigid, unequal categories, such as the racial hierarchy, and 
individuals must overcome the sociocultural power of these categories in order to be open to and 
connect with people in other categories.  
 Andrew Jolivétte, in his call for Critical Mixed Race Studies to adopt radical love as a 
founding principle of the field, points out that these categories not only divide, but can provide a 
sense of security. The work involved in breaking down prejudices—both in oneself and in 
others—overcoming systemic social and cultural barriers, and then opening oneself to what at 
that point is still an unknown other is what makes such love radical: “Radical love is about being 
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seems a promising solution, and one that is in keeping with the border-crossing ethos of Critical 
Mixed Race Studies. I do not pretend, however, that it is the only strategy available for dealing 
with these prejudices. 
Potential Applications/Usefulness of This Work 
 Neither the conflicts discussed nor the attributions to race-based abjection in this project 
should be read as representing all—or even the majority of—mixed race mother-daughter 
relationships. In literature and in real life, many differently raced mothers and daughters relate to 
each other in far less dysfunctional ways and instead build healthy, loving relationships. (Rena 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
vulnerable. It is being unafraid to speak out about issues that may not have a direct impact on us 
on a daily basis. Radical love is caring enough to admit when we are wrong and to admit 
mistakes” (157). Radical love requires humility and strength, not on behalf of oneself, but on 
behalf of the beloved. 
 All of these writers perceive love to mean embracing significant social responsibility. 
Oliver writes that the “openness to otherness […] requires reflection as a turn toward others. It 
requires the insomnia of a vigilance that recognizes the urgency of opening to what is beyond 
recognition” (Witnessing 220). For Oliver, the openness of love is not passive, because it is the 
foundation for bearing witness to the experiences of the other. Sandoval, speaking of the same 
group of writers that she referenced above, continues: “These writers who theorize social change 
understand ‘love’ as a hermeneutic, as a set of practices and procedures that can transit all 
citizen-subjects, regardless of social class, toward a differential mode of consciousness and its 
accompanying technologies of method and social movement” (140). Likewise, Sandoval herself 
advocates a hermeneutic of love, a critical approach that dismantles colonizing influences in 
order to allow true connection with people outside one’s own categories and experiences. 
Jolivétte is perhaps the most specific in his explanation of what radical love means for one’s 
actions and attitudes in society: “Radical love should ask how does the work in which we are 
engaged help to build respectful relationships between ourselves and the others involved in 
social justice movements. Radical love asks if we are each being responsible in fulfilling our 
individual roles and obligations to the other participants in the struggle for social justice and 
human rights” (157). Jolivétte then describes his vision of the operation of radical love in Critical 
Mixed Race Studies: “Finally, radical love in critical mixed race studies means asking ourselves 
if what we are contributing is giving back to the community and is strengthening the relationship 
of all of those involved in the process” (157). For all of these writers, radical love is a social 
imperative that involves acceptance, respect, and alliance—a commitment to fight for justice and 
the rights of others. 
 In the context of this project, I am using “radical love” to describe a similar commitment 
to acceptance, respect, and alliance between mother and daughter, regardless of whether one 
identifies with the other’s experience(s) or position(s).  
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and her mother in Charles Chesnutt’s The House Behind the Cedars come to mind, as do Yumi 
and her mother in Cristina García’s I Wanna Be Your Shoebox.) 
 Nor is conflict in mixed race mother-daughter relationships necessarily due to race-based 
abjection, or any other race-related cause. The multifaceted nature of deep, longstanding conflict 
means there are likely multiple causes, some or all of which might have nothing to do with race. 
Mixed race mother-daughter relationships are still susceptible to most of the conflicts 
experienced by mother-daughter dyads who do not view themselves as being racially different 
from one another. To equate all tension between a mother and her differently raced daughter to 
race-based abjection would be reductive. 
Critical Mixed Race Studies 
 Studying race-based abjection in the context of differently raced mothers and daughters 
matters for several reasons:  
1. First, it illuminates a race-related cause of conflict that can destroy even the closest 
relationships in a mixed race family, as seen in a variety of mixed race U.S. women’s 
narratives, both fiction and memoir. 
2. In addition to explicating mixed race-related mother-daughter conflicts that result in 
geographical separation, child abandonment, and objectification, this study sets up a 
framework for further explorations, particularly the intersection of racial/ethnic 
difference between mothers and mixed race daughters with conflicting constructions 
of femininity. 
3. Even though I focus on abjections, I conclude by offering a strategy that mothers and 
their differently raced daughters can employ to prevent or mitigate such abjections. 
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4. The project helps to broaden current conversations in Critical Mixed Race Studies. 
Arts and scholarship addressing individual identity development overwhelmingly 
dominate Critical Mixed Race Studies—and with good reason. Scholars, artists, and 
activists who work in this subfield have laid (and continue to lay) a crucial foundation 
for new projects, such as this one, that deal primarily with individuals but are 
externally focused, as opposed to internally. Instead of asking, “If someone is of 
mixed race, how will that identity affect her understanding of herself?,” this project 
questions, “If someone is of mixed race, how will that identity affect other people’s 
understanding of her, and her understanding of them? Are there certain relational 
dynamics that result from her mixed race identification, and if so, are they exclusive 
to that identification?”  
 In exploring the intersection of mixed race, female, and feminist identities, my project 
aligns with the latest critical developments in this emerging field. The interest in a project such 
as mine can be inferred from scholarly explorations like Caroline A. Streeter’s 2012 Tragic No 
More: Mixed-Race Women and the Nexus of Sex and Celebrity, Habiba Ibrahim’s 2012 
Troubling the Family: The Promise of Personhood and the Rise of Multiracialism, and the Asian 
American Literary Review’s Fall 2013 and Spring 2014 nationwide Mixed Race Initiative, whose 
six “digital labs” included one specifically devoted to “mixed race feminism(s)” 
("Opportunities"). Even more recently, the 2018 Critical Mixed Race Studies Association 




 Additionally, this project or portions of this project may be of interest to scholars in 
women’s studies, African American studies, Asian American studies, Latinx studies, and Native 
American studies, since I will be drawing extensively from and theorizing about literature from 
all of these fields. 
Women’s studies, especially women of color feminisms 
 Focusing this study on mother-daughter relationships highlights the profound effects of 
such relationships, and therefore the potentially great consequences of disrupting such 
relationships with the added stress of racial or ethnic difference. As Karen Fingerman notes, 
“Gender […] plays a key role in the emotional qualities of parent/child ties. Regardless of where 
they live, women are more likely to maintain strong ties to their parents and their children than 
are men. […] Few relationships endure with the strength of the mother/daughter tie throughout 
life” (xv). More specifically, “women who lack a partner turn to their children, and particularly 
to their daughters for solace and support,” whereas “Daughters, more often than sons, retain 
intimate ties to their families of origin throughout adulthood. […] women are socialized to value 
their families and to invest in generations above and below them. From childhood on, girls are 
taught to remain close to their mothers” (Fingerman xvi). These statements are generalizations, 
not absolutes, but they show the pervasiveness and cultural import of investing the mother-
daughter relationship with particular value. 
 Conclusions drawn from a mother-daughter study need not be limited to mothers and 
daughters in their applicability. Rather, these relationships provide an entry point for further 
theorization about family units and their individual members, regardless of gender identification. 
Fingerman explains,  
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the mother/daughter tie is important not only to the participants involved, but to 
the larger kinship network in which it is embedded. Given the central role of the 
mother/daughter tie in family functioning, the emotional complexities of this 
relationship may provide insights into the family as a whole. Mothers and 
daughters who maintain stronger ties may foster closer ties to other kin. By 
contrast, when mothers and daughters are upset with one another, their feelings 
may taint family gatherings and other relationships. (xvi)  
 
Mother-daughter relationships are important not only to the mothers and daughters themselves, 
but also to all other family members, because their causes and consequences affect more than 
just the mothers and daughters. If a mother and/or her daughter engage in race-based abjection of 
one another, the whole family suffers; likewise, if the mother-daughter relationship is healthy, 
the whole family is strengthened. 
Summary 
 Being part of a mixed race family carries certain opportunities and complications 
specifically tied to the combination of intimacy and racial difference. Some, but not all, of these 
considerations present unique difficulties, such as the impossibility of the (assumed) racial 
homogeneity that typifies singly raced families and is the default societal expectation in the U.S. 
Racial hierarchies and colorism can infect the family ethos of both multiply and singly raced 
families, as can other norms like the assumption that mothers and daughters will have similar 
bodies and racialized experiences. Failing to meet these norms can strain relationships among 
mothers and daughters (and/or other family members) and cause them to abject one another, as in 
the texts I examine in my project’s chapters. Family members are not without recourse, but in 







CHAPTER 1: SECRET MOTHER 
 
 In 1958, Norma Booth and her four-year-old daughter, June, left New York City to visit 
friends in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Norma returned to New York alone. An aspiring actress, she 
had recently noticed young June’s darkening skin with concern. June’s father, famed black 
comedian Jimmy Cross, had been an abusive partner and a deadbeat father, and Norma had left 
him years ago. She and June had lived on their own ever since, a single white mother struggling 
to raise a daughter whose curly hair and increasingly dark skin were a liability in the mid-1950s 
U.S.  
 Fearing the consequences for her career if her relationship to June became public 
knowledge, Norma decided to give her daughter to an African American couple, Paul and Peggy 
Bush, to raise. She tried to justify this move by arguing that “Aunt Peggy” and “Uncle Paul” 
could integrate June into their African American community, providing stability and preparing 
the girl in ways that Norma, ensconced in white privilege, could never think of to deal with the 
racism of midcentury U.S. society. But June’s welfare was not the only reason for the separation: 
small-town Norma loved the glamour and excitement of the New York City entertainment 
industry. She didn’t want to give up her chance to move permanently into this upper-class society 
by becoming a star—or marrying one. 
 After that autumn 1958 trip, although Norma would always remain an active part of 
June’s world, she would never be her full-time, year-round parent again. 
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Introduction 
 This chapter is situated in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, before Loving v. 
Virginia proclaimed interracial marriage to be legal throughout the U.S. Within this context, it 
deals with women who occupy privileged positions in their communities’ respective color 
hierarchies. Using the real-life example of journalist June Cross, I argue that when the 
relationship between a thus-privileged mother and her mixed-race daughter lacks sufficient 
family and/or social support—a common situation in the years before Loving—the mother, in a 
reflection of her hostile social context, can react to real or supposed racial differences between 
herself and her daughter by physically abjecting the daughter and excluding her from the 
maternal home; the daughter can similarly respond by emotionally abjecting the mother and 
possibly, depending on her power and resources, physically abjecting her as well. 
Separation and abjection 
 Separation is the ultimate goal of abjection; one abjects that which one no longer desires 
or with which one can no longer tolerate any sort of relationship or connection. The separation 
caused by abjection is an unavoidable element of human experience; as Kelly Oliver notes, 
“Human life, human society is founded on the abject separation of one body from another at 
birth, a separation, like subsequent ones, that is labored but necessary” (Subjectivity without 
Subjects 60-61). To be a subject, one must first be abject. To continue as a subject, one must 
continue to abject. 
 Because the abject by definition represents a threat to the boundaries and borders of the 
self, and thereby to the self’s identity, becoming/being not-abject is a basic function of the 
instinct towards self-preservation. Oliver summarizes Julia Kristeva’s thinking thus: “to set up 
your own clean and proper identity as a self, it is necessary to jettison certain threatening 
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elements from your own identity. Those elements are the borderline qualities that threaten any 
identity” (Subjectivity without Subjects 50). Delineating between “I” and “not-I” is how one 
ensures that “I” can continue to exist. Whether dealing with a corpse or with spoiled food—
Kristeva’s two most famous examples of abjection—the core process is the same: upon realizing 
one’s connection to the abject, one immediately moves to sever that connection. This impulse 
explains why one might involuntarily avert one’s eyes from a deceased human body, as Kristeva 
points out (Kristeva 3-4). The same impulse violently propels spoiled food from the stomach, 
vomiting out potential poison before it can become one with the body.  
 These rejections and separations are neither happy nor calm; rather, they gain power from 
the degree to which the abjector feels threatened. The negative energy inherent in abjection is 
such that Kristeva titled her primary treatise on abjection Pouvoirs de l’horreur (“Powers of 
Horror”), highlighting above all else the intensity of the fear and revulsion that coalesce to 
initiate the cycle of abjection. It should also be noted that the abjector’s perception of the extent 
of a threat is not necessarily the same as the extent to which the abjector actually is threatened. 
Ideally, abjection is an intervention by which one saves oneself from harm. In practice, it can 
destroy opportunities, relationships, and overall quality of life, becoming more harmful than the 
thing that was abjected. 
 In the United States, racially oriented abjective separation has manifested as a series of 
repeated, evolving race-based segregations. African American enslavement, genocide of 
Indigenous peoples, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Jim Crow laws, Japanese internment 
camps, anti-Latinx immigration rhetoric—all have had their roots in fears by the abjecting 
race(s) that the abjected race(s) might otherwise infiltrate and/or destroy their abjectors (usually, 
but not exclusively, the dominant white race). These long-term, macro-level abjections have 
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been carried out via millions of individual actors making countless situationally dependent 
choices and actions based on their widely shared but still-local social norms. For example, on 
this micro level, individuals other than white males have traditionally been strongly discouraged 
from engaging in interracial sex. Consequences for miscegenation have ranged at various times 
from disownment by one’s family, to public condemnation, to social ostracism, to loss of U.S. 
citizenship, to imprisonment, to torture and death.  
 Even after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1967 legalization of interracial marriage, social and 
cultural dictates continued to frown on interracial sexual unions and on the products of these 
unions. These dictates have eased significantly in the fifty years since Loving v. Virginia, but 
remain powerful enough that news media still regularly report on the release of studies showing 
increases in the rates of interracial marriage, as well as in social acceptance of interracial 
marriage; despite the growth of such rates and acceptance, they remain relatively rare and 
apparently newsworthy events. 
 As stated in my introduction to this project, I am examining ways in which racial 
difference can complicate relationships between mothers and their daughters. Cultural context 
matters a great deal in determining what each party considers her options, and often her goals, to 
be. A mother who has previously occupied a relatively high position in her community’s racial 
hierarchy may find herself unprepared, unable, or unwilling to stand up to a society that abjects 
her racially different daughter and also, by association and possibly for the first time ever in her 
experience, the mother herself. The more widespread and open the hostility among races in that 
community, the stronger the social pressures will be upon the mother to realign herself with her 
community and echo their abjection of her daughter. Practical considerations and concern for the 
daughter’s interest may increase the mother’s perceived need to separate from her daughter, as 
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she may fear for her daughter’s (and possibly her own) safety, stability, and socioeconomic 
opportunities, should the two remain together. Thus, in the pre-Loving years, in particular, it was 
not unheard-of for a white or light-skinned mother to abject her darker-skinned daughter, up to 
and including physically removing the daughter from her home and erasing her from the family 
narrative. 
 In keeping with the paradoxical nature of abjection, a mother who has rejected a daughter 
in this way may choose to remain secretly a part of the daughter’s life. Her mixed-race daughter, 
meanwhile, may similarly choose to remove herself physically from her mother’s sphere of 
influence. In such instances, the separation and abjection between mother and daughter go 
beyond any separation and abjection that, from a psychoanalytic perspective, would normally be 
expected in a healthy mother-daughter relationship. Rather, the power and extent of the 
separation-attraction duality in these cases, which are marked not only by abjective emotions but 
also by literal and often long-term physical manifestations of the abjective impulses between 
mother and daughter, demonstrate a distinctive type of abjection, an extreme race-based 
matrilineal abjection.  
 Race-based matrilineal abjection differs from other forms of abjection in that it takes 
place exclusively among mothers and daughters and its abjective attitudes and events can be 
directly attributed to racial concerns in ways that would be irrelevant were race to present no 
differentiating factor in the relationship.12 In race-based matrilineal abjection, the cycle of 
                                                          
12Several other forms of race-based familial abjection exist, though most are beyond the scope of 
this project. Race-based patrilineal abjection is the masculine equivalent of race-based 
matrilineal abjection, in that it occurs between fathers and sons exclusively. Race-based 
maternal and paternal abjection are broader designators that denote instances of a mother or a 
father, respectively, abjecting a child of unspecified gender, who may or may not be similarly 
abjecting them; race-based matrilineal and patrilineal abjections are subsets of these, indicating 
not only some degree of mutuality in the abjections between parent and child, but also same-
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separation, pain, resentment, and attraction occurs on the parts of both mother and daughter, 
giving the abjection an enduring nature that can affect entire families for generations, particularly 
when the abjection is so extreme as to have had long-standing physical consequences; such 
legacies, many born in the decades and centuries before Loving, continue to shape racial and 
mixed-race discourses in the U.S. to this day.  
 These mother-daughter dyads face the barrier of unbalanced racial privilege, a barrier 
that, for whatever reason, they cannot or will not cross. The more privileged party might fear 
losing her privilege and place in her social hierarchy, while the less privileged party might resent 
her deprivileged state so much that she clings to it as an act of rebellion. When these mothers and 
daughters then physically separate in order to avoid racial association with one another, they 
support the same race-based power imbalance that assigned one to a higher level of privilege 
than the other in the first place. The result is an intimate, familial version of Gloria Anzaldúa’s 
struggle in “La Prieta”: 
It is difficult for me to break free of the Chicano cultural bias into which I was 
born and raised, and the cultural bias of the Anglo culture that I was brainwashed 
into adopting. It is easier to repeat the racial patterns and attitudes, especially 
those of fear and prejudice, that we have inherited than to resist them. […] I see 
Third World peoples and women not as oppressors but as accomplices to 
oppression by our unwittingly passing on to our children and our friends the 
oppressor’s ideologies. I cannot discount the role I play as accomplice, that we all 
play as accomplices, for we are not screaming loud enough in protest. (207) 
 
Rather than owning their transgression of racial categories, using it to demonstrate (inter)racial 
solidarity, and disrupting the racism of U.S. society, these women become complicit in their own 
oppression, ultimately perpetuating it for themselves and others. As Kristeva points out, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
gender relationships. Race-based maternal and paternal abjections, on the other hand, include 
cross-gender relationships, i.e. between mother and son or father and daughter, as does the catch-
all term race-based parental abjection. Race-based spousal, filial, and sibling abjections follow 
similar “race-based _______ abjection” terminological rules. 
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“abjection is elaborated through a failure to recognize its kin; nothing is familiar” (Kristeva 5). In 
refusing to recognize a mother or daughter as family, in abjecting her and choosing not to be 
familiar with her, the abjecting party rarely sees that she has become an agent of her own 
abjection: in abjecting her other, she abjects herself. 
Race-based Matrilineal Abjection: Norma Storch and June Cross 
 June Cross’s 2006 memoir, Secret Daughter: A Mixed-Race Daughter and the Mother 
Who Gave Her Away, provides a strong and poignant example of race-based matrilineal 
abjection. The book, an extension of Cross’s 1996 Emmy Award-winning Frontline 
documentary by the same title, is rooted in the anti-miscegenistic pre-Loving culture of the 
1950s, which in turn grew out of the violently segregated Jim Crow social structure of the early 
and mid-1900s. Cross describes the transgressive sexual relationship between Norma Booth and 
Jimmy Cross, noted at the beginning of this chapter, that led to the birth of June13 in early 1954. 
She follows June through her childhood and teen years spent torn between two drastically 
different locations and cultures: her respectable, middle-class African American home with Paul 
and Peggy Bush in Atlantic City, and her vacations to the glamorous, upper-class white world of 
her mother and celebrity stepfather, actor Larry Storch, in New York City/Hollywood. Cross 
details the pain, confusion, abandonment, alienation, resentment, bitterness, and eventual 
gratitude she felt during her formative years as she grappled with Norma’s decision to raise her 
secretly, by proxy. She also describes how this upbringing drove her to fight in her career as a 
journalist for justice and an end to silencing and marginalization. Her personal version of this 
battle became a quest for justice and recognition from Norma, and triumph was neither quick nor 
                                                          
13To differentiate between June Cross, adult memoirist/narrator, and June Cross, child/adult 
participant in the events of the memoir, I will use “Cross” to refer to the author persona and 
“June” to refer to the character. 
38 
easy. In fact, not until the release of the Secret Daughter documentary, when June Cross was 42 
years old, did Norma acknowledge to the world that she was her biological daughter. 
 Throughout the book and the documentary, both Norma and June demonstrate a strong 
but deeply conflicted love for each other. Cross juxtaposes Norma’s delight in baby June with 
her semi-abandonment of the child just a few years later. Norma never fully let go, however, as 
she exchanged regular letters and phone calls with June and the Bushes, provided financial 
support to the Bushes for June’s care, and welcomed June back into her home for numerous 
weekend and summer visits. Yet, during these visits, Norma’s fear of being publicly linked to 
blackness was such that June was often forced to play the part of a niece or an adopted daughter, 
not Norma’s biological offspring. To be with her adored mother, the child had to deny her own 
identity. This dance between embrace and exclusion of June lasted nearly half of Norma’s life—
well over half of June’s—and presents a clear example of maternal abjection based on (mixed) 
race. June, too, continually alternates between identifying with and rejecting Norma, the 
daughter’s pendulum-like shifts in attitude towards her mother discernible even in Cross’s 
narrative voice as, at the age of 52, three years after Norma’s death, she publishes for the world 
her memories of her mother and their complicated relationship.  
Norma’s identification with June 
 According to Cross, during June's infant and toddler years, Norma seems to emphasize 
the likenesses between herself and her daughter, rather than their differences. Towards the 
beginning of the book, Cross recalls a nightly call-and-response in which her mother asks, 
“Who's got perfect little hands?” and young June crows delightedly, “We do!” (1). Through this 
ritual, Norma goes beyond telling June that their bodies are comprised of the same kinds of 
parts—that they both have noses and eyes, for example. Instead, she explores with June the 
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intricate details of how the parts of one echo the parts of the other. Cross continues, “We laughed 
over this, our shared proportions: our hands shaped alike—the pinkie exactly half the length of 
the ring finger, the index and ring fingers each a half inch shorter than the second digit, our nails 
shaped the same. Even the arches of our feet arced in the same curve, and our toes, too, had a 
similar square outline” (1-2). In silhouette, at least, Norma is able to identify her daughter as 
being in many ways a miniature version of herself. Furthermore, she embraces and revels in the 
similarities, teaching June to do the same. 
 It is possible that Norma’s embrace of June as her miniature is not an embrace of June at 
all, but an embrace of Norma’s own self, which she sees in June. However, narcissism does not 
preclude abjection; rather, it can enhance abjective impulses. Kristeva argues that narcissism, 
though commonly viewed as a state of self-love so deep as to appear a total embrace of what the 
narcissist insists is her perfect self, may not be so peaceful and self-accepting in reality. Kristeva 
states, “Abjection is therefore a kind of narcissistic crisis: it is witness to the ephemeral aspect of 
the state called ‘narcissism’ with reproachful jealousy, heaven knows why; what is more, 
abjection gives narcissism (the thing and the concept) its classification as ‘seeming’” (14). Given 
enough time, reality will not let narcissism go unchallenged. If and when the narcissist finds a 
flaw in her reflection, such as might occur if the reflection does not exactly replicate what the 
narcissist has already deemed to be the perfection of the self it is supposed to copy, the narcissist 
is then suddenly confronted by a thing that is like her and/or part of her yet completely 
undermines her carefully constructed image of herself—exactly the sort of primal threat that 
triggers abjection. In her initial description of abjection, Kristeva writes of being “On the edge of 
non-existence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me. There, 
abject and abjection are my safeguards” (2). People who do not suffer from narcissism will often 
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react to a threat against the integrity of the self by taking refuge in abjection. A narcissist’s 
pathological love of self can result in her not just fearing such threats, but developing a similarly 
pathological fear or phobia of them, causing her abjection to be stronger and/or more extreme. 
Thus, Norma might love June solely because she looks at June and sees herself; there are plenty 
of incidents in Cross’s narratives that could support such a reading. This narcissism would make 
Norma’s abjection of her mixed-race daughter more likely, however, since June has her own 
identity, racially and otherwise, and neither can nor should be her mother. 
 Whether loving, narcissistic, or both, Norma's ability to identify her daughter's body with 
her own is facilitated at first partly by her own naïveté. During her pregnancy, Norma seeks 
advice from Peggy Bush about what to expect for her unborn child. Peggy gravely explains the 
discrimination facing African Americans in the 1950s in general and “the tragedies that befell 
children who were the products of mixed parentage” in particular (Cross 283), whereupon 
Norma enters a state of denial. She later tells June, “Peggy kept telling me how hard it would be 
for you, […] And I'm sure I was polite and nodded very nicely, but I didn't believe it. You were 
going to pass. That's what I decided. […] You would be born light enough to pass, and I would 
leave Jimmy and raise you on my own—in other words, this Negro thing would never be a 
problem” (284). Unable to cope with the revelations of the extent of her own white privilege and 
her child's near-certain lack of such privilege, Norma resorts to magical thinking: she will simply 
will her child into whiteness. 
 Norma accordingly goes to the hospital and births June alone, without Jimmy around to 
reveal June's mixed-race parentage to the medical staff. Consequently, June's birth certificate, 
filled out by the attending nurses, records June's race as “white.” The adult June recalls how 
Norma turned her version of June's origin story into an oral tradition between mother and 
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daughter, focusing on identification and sameness: “Every year on my birthday, Mom would 
describe the first moment she saw me, when the nurses put me in her arms and she held my foot 
in her palm and saw that it was a miniature version of her foot, and she said that she fell in love 
with me immediately” (285). This narrative of June's birth story foreshadows the nightly routine 
Norma and June would later practice, together examining the outlines of their hands.  
 More importantly for the new mother, it seems that the anxiety and uncertainty haunting 
her pregnancy are resolved by the birth of a child who takes after her in every way, including 
skin color. She tells Cross, “You were white, […] so I was very happy. You were the same color 
as I am, just a shade darker, perhaps. Like an olive, you know, instead of a redhead, which I 
was” (Cross 285). Six weeks after the birth, Peggy Bush comes to visit Norma and the newborn, 
bringing her beloved camera along so she can take June's first pictures. Cross relates Norma's 
relief and delight: “‘Isn't it wonderful, Peggy?’ Mom told her triumphantly. ‘She'll be light 
enough to pass!’” (285). Once again, Peggy is left to reveal what will become for Norma a bitter 
truth: “Aunt Peggy looked up as she focused the Rolleiflex. ‘They get darker as they get older, 
honey,’ she […] warned” (285). Although June’s skin is like Norma’s now, it will not stay that 
way. Abjection, as noted earlier, takes place when the self encounters something that is so close 
to it and yet so opposed that it threatens the self’s identity by potentially destabilizing its 
boundaries. This is the situation with which Norma is faced upon hearing and eventually seeing 
that June’s skin, originally that “just a shade darker, perhaps,” than her own, will become what 
she and her society believe to be her racial antithesis. If June’s skin can change from white like 
Norma’s to black like Jimmy’s in just a few years, it could call into question everything that 
Norma believes she knows about where the boundary line between white and black lies—and 
whether it even matters. 
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 Cross’s exact description of this exchange between Norma and Peggy, of which she 
likely has no personal memory, having been just six weeks old at the time, also merits closer 
analysis. In Cross’s portrayal, Peggy alone sees June clearly, through focusing the lenses of both 
her camera and her years of observation and lived experience as an African American woman. 
Norma sees her daughter, but only in the present, whereas Peggy sees June's present and her 
future. The parallels continue: since Peggy had her own darkroom, it is likely that after this 
session she took the exposed film home with her in order to develop the negatives into 
photographs herself, just as she would later take the four-year-old June, exposed by her darkened 
skin as an African American, into her Atlantic City home, developing the girl from a confused 
child into a strong African American woman. 
 With Norma's expressions of identification with June built so much on bodily 
appearances, one might think that her identification of June with herself would end when Norma 
could no longer deny their physical differences. According to Norma, though, her physical 
separation from June never entails a psychological one. Many years after leaving June with the 
Bushes, and despite repeated public denials of June as her biological daughter, Norma continues 
to claim moments of self-identification with her. In a 1985 letter to June, for example, Norma 
writes, “I see myself in you (I guess that's the parent tree) only better and more true to my early 
dreams” (Cross 243). Cross remembers another occasion in which Norma stubbornly refuses to 
cooperate in the making of the Secret Daughter documentary. Exasperated, June blurts out, 
“God, you remind me of myself!,” to which Norma immediately responds, “I should. I am you!” 
(262). Yet for Norma, seeing herself in her daughter will never be enough; the identification 
needs to be mutual. She at one point admits to Cross, “I've always wanted you to identify with 
me so much, and I'd say, ‘Well, you're just like me.’ You know, because I wanted you to feel 
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close to me always, because you didn't live with me, and I wanted that bond. I never wanted that 
bond broken” (285). In her guilt over a lifetime of mother and daughter seeing one another only 
occasionally, Norma longs for June, like Norma, to see the mother in the daughter—and to see 
that she has been there all along. 
 The adult Cross views many of these proclamations with skepticism. Some she portrays 
as mere posturing on Norma's part: “‘I don't see you as a black woman when I look at you,’ she 
protested, almost making me believe her. ‘I see you as mine, all mine. I don't see Jimmy in you 
at all’” (5).14 Decades of differences between Norma’s treatment of June and her treatment of 
June’s white half-brother, Lary, give June plenty of reason to doubt her mother’s claims. After 
all, Lary was never forced to deny that Norma was his mother. Lary, who had lived with Norma 
and Jimmy when they were together, is sent away for a time but taken back when Norma’s 
situation stabilizes; June is never more than a month-long guest in her mother’s home.  
                                                          
14For Norma, “Jimmy” might encode not just blackness, but drunkenness and beatings; however, 
that added layer of meaning does not negate her original syntactical equation of Jimmy with 
blackness. Contextually, the conversation is about race, and it is Norma, not June, who brings 
Jimmy into the discussion to symbolize a racial identity opposed to her own. Whether Norma 
uses “Jimmy” to signify only blackness, thus stating that she sees no blackness in June, or 
whether Norma also equates “Jimmy” with trauma and abuse, potentially reframing her comment 
as one pertaining to June’s identity on a moral plane instead of racial, the fact remains that she 
cites Jimmy as her own antithesis and uses him to represent a deep negativity that she had 
associated with blackness mere sentences before. The possible intermediary steps of “Jimmy” 
meaning “violence” and “violence” meaning “blackness” do not change the end result in this 
case. Neither Norma nor Cross ever blame Jimmy for Norma’s decision to send June away, 
either—in fact, it took Norma longer to escape Jimmy and his abuse than it might have had she 
not been set on keeping then-two-year-old June with her, a mindset that remained for at least the 
next year, until it became clear that continuing to acknowledge her would have increasingly 
drastic consequences on Norma’s own social and financial prospects. 
 It should not be overlooked that Cross, the other participant in the conversation, clearly 
interprets the juxtaposition to be evidence of Norma saying “Jimmy” and meaning “blackness.” 
The use of “Jimmy” as a euphemism for “blackness” between her and Norma is further 
established elsewhere in the text, as in the passage I will cite next, where, given June’s interest in 
social justice, it seems unlikely that she would insist on aligning herself with Jimmy if she 
believed that doing so would connote abuse for Norma instead of blackness. 
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 Still, Norma's declaration that she does not see Jimmy in her daughter may ironically be 
accidentally true, albeit not in the way Norma likely intended. By insisting that she sees only her 
own whiteness in June and none of June's equally integral blackness, Norma betrays an 
assumption that June will respond positively to this rewriting of her racial heritage. Norma may 
see June as racially equal to herself, or she may believe herself to be silently elevating June to an 
honorary all-white status through the strength of Norma's whiteness. Either way, Norma is blind 
to the blackness in June that has its own pride and value, a blackness that neither can nor should 
be bleached out of June's identity. Furthermore, she expects June to share these views and 
values. She does not consider that perhaps June would like her mother to see not only herself in 
the daughter, but also some of the father and his blackness. In fact, on another occasion, when 
June haltingly tells Norma, “there's a part of Jimmy that's here, that did not come from you […] 
and that's the part I've been pressing you to see. […] Can you embrace that part of me?,” Norma 
unwittingly shows how far she is from being able to understand June in this way: “‘Oh, of 
course,’ she replied. ‘Because, you're not . . . I mean, I don't think of you as being part of Jimmy. 
You're just yourself’” (285). Cross describes the effect of Norma's skewed vision as that of 
reducing June to “the dark shadow of [Norma's] alter ego” (247). Caught up in her fantasy of the 
perfect white daughter who is exclusively her own, Norma interposes this dream-image between 
herself and her real-life daughter. In doing so, she fails to see the black woman that June chooses 
to be. 
Norma’s (non-)identification with June’s blackness 
 Paradoxically, although Norma identifies June with Norma's own whiteness exclusively 
at times, at other times she seems to identify her just as exclusively with Jimmy's blackness. In a 
1964 letter to Peggy Bush, Norma indicates that June’s blackness even has the power to make 
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Norma black. After learning that her neighbors had petitioned to have her evicted because of 
June, she writes, “Boy, I tell you, it’s not easy being a negro [sic] in a white neighborhood. For 
I’m a negro now, I told that to Larry the other night. I carry all the sensitivity within me, because 
of June—what she is, I am” (Cross 86). Norma seems to be indicating to Peggy that if June does 
not belong in the white neighborhood, neither does she, and the mother pledges allegiance to the 
daughter to protect her from the neighbors. Notably, though, Norma does not move out of the 
neighborhood to join June, nor does she bring June back to live with her. The reality is that 
Norma is so far from understanding African American experiences of discrimination in 1964 that 
she fails to recognize how presumptuous and tactless it is for her to assume—much less to tell 
Peggy, who understands all too well what that discrimination feels like—that she does. 
 Expressions of racial solidarity with her daughter are the exception for Norma, not the 
rule, and when they do occur, they typically involve some element of involuntariness on 
Norma’s part. In the above example, Norma has no knowledge, much less any control, over the 
neighbors’ petition, which her landlord unceremoniously rejects before she ever hears about it 
(Cross 85). The neighbors, not Norma, are the ones who have determined that June’s race should 
mean Norma’s expulsion, and the landlord, not Norma, determines to let both stay. Another time, 
many years later, Norma chooses to stay silent, and someone else outs her. She tells Cross that, 
while at a dinner party, the man seated next to her “started talking about O. J. Simpson and how 
Nicole’s murder proves that race mixing doesn’t work. In other words, that Nicole Simpson got 
what was coming to her. Anyway, he went on and on, till finally our hostess said, ‘Stop that! 
Norma was married to a black man and has a black child’” (Cross 262). The man, who until this 
moment has been quietly friendly towards Norma, abruptly stops acknowledging her, which is 
all the justification Norma needs to affirm her decades-old public denial of June: “‘I don’t want 
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to be treated like that,’ she whined” (Cross 263). Somehow, she fails to see that just as the man 
had ignored her once he associated her with blackness, so she is ignoring her own daughter. 
 Another set of incidents suggests that Norma may have gone beyond reluctance or silent 
non-contradiction and instead actively undermined what could initially be read as racial 
solidarity with her daughter. Cross recalls being 3 or 4 and waiting in an ice cream shop to meet 
her mother’s then-boyfriend for the first time. The boyfriend, Colonel Dixon, arrives, sees her, 
and immediately begins to roar, “A nigger? You’ve got a nigger child?!,” whereupon Norma and 
June flee in tears (184). At first glance, this response might appear to be Norma sharing in the 
discrimination faced by her daughter. Upon further examination, fear—of the colonel’s yelling, 
not his prejudice—seems the more likely reason for Norma’s actions, especially since the fallout 
from Norma aligning herself with June in this case proves to be the opposite of solidarity: “It had 
been afterward, I think,” writes Cross, “that she started leaving me in Atlantic City” (185). As 
Cross frames it, what happened with the colonel seems directly connected to Norma’s 
subsequent rejection of her.  
 Although the text does not explicitly state this, if Cross’s timeline is correct, then close 
reading further suggests that Norma actually continued her relationship with Colonel Dixon after 
the ice cream shop encounter that preceded and perhaps triggered the Atlantic City trips. Letters 
from Norma show that in 1957, when June was 3, she left the girl in Atlantic City before 
traveling to do some temporary film or modeling work near Fort Benning, Georgia (Cross 25-
26). Thirty years later, Norma reveals to June that in reality, “There was no modeling 
assignment. […] That’s what I told Peggy so she wouldn’t think ill of me. I had gone to Fort 
Benning to visit an army colonel I was dating” (26). It is possible that Norma dated two racist 
army colonels that year; however, the more likely explanation seems to be that this colonel was 
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the infamous Colonel Dixon, especially given Norma’s memory of the words the unnamed Fort 
Benning army colonel used: “He told me he wouldn’t help raise a ‘nigger child,’” she tells Cross. 
“That’s what he called you. ‘A nigger child’” (26)—the same epithet Cross remembers from 
Colonel Dixon at the ice cream shop. In any case, Norma’s decision is clear. She takes June to 
the African American community where June would grow up and leaves her there in order to 
(re)turn to a white man who accepts her only if she comes to him without her little girl. 
Norma’s history of maternal re-/abjections 
 In turning June over to others to raise, Norma follows a pattern she has experienced 
before. Norma herself had been neglected and then abandoned by her own mother during her 
preteen years. During this time, Norma had lived in Idaho with her mother’s family and visited 
her mother in California during the summers, foreshadowing the schedule she would later keep 
with June (Cross 272). Even when Norma moved to California to be with her mother 
permanently, the mother continued to float in and out of her life for years at a time without 
warning. According to Norma’s New York Times obituary, “Her mother moved from place to 
place, married seven times or so, and from time to time vanished completely” (Martin). This 
unexplained absenteeism can explain Norma’s reaction upon finding out the subtitle of the Secret 
Daughter documentary, “A Mixed-Race Daughter and the Mother Who Gave Her Away”: “‘I 
didn’t give you away!’ she cried. ‘You always knew where I was!’” (Cross 287). Unlike her own 
mother, Norma takes care to communicate with June, writing daily letters or postcards and 
scheduling regular phone calls whenever she and June are apart. She consistently tells June about 
the places she visits; Cross reports eagerly anticipating kindergarten because she “wanted to 
learn how to find all the states on a map, so that I could always know where Mommie was” (33). 
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By staying in close contact, Norma tries desperately to mother her daughter better than she 
herself had been mothered, despite their physical distance. 
 June was not Norma’s only child, however, and Norma abandoned both her other 
daughter and her son at various times. Lary May, born when Norma was approximately 19, lived 
with Norma, with Norma’s mother, and then in foster care before returning to Norma as a 
teenager. Candace, Norma’s child with Larry Storch, was the product of a fling that preceded 
their marriage by thirteen years. She also spent time in foster care before being put up for 
adoption, finally being reunited with her birth parents more than forty years later (Cross 276-277, 
298). In both cases, as would happen later with June, Norma gave her children to people who 
might have been better equipped than she to meet their physical and emotional needs while she 
pursued her dreams of a career in acting (277). Unlike June, however, Lary and Candace were 
both white, so race was never a factor in their separations from Norma, whereas with June it was 
consistently presented as the single greatest barrier between daughter and mother. 
Norma’s rejection of blackness in general 
 In adolescence and adulthood, June would grow to understand that it was not society 
alone that rejected her blackness and forced the separation between her and her mother; Norma 
herself held many racially prejudiced views. Her behavior in the years before June’s birth might 
have belied this characterization, since she was generally more racially progressive than her 
family and community. Cross writes, “I had always wondered where my mother found the 
courage to begin an affair with a black man. I discovered that those seeds had been planted […] 
in Blackfoot, Idaho, where she was raised. In those days there were no blacks in southeastern 
Idaho—but there was plenty of prejudice. At the general store, the signs said, ‘No Dogs, No 
Indians, No Mexicans’” (269). In seeming contrast with her racist environment, little Norma had 
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chosen to play with the Native American children instead of the white children. She did this, 
however, in order to assert superiority, later reminiscing to Cross that “the Indian children, they 
were always so happy to do whatever I said. They let me be the leader” (270). Although the girl 
Norma had embraced non-white children as playmates, she had not done so as equals. 
 Norma’s teenage and young adult years reflected a similar racial bias, subtler than that of 
the surrounding culture, but present nevertheless. Norma’s stepfather during her teenage years 
was a German-born Nazi sympathizer who “would not let her greet the only black man in Long 
Beach—the shoeshine man. ‘Niggers and Jews are not to be spoken to,’ he told her. ‘They’re 
lower class’” (Cross 274). Norma defied many of her stepfather’s dictates, including the one 
about not greeting the shoeshine man, but her mother also held problematic racial and ethnic 
views. The U.S.’s entrance into WWII split the family, with the stepfather vanishing into an 
internment camp and the mother vanishing for five years, as well. Norma later learned that her 
mother had left and cut off communication during those years because she was secretly living 
with a Jewish man and did not want anyone, even her own daughter, to know (Cross 275-276). 
The mother’s stated attitude towards African Americans, meanwhile, was that “Negroes are 
okay, but you should never eat with them” (Cross 215), or, as Lary, June’s older brother, later 
explained to Cross, that “Negroes were a subclass of the poor: to be pitied and helped, but not 
socialized with” (276). When 29-year-old Norma informed her mother in a postscript to a letter 
that her wonderful new beau was black, the mother again cut off communication. Cross describes 
Norma’s own feelings surrounding the match and its ramifications at that time: “Living in New 
York with Jimmy, Mom felt as if she’d finally been freed from the locked car in which she’d 
lived her life. Finally, she had gained entry to the world of show business, even if it was as the 
consort of a black entertainer. She found that world of black show business, so foreign from 
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Idaho and Long Beach, fascinating, and she worked hard to blend in” (278). Norma loves Jimmy 
and his lifestyle, but she does so despite their blackness. Similarly, for years, she endures the 
racial slurs thrown at her and Jimmy because of their relationship, but later, in a moment of rage, 
she joins in them, screaming at Jimmy, “You’re just a nigger, and I hate you, and I’m going to 
leave!” (281, 286). Even though her racial attitudes are better than those of her family, they still 
involve plenty of prejudice. 
 In Norma’s later years, she would continue to reveal stereotypical beliefs she held about 
African Americans, often tactlessly sharing these beliefs with her African American daughter. 
During one conversation, Cross writes, Norma casually remarks, “You know, blacks and whites 
really do have different attitudes about life. Whites can be so uptight. Blacks, no matter what 
happens, they can find the joke. They’re so much more fun to be around” (241). A stronger, 
more deeply rooted belief, though, was Norma’s equation of blackness with poverty. She objects 
to June’s decision to live in Harlem, telling her, “You’re living in the wrong neighborhood” 
(Cross 246). At another point, she tries to explain this aversion: “Whenever I visited someone 
with Jimmy, the apartments were always so small, […] wallpaper peeling from the ceiling, heat 
not working, roaches—[…] They always made the best of it, but I didn’t want to live like that.” 
Cross interprets these statements to mean that for Norma, “‘black’ and ‘poverty’ were 
inextricably linked, and physical threat lay just around the corner” (246). On one hand, this 
connection is not surprising, given Norma’s mother’s similar belief; on the other hand, by this 
time, June herself, as well as many other African Americans, clearly do not live in poverty, so 
Norma’s continued belief in it seems thoughtless and strange. 
 By the time of Peggy Bush’s death in the early 1980s, Norma’s discomfort around black 
people, and her horror of being associated with them, are such that she does not attend Peggy’s 
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funeral. Cross remembers being unsurprised at Norma’s absence and knowing “something […] 
so accepted that its truth has never even been spoken: that my mother feared being the subject of 
nods and whispers […] my mother hated being reminded of the years she lived with my father, 
the hostile looks she got when she walked into bars with him” (Cross 236). Even though Norma 
had spent five years largely immersed in a black community with Jimmy, and even though she is 
the mother of a black daughter, she refuses to leave the comforts of whiteness ever again; she can 
give up her daughter, but not her race. In fact, the separation Norma maintains between herself 
and black people is so strict that Cross later refers to Norma’s first years with Jimmy as “Mom’s 
foreign holiday in the Negro world” (281). Meanwhile, June, abandoned by her white mother to 
mourn her black mother alone, is well aware that Norma’s “foreign holiday” was a once-in-her-
lifetime event. “I did not expect her [at the funeral],” Cross explains, “because the unspoken 
contract between us had always been that Peggy and I could cross into her world, but she did 
not—could not—would not—cross again into ours” (236). By this time, it is the 1980s, 
interracial marriage has been legal for well over a decade, and Jim Crow is no longer in effect, 
but Norma clings to the old divisions anyway—more so than she had during the 1940s and ’50s. 
She does not allow herself to cross racial lines for physical or even emotional connections. Cross 
recalls bitterly, “When she called, using her most sympathetic voice to tell me how sorry she felt 
about Peggy’s passing, she said, ‘I know how much she meant to you’; she did not add, ‘and how 
much she meant to me,’” an omission made all the more noticeable by the women’s friendship in 
the years surrounding June’s birth, when Norma’s love for Jimmy and June was still powerful 
enough to tie her to blackness (236). Norma later goes so far as to repudiate her love for Jimmy, 
telling June “that she had never loved my father. She had initially moved in with him because he 
was making money and she had no place else to go”—an assertion that Cross contends is belied 
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by Norma’s consistent solicitude about Jimmy after father and daughter are reunited (211). 
Perhaps Cross is wrong about her mother and Norma is telling the truth about having been 
desperate and vulnerable and never having loved the man who abused her. Regardless of how 
she had felt about Jimmy, his drinking and beatings had driven her away. In June’s case alone, 
Norma allows a connection between her and blackness to remain, and then only selectively so. 
Norma’s rejection of June’s blackness in particular 
 One explanation of the incongruity between Norma’s attitudes towards African 
Americans and her attitude towards June has already been posited, that Norma does not see 
June’s blackness. Another possible explanation is that Norma sees two Junes, one white and one 
black. Cross recalls reminding Norma “that she had always told me that all the good parts of me 
came from her and the bad traits from my father” (285). Norma denies this charge, yet her 
association of blackness with Jimmy and Jimmy with badness is made clear throughout the book. 
It makes sense that even if she never made a direct statement to June about the issue, she would 
take some measure of maternal pride or credit for the attributes she admires in June and reject 
any negative aspects as being the legacy of June’s absent father. Norma’s repeated statements 
that she does not see Jimmy in June support this interpretation. Cross, meanwhile, believes that 
Norma always sees her blackness, even if she denies it. Norma tries to tell June that “I don’t see 
you as a black woman when I look at you,” as noted earlier, but to set up this statement, Cross 
declares, “My mother and I never talked about her decision [to give up June], how it affected her, 
the way she saw me and those who looked like me […]. She could not look at me—with my wild 
Afro, wide hips, and Harlem address—and ignore the black woman she saw” (5). For Cross, 
physicality alone—specifically, phenotype and space/location—can guarantee that Norma will 
never look at her daughter without also seeing the lifetime of negative associations she has with 
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her daughter’s dark skin. To support this assertion, Cross immediately acknowledges that she 
experiences similar constraints in her view of her mother: Norma “could not […] ignore the 
black woman she saw any more than I could ignore her Upper West Side apartment with the 
wraparound balcony, her closets full of designer clothes, or her support for Ronald Reagan” (5). 
If Norma’s whiteness clouds June’s experience of her, then surely, argues Cross, June’s 
blackness must likewise cloud Norma’s experience of her daughter. 
 Cross’s assurance that Norma sees June as black first and her daughter second also comes 
to the fore when she mentions trying to visit her mother early in the morning and receiving no 
answer to her ring at the gate. “I knew a secret way in, […] but I feared triggering some newly 
installed alarm. I had a short Afro. I wore jeans and a sweatshirt; to my mother, foggy with sleep, 
I might look like any other black person. […] I could imagine the headlines: MOTHER 
SHOOTS DAUGHTER MISTAKEN FOR INTRUDER. […] I stayed in my rental car, sleeping 
fitfully, waiting for the gray dawn to reveal my features” (248). When day comes and June and 
Norma greet each other, June learns that her mother has waited for her all night. She explains her 
reasoning in staying outside, only to hear Norma say, “There is no gun, […]. I just said that so 
the word would be out in case somebody who knows us is defacing the property” (249). In this 
moment, both June and Norma are faced with the realization of how little faith they have in each 
other when it comes to race, with June assuming her mother would shoot any black intruder on 
sight, and Norma lying to June about having a gun with which to shoot such an intruder.  
 Cross explains June’s and Norma’s emotional responses to these realizations and to each 
other with vivid abjective imagery. “We looked at each other,” she writes. “The unspoken hung 
between us in the air like a high-voltage wire, the current running from her eyes to mine. I had 
always measured the distance between us in miles, hours, days. Now we stood in the same room 
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looking across a chasm even our love for one another couldn’t bridge” (249). This description 
deftly depicts the simultaneous division and connection inherent in abjection. Racial differences 
divide mother from daughter, and society, through centuries of racial oppression, has eroded the 
division into a chasm that it does not yet have the tools to overcome. Norma’s and June’s 
membership in this society has placed them on opposite sides, and their continued participation 
in its racist systems—somewhat voluntary on Norma’s part, forced on June—keeps them in their 
assigned places. What is unspoken is honesty, an honesty so painful that it is perhaps impossible 
for one or both to face: honest recognition and admission of their prejudices in general, and 
honest communication about how they really view each other in particular. Like it or not, the 
women are connected by the indignation each feels over the uncharitable assumptions of the 
other, and shame over her own. They are also connected by their simultaneity of their similar 
realizations, triggered by the same incident, and their mutual inability or unwillingness to fully 
acknowledge the truths the incident has revealed. Their division from each other ironically links 
them together forever. The connection is so powerful, and its ramifications so unpredictable, as 
to make it dangerous—something not to be touched. Yet its existence depends on the division 
between them. In June’s early years, before she understood the complexities of racism, she and 
Norma had been emotionally close while physically separated; now, though physically close, 
they remain abject from each other by the emotional separation, even revulsion, to which 
physical proximity and the observations it entails has brought them. 
Norma’s rejection of June 
 Norma’s rejection of June’s blackness gradually becomes a rejection of June herself, and 
it begins subtly. Norma takes the 4 year old on a series of visits to the Bushes in Atlantic City. 
She leaves June with these family friends while she makes excuses to go elsewhere, as with her 
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supposed modeling work in Fort Benning. The visits increase in duration and frequency. Then 
comes a day when June rebels against the Bushes—specifically, refusing to eat a particularly bad 
batch of Peggy’s cooking—and appeals to Norma via telephone for support. This time, however, 
Norma does not back her up or explain to Peggy that she does not force June to eat; rather, she 
turns on June and tells her that she must obey Paul and Peggy, eat the offending beans, and 
apologize for the temper tantrum she has thrown. The girl is shocked: she had been recoiling in 
disgust from poorly cooked food, a physical threat uncannily similar to the spoiled food that 
Kristeva uses in Powers of Horror to exemplify abjection. According to Kristeva, “Food loathing 
is perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection” (2), and June’s experience 
seems to bear this statement out as she demonstrates that even—or perhaps especially—a 4 year 
old can and will engage in it. June’s bodily reaction is also similar to the recoiling that Kristeva 
describes. June manages not to vomit but, after one bite, violently refuses to allow any more of 
the mushy mess into her body. Norma had raised June on light, healthy foods, conditioning the 
child all the more to reject the “strange,” “overcooked,” “heavier and spicy” fare placed before 
her by Peggy (Cross 7). Suddenly, however, the mother has changed sides and thwarted her 
attempted abjection of the “nasty food” (8), thereby abjecting the girl instead, by turning her over 
to Peggy. In one fell swoop, June is no longer the abjector, but the abjected. 
 Drawing upon Kristeva, Sara Ahmed theorizes that the act or impulse of abjection results 
in the reaction or feeling of disgust. “Abjection,” she notes, “is bound up with the insecurity of 
the not; it seeks to secure ‘the not’ through the response of being disgusted” (86). In order to 
maintain the border between “I” and “not-I,” abjection uses disgust. The emotion of disgust 
provides the catalyst necessary to reject the impending invasion of “not-I” and, threat thwarted, 
to fortify the distinction and separation between “not-I” and “I.” Ahmed explains the abjection 
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such as that which June has towards Aunt Peggy’s unhealthy, unpalatable food thus: “Food is 
significant not only because disgust is a matter of taste as well as touch – as senses that require 
proximity to that which is sensed – but also because food is ‘taken into’ the body. The fear of 
contamination that provokes the nausea of disgust reactions hence makes food the very ‘stuff’ of 
disgust” (83). Aunt Peggy’s cooking serves as an existential threat against 4-year-old June. What 
June does not realize is that the food is indeed disgusting on a literal, physical level, but also on a 
metaphorical level, since it represents the transfer of June’s day-to-day guardianship from her 
mother’s nurturing to Aunt Peggy’s care. Ahmed continues, “the very project of survival requires 
we take something other into our bodies. Survival makes us vulnerable in that it requires we let 
what is ‘not us’ in; to survive we open ourselves up, and we keep the orifices of the body open” 
(83). At 4 years old, June depends on adults to sustain her in nearly every possible way; she 
cannot help but acknowledge her necessary vulnerability to the grownups surrounding her. Part 
of the reason that Norma’s handing June over to Aunt Peggy and Uncle Paul is so painful is that 
it wounds the little girl by betraying her utter trust in her mother, while requiring that she 
simultaneously open herself anew to trusting and depending on Aunt Peggy in almost exactly the 
way that she had with Norma. For her physical and emotional survival, June must accept Aunt 
Peggy into the half-vacated role of mother in her heart, now that Norma is unwilling to fully fill 
that role herself. 
 Three years later, after June has grown accustomed to living with “Aunt Peggy” and 
“Uncle Paul,” Norma introduces a new level of abjection. She has called and written regularly 
during these years and often arranged for June to visit, so the girl retains a measure of security in 
their relationship. In the meantime, though, Norma has begun dating the man who would become 
June’s stepfather, actor and comedian Larry Storch, and now pours her energies into furthering 
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both his chances in Hollywood and her own chances with him. Accordingly, she throws a party 
for Larry, his family, and a prospective agent. Seven-year-old June is visiting at the time, so 
Norma faces the challenge of explaining the girl’s presence to a group of people whom she 
desperately wants to impress and who—aside from Larry—do not know that she has a black 
daughter. She invites June to play a secret game, in which June will call her “Aunt Norma” 
instead of “Mommie.” This strategy gives Norma a plausible reason for including June among 
the guests, since it frames Norma as a relative or possibly a close friend who is hosting the girl; 
the change in relationship designator simultaneously suggests that June is not a member of 
Norma’s immediate family and therefore not necessarily a permanent member of Norma’s 
household. Linking Norma and June as mother and daughter would reveal Norma to have 
engaged in at least two forms of transgressive sex: interracial and unwed. By verbally destroying 
that relationship, Norma temporarily absolves herself of what mainstream white U.S. society of 
the time considered a racially and morally checkered sexual past. She tells June after the party, 
“This agent could be very important for Larry, to help him get jobs. I didn’t want him thinking 
I’d already been married and had children; it might not reflect well on Larry” (Cross 52). Instead, 
Norma portrays herself as pure—racially, morally, and sexually—and perhaps even good, 
because of her apparent willingness to acknowledge her relationship with a black girl, albeit a 
relationship that exists through no transgression on Norma’s part. 
 June, being 7 years old, tries but fails to uphold her mother’s deception. She agrees to the 
game and plays it with enthusiasm at first, because its secret nature ironically makes her feel 
closer to her mother. To outsiders, the game might indicate a distancing in their relationship, but, 
to June, it is something they and only they own, together—a truth and reality buried so deep that 
they alone can see it. June eventually forgets herself, though, and tries to get Norma’s attention 
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with cries of “Mommie!” To her surprise, Norma fails to react. When June persists, Norma takes 
her to the bathroom and sternly reminds her of their game. June had made a child’s natural 
assumption that the word “game” indicated play and not something serious. She realizes her 
mistake as she stares at her mother and “nearly didn’t recognize her. Her narrow eyes looked like 
an evil witch’s” (Cross 52). The sight of Norma has inverted June’s reality. Her beautiful mother 
is suddenly neither familiar nor familial, but has morphed into a fairy tale villain before June’s 
eyes. June starts to see that it is she, not the guests, whom the mother has lied to and played, so 
she “tried to back away” (52). The emotional distance between mother and daughter is so sudden 
and so great that the girl instinctively wants to translate it into the physical realm, hoping that an 
escape from this new, non-familiar mother will restore some measure of the safety and security 
she had felt when they entered the bathroom. But she has nowhere to go and no one to whom she 
can turn. “Trapped between the toilet and the wall,” Cross recalls, “I responded with a mask of 
my own—my small voice” (52). She, like the fairy tale children of old, has no choice but to play 
along with the tyrant and trust her wits to save her as she answers, “‘Yes, Aunt Norma’” (52). 
Unlike most fairy tale protagonists, however, even at the age of 7, June knows she has already 
lost. 
 The party fiasco turns out to be only the first of many times that Norma verbally disowns 
June and manipulates her into compliance. Norma soon strengthens the physical and emotional 
barriers between them by adding another dimension: time. According to Cross, after Norma and 
Larry are married they “developed two circles of friends: those who knew about me and those 
who didn’t. Gradually my visits began to coincide with those occasions when it was convenient 
for me to be seen” (53). The new Mrs. Storch’s calendar, soon filled with social engagements 
and travel, becomes an added agent of June’s abjection. June grows used to this routine over the 
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years, though she never completely makes peace with it. As her half-brother, Lary, remarks 
during a visit to her after both have reached adulthood, “We’re probably lucky, in a way, […] 
that we were only around when [Norma] felt it was convenient. That way we only experienced 
the side of her that wanted us” (180).15  Elsewhere, Cross explains that such apparent self-
centered whimsy is characteristic of Norma—so much so that “to Aunt Peggy I made sarcastic 
remarks about my mother’s constantly shifting allegiances and friendships. We called this 
tendency of my mother’s her ‘Bridge on the River Kwai’ routine—she could make a friendship 
and burn the bridge as soon as the next opportunity came along” (195). Even June is surprised at 
the lengths to which Norma is willing to go in her disavowals of her own flesh and blood, 
however. As late as 1989, when June is 35 years old, Norma could still stun her daughter by 
introducing her as “our daughter, June” at one of Larry’s cast parties but as “my friend June” to a 
recently acquired “best” friend two nights later (Cross 252). The imagery of a lifelong cycle of 
Norma metaphorically burning and rebuilding and burning and rebuilding her bridges with her 
own family also represents what, if literal, would be a physical symbol for the 
physical/geographical abjection through which Norma puts June, more than anyone else, for 
forty-two years. 
 Perhaps the cruelest betrayal comes in 1966, when then-12-year-old June is visiting 
Norma and Larry in California. Larry has a major role on the sitcom F Troop, and the family is 
reaping the benefits of his success: Norma and Larry through celebrity, opportunity, wealth, 
power, etc.; June through increased financial support. The many weekend and holiday trips to 
                                                          
15As noted earlier, June and Lary both experience physical abjection from Norma at various 
times throughout their respective childhoods; however, June’s situation differs significantly from 
Lary’s in that she is told directly and repeatedly that the reason she cannot be with Norma is her 
race, specifically the supposed social and financial dangers her blackness presents if connected to 
her mother’s whiteness. 
60 
New York City have been replaced by an annual month-long vacation in Los Angeles, now that 
mother-daughter reunions require coast-to-coast travel. During this particular visit, the F Troop 
cast participates in a family photo shoot for their publicity department, and Norma unexpectedly 
allows June to join Norma, stepfather Larry, and older half-brother Lary in the shoot as a visible 
part of the family. Perhaps this sudden public acceptance represents a softening in Norma’s heart 
or an increase in her courage; perhaps it is a shrewdly calculated move on her part to manipulate 
the sympathies of 1966 U.S. society in favor of Larry. Cross would later reflect that Norma 
“must have realized she’d have a lot of explaining to do when those pictures became public. As 
for me . . . well, I was just twelve, and consumed by the heady excitement of my first visit to the 
set of a Hollywood TV show. I was oblivious” (116). Physically reunited with Norma and 
deliberately included in the same space as her family, June feels an unspoken security in her 
mother’s love that allows her to eagerly anticipate the photo shoot, not fear or dread its 
consequences. 
 June remains oblivious until months later, when she has been sent back once again from 
her mother’s home to Atlantic City. One evening, mother and daughter are enjoying a telephone 
call when Norma tells her, “There’s going to be a magazine article about us!” (Cross 116). June’s 
natural excitement is short-lived, since, seconds later, Norma continues, “the publicity 
department saw [the family photo], and someone asked who was that Negro girl, so I told them 
you were our adopted daughter, that you had grown up across the hall from us in New York City. 
. . .” (116). Just as Norma had fabricated the “Aunt Norma” narrative for Larry’s family and 
potential agent and forced it upon June, she now creates another false narrative for her husband’s 
employers and dictates the new narrative to June, using her maternal authority to put the words 
she wants into June’s mouth. This narrative strengthens her abjection of June by completely 
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rejecting the biological link between mother and daughter, whereas the “Aunt Norma” version 
had retained that link, reframing it in the form of a less immediate biological relationship. June 
feels the difference immediately: “I couldn’t really absorb what she was saying. Having me call 
her ‘Aunt Norma’ was one thing, but her disavowing me altogether felt as though I were being 
erased” (116). The depth of June’s pain and the increase in her maturity since the “Aunt Norma” 
game are shown as she responds by abjecting her mother, handing the phone that transmits 
Norma’s voice over to Aunt Peggy before walking away to stand, alone (116). Five years ago, 
she had been caught off guard at Norma’s sudden abandonment of motherhood at the party. 
Now, she has a stronger sense of self, for which she is willing to stand—both literally and 
figuratively—though she would ultimately lose in this situation, too. 
 The article, published in January 1967, reads like a happy tabloid puff piece on the 
surface, but as a much darker tale in the context of June’s actual history. Norma’s voice 
reverberates in the words of the writer, Paul Denis; the events in the narrative often parallel the 
real-life incidents that inspired them, but the details of June and her fictitious non-Norma mother 
are reimagined to rationalize Norma’s actions and to make Norma and Larry appear as kind and 
gracious benefactors. For example, Denis, after interviewing Norma, writes that Norma “felt that 
June ought to have some emotional security in a loving home, with permanent guardians. Even 
June’s mother finally asked Larry, ‘Couldn’t you put June somewhere? You know I can’t take 
care of her properly’” (Denis 86). The first sentence of this passage explicitly offers Norma’s 
justification for her actions. The succeeding sentences give voice to the long-ago Norma’s 
desperation, here represented as a separate, nameless person whose only identity lies in her 
relationship to June. Yet even the mother whom Norma invents for June ends up abjecting her 
daughter. The fictitious woman struggles to put food on the table and establishes a pattern of 
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handing the girl over to the care of strangers, before abandoning her entirely to Norma and Larry 
(Denis 48, 86). Without explicitly saying so, Norma reframes herself and Larry as heroic white 
saviors who care for a poor black girl more than her own mother does—though admittedly still 
from a distance, since in the article, as in real life, June lives with the Bushes. Having thus 
bestowed upon herself the made-up mother’s endorsement of her and Larry’s parenting, Norma 
invents a similar endorsement from June: “One day, they mentioned to June, ‘Would you like it 
if we adopted you?’ and June said, ‘I would love it!’” (Denis 86). Thus, through this new 
narrative, Norma rejects any original responsibility for her daughter and turns the long-distance 
mother-daughter relationship into one not of biology, but of choice. She first removes but then 
reinstates herself as June’s mother to again—as at the party five years before—avoid any charge 
of miscegenation on her own part, severing all racial ties to her daughter in the process. 
 Towards the end of the Denis TV tabloid article, Norma changes real-life details at least 
twice more to absolve herself of guilt and to project upon her daughter an acceptance that June 
does not actually feel. Cross’s documentary and memoir both recall June’s reaction to the 1965 
Watts riots as a pivotal moment in June’s development of her own racial identity. Both accounts 
describe June and Norma watching TV news footage of the riots together. In confusion, Norma 
asks June to explain why the people are rioting, and both versions of June’s response clearly 
show her solidarity with the black rioters, not her white mother: “white people never accept us. 
They don’t want us around” according to the documentary (1:30:44) and “they’re tired of being 
not wanted by whites. […] You don’t want us around” in the memoir (98). In the tabloid article, 
Norma recalls the incident differently. For one thing, Norma’s version changes the occasion of 
the conversation from TV coverage of the nationally known Watts riots in Los Angeles to 
personal observation of an unnamed “civil rights demonstration in the streets” in New York City 
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(Denis 87), downplaying the size and significance of the event. In Norma’s version, instead of 
answering a direct question, June displays a seemingly unmerited passion when she “suddenly” 
exclaims, “That’s because you white people hate us!” (Denis 87). Most importantly, in Norma’s 
account, June immediately follows her comment about hate-filled white people by excluding 
Norma and Larry from the perpetrators of injustice: “Larry was shocked, but June added, softly, 
‘But of course I know you love me’” (Denis 87). Norma’s reimagined June does not hold her 
race-based exclusion from the family against them, nor does the abjection cause her to doubt 
their love. June’s supposed acceptance of the separation is made more explicit a few paragraphs 
later in the article. “Sometimes [June] wonders why she can’t move to Hollywood and live with 
Larry and Norma in their hilltop home with the swimming pool,” writes Denis. “But Norma 
explains that such a move might create new problems, and it might be better to wait. And June is 
now old enough to understand” (Denis 87). Without specifying exactly what June is 
understanding, Norma cleverly conveys to 12-year-old June that she had better continue to play 
by her mother’s rules if she wants her mother’s respect; doing so is a sign of maturity, whereas 
objecting to the arrangement will be treated as immaturity.  
 Norma’s carefully polished, charming, yet shrewd and manipulative persona never 
wavers in the article, a portrayal that suggests she had assumed a similar and equally consistent 
persona in her interview with Denis. The article concludes with a final quotation from Norma: 
“taking over June has been a big responsibility. […] It has been a worry to us always. […] It 
would be easy to back out, but how could we respect ourselves if we did? We’ve only done the 
human thing. We just followed our instinct—the instinct to help others. As the song says, 
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‘People need people . . .’”16 (87). Simultaneously self-deprecating and self-exalting, even in the 
end Norma neatly transforms June from a source of shame into a symbol of Norma’s own 
goodness. June feels this objectification keenly, though she does not seem to have realized the 
extent to which Norma has used her until she reads the newly published article in January 1967. 
“It was a variation of the story Mom had always told me about her and my real father. She had 
just twisted it around a little bit,” writes Cross. “I felt angry with her then, a palpable anger, for 
caring more about appearances than family, and angry with Aunt Peggy, too, for conspiring to 
help her keep the secret. And I was angry with myself for trying to please both of them by 
buying that stupid dress and trying so hard to make my hair look decent, with that lame flip” 
(117). June experiences this long-distance abjection as a betrayal, primarily a direct betrayal by 
her mother, but also as lesser but still direct betrayals by Peggy and June herself. These latter 
betrayals both occur in service to Norma and her agenda, though, so they ultimately represent 
indirect betrayals that augment the direct one. Norma has proven that the emotional separation 
between mother and daughter echoes their geographical one, and the rare occasions when either 
separation seems to be closed are no indication of continued unity or closeness. 
Summing Up 
 Norma seems to have initially identified closely with her daughter. She successfully 
shares that identification with baby June by basing it in the similarities between their bodies. 
                                                          
16The song to which Norma refers is likely Jule Styne and Bob Merrill’s “People.” Barbra 
Streisand debuted the song in 1964 to wide acclaim and, at the time of the 1966 interview, was 
performing it in the Broadway musical Funny Girl. Streisand would later perform the song, 
whose refrain repeats the lines “People who need people / are the luckiest people in the world,” 
in the 1968 movie version of Funny Girl. Norma’s place in the celebrity circles of both 
Broadway and Hollywood make it highly likely that she was familiar with both the musical and 
the song. By removing the “who” from the line “People who need people,” Norma 
characteristically and cleverly inverts the focus of the words from people who need, such as 
June, to the people who are needed, such as Norma and Larry. 
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When Norma sees the physical likenesses between them starting to fade into June’s blackness, 
she rejects her daughter by forcing her out of the maternal home and into a new family. 
Subsequent contact between mother and daughter is almost always controlled by Norma in terms 
of place and time, and most is long-distance. As June grows older, Norma reinforces the physical 
separation between them by inventing a genealogical one, dictating new narratives to June that 
explain their relationship in terms of temporary past and/or present proximity, not mother-
daughter lineage.  
 For forty-two years, Norma finds herself emotionally unable to separate from June 
completely, a state evidenced physically in the form of continued invitations to visit, as well as 
sharing physical artifacts like letters when the two undergo physical separation. Nor can Norma 
bring herself to publicly embrace her daughter, metaphorically or physically, unless it is 
anonymously, masked as part of a false relationship, or in the company of a few select people. 
She frequently uses her privilege as a white and eventually wealthy woman to enforce her 
ambivalence and abjection, while using the threat of losing that privilege as both a justification 
and an enforcement mechanism for continuing the separation. Although she seems to struggle 
somewhat over the realization that her daughter does not and likely will never have the same 
levels of privilege that she enjoys, she actively participates in the same racist social discourses 








CHAPTER 2: SECRET DAUGHTER 
 
Introduction 
 Strong though the case against Norma seems, it is important to keep in mind that nearly 
all of our information regarding her behavior—and what motivates it—is presented only after it 
has been through June Cross’s editing. This is true for both the Secret Daughter film and the 
memoir, and Cross’s voice and perspective are not impartial in either case. Even when Norma 
ostensibly speaks for herself in the film, she does so in response to Cross’s guidance, and each 
word that reaches the viewer does so because Cross makes the decision to allow it. According to 
Kristi Siegel, “Autobiography is largely an act of deletion and interruption. […] In short, an 
autobiography is a selective, packaged product. The autobiographer presents a performance, 
shaped by his or her knowledge of fiction (a good narrative must tell a story) and the 
bildungsroman tradition of autobiography” (21). Unfortunately, although June’s lifelong 
abjective impulses towards her mother are understandable and heighten the dramatic tension of 
her film and book memoirs, they undermine the journalistic objectivity with which she has been 
trained to write.  
 Cross does not explicitly claim to be objective. However, as will be discussed further 
later, the initial release of Secret Daughter as a documentary episode for PBS’s FRONTLINE 
implicitly frames the work as investigative journalism, and Cross’s dual roles as producer and 
narrator for the film frame her as an investigative journalist presenting another true-to-life story 
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to the public. The film would go on to win an Emmy Award, and Cross would go on to become a 
professor of journalism at Columbia University, specializing in broadcast journalism and 
documentary. The book form of her extended memoir, meanwhile, is not marketed specifically 
as journalism, but publisher and reviewers alike frequently tout Cross’s journalistic credentials as 
the most important (and sometimes only) element of her “About the Author” blurb. Yet June 
Cross the acclaimed journalist does not narrate Secret Daughter, telling Norma’s story as well as 
her own; June Cross the wounded, secret, abject(ing) daughter does. 
Generic Considerations: Daughterly (Auto)Biography 
 Scholars such as Siegel see separation from and criticism of the mother-figure as being 
primary features of female-authored (auto)biography. Pointing out that “the majority of women’s 
autobiographies are written from the daughter’s perspective,” Siegel states that the “women’s 
autobiography” genre itself “is characterized by its inability to silence the maternal. Rather than 
being erased, the daughter’s representation of the mother becomes instead a charged space—a 
textual abyss—in women’s autobiographies” (14-15). The historical marginalization of women 
results in their daughters claiming a place in the mainstream by joining the mainstream in 
continuing that marginalization. For example,  
For a woman, the culturally acceptable story of her education must often be 
achieved by distancing herself from her mother, whose intellectual abilities have 
either not been allowed to develop or have been culturally dismissed. The 
mother—typically—does not present a model whose power exceeds the domestic 
sphere; further, the mother’s socially constructed connection to ‘body’ 
threatens—by association—the daughter’s ability to represent herself as part of 
autobiography’s cultural/spiritual realm. Accordingly, the strategies a daughter 
employs to position herself in relation to her mother—strategies affected by 
historical, cultural, racial, and socioeconomic determinants—may be a central 
way to examine the difference between men and women’s autobiographies. 
Whether the daughter as autobiographer ultimately resents her mother negatively 
or positively, the mother’s representation remains textually complex and 
problematic. (Siegel 21-22) 
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For the daughter to sell her story, argues Siegel, in many cases means selling out her mother. 
 Tess Cosslett further explores this dynamic. Cosslett highlights “a feminist-inspired move 
by which contemporary women’s autobiographies construct a matrilineage for their protagonists; 
the identity of the subject is assumed to be dependent on or in relation to the identities of her 
female ancestors” (142). Cross performs this work in Secret Daughter, providing extensive detail 
not just on Norma, but also on Norma’s mother, for whom June is named.  
 As noted in chapter 1, Norma’s mother is the one who begins Norma’s cycle of child 
abandonment, first by abandoning Norma herself, and then by caring for Norma’s son and 
enabling Norma to abandon him.17 In the Secret Daughter documentary, June’s sister-in-law, 
who had studied and interacted with “Granny” as part of her research for a book project, states, 
“Granny was a flapper. Granny was a bookie. Granny was a wild lady. I mean, you know, Your 
mother didn’t get her free spirit from—from nowhere.” Cross, meanwhile, claims never to have 
known or met her grandmother, although she does remember Granny making racist comments 
about her during a visit when she was 4; she includes this anecdote in both the documentary and 
the book. Later in the documentary, Cross again sets out to explore her matrilineage, stating in a 
voice-over that “The pain between mother and daughter – unspoken, unresolved—passes from 
generation to generation. If I’m to come to terms with what happened to me, I need to come to 
terms with my grandmother.” She travels to Idaho, where she meets one of Norma’s cousins for 
the first time and asks about Granny’s racism and Norma’s girlhood days. The cousin remarks, “I 
don’t know why Aunt—you know, I just don’t know why—I guess—I don’t think Aunt June had 
any room to talk about anything. […] Her life wasn’t sublime and, you know, exactly straight.” 
                                                          
17In June “Granny” Steffensen’s defense, whenever Norma chose to abandon Lary and “Granny” 
did not take him in, he was placed in foster care. When Norma was set on leaving her son 
behind, her mother’s acceptance of the boy facilitated the abandonment, but it was by no means 
the determining factor. 
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Regarding Norma, the cousin, like June, blames Granny for starting the cycle of child 
abandonment: “I always liked Norma. I’m glad I didn’t have to go through what she did, you 
know, because her mother, she never knew probably where her mother was half the time” (Secret 
Daughter 1:34:19-1:38:51). This context enables Cross to indirectly explain why June the 
granddaughter chooses not to have children at all: she fears continuing the cycle and would 
rather remain childless than risk fulfilling and perpetuating the pattern set by her family 
matriarchs.  
 The profound effect that not just Norma’s, but Granny’s legacy of race-based rejection 
has had upon June is further evident when she learns in the documentary that she is descended 
from Myles Standish. In consecutive voice-overs, Cross declares, “But I don’t want to be 
descended from Myles Standish or anyone else who would have looked down on me. That 
includes my grandmother” and “I’d like to be able to say I buried my bitterness against [Granny] 
out here in the sagebrush, but I can’t yet” (Secret Daughter 1:40:22-1:41:15). At the end of the 
documentary, then, June has clearly not come to terms with her grandmother, which, according 
to her earlier statement, confirms that she has yet to come to terms with her own story.    
 The choice not to have a daughter that she might abject or abandon can give June the 
satisfaction of knowing she is stopping a harmful family cycle, but it cannot resolve the anguish 
she feels over being an abjected and abandoned daughter herself. Cosslett expands on 
“matrilineal narratives” like the one presented in Secret Daughter, defining such narratives as 
“attempts by some feminist autobiographers to ‘reclaim’ or ‘recover’ the mother’s subjectivity 
by writing their mothers’ stories, in conjunction with their own” (141). One reason to take note 
of this phenomenon, Cosslett continues, is that “these writers were often very ready to attribute 
thoughts and feelings to their mothers, to speak for them, but not for their daughters (where 
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daughters did appear in the narrative)” (141). Cosslett suggests that this difference could be due 
to daughters “represent[ing] unknown potential, the unshaped future,” and a recognition that “it 
would be intrusive and limiting to try to write [a daughter’s] thoughts, to inhabit her 
consciousness” (141). Cross does not have a daughter for whom she might or might not speak, 
but her representations of Norma are ethically problematic, at least in Cosslett’s framework: 
“couldn’t the narration of the mothers’ stories be destructive too? The only reason it isn’t, is that 
the mother has already lived, unhampered by daughterly fictions” (141). According to Cosslett, 
Norma has already written the facts of her story, so Cross’s rendition of it would not be 
“destructive”—an idea with which Norma, ever concerned with her Hollywood status and 
publicity, might disagree. Cosslett seems to recognize this potential for daughter-inflicted 
destruction in her next sentence: “A more sinister reason for the imbalance [could be this]: the 
mother being dead, or so far estranged, or of a different culture, can’t answer back” (141). 
Indeed, between the documentary and the book, Cross’s narrative voice undergoes a marked shift 
that suggests she feels much freer to critique her mother’s actions and supposed motivations once 
Norma can no longer respond. 
 At the time of Cross’s documentary, Norma is still alive and able to speak for herself; 
even then her words are filtered and necessarily selectively silenced by Cross in the editing 
process. When Cross’s book appears, ten years later, Norma has been gone for three years and, to 
use Cosslett’s words, “can’t answer back” (141). By that time, Cross has also had the benefit of 
ten years of public acknowledgment of her and Norma’s complicated relationship, ten more 
years to untangle her feelings related to Norma’s choices. Converting her narrative from a two-
hour documentary to a three hundred-page book, along with the added history of the intervening 
ten years, means Cross has significantly more space—textually, chronologically, emotionally—
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in which to detail and reflect upon her (mother’s) story. In both iterations of Cross’s memoir, but 
(as will be discussed later) particularly in her book, she demonstrates that Norma’s abjection of 
June is the driving force behind June’s abjection of Norma.  
Truth and fiction, documentary-style 
 As mentioned previously, Cross’s initial choice in the 1990s to use documentary to 
publicize her heretofore hidden narrative is both significant and, in light of her potential biases, 
problematic. Her reliance on the genre bespeaks not only her history, skills, and resources as a 
PBS Frontline producer of documentaries at the time, but also her view of her own story. In the 
1990s, before the advent of social media and YouTube, Janet Cutler and Phyllis Klotman argued 
that “in the face of a history of exclusion and misrepresentation, many African American 
film/videomakers have adopted the documentary mode to assert their view of reality. 
Documentary’s identification with realism as a social signifier and its non-commercial status 
have made it a welcome site for challenging the authority of mainstream American history and 
culture” (xvii). Cross, too, having been excluded and misrepresented since the age of 4 by 
Norma, turns to documentary to challenge the false narratives by which many of Norma’s friends 
and acquaintances have known June.  
 Despite documentary’s connotation of realism, Cross’s story and her positionality in it 
inevitably compromise the realism and reality she tries to put forth. Continuing to speak about 
women’s autobiographies, Cosslett notes that “because […] matrilineage is often hidden, 
silenced or lost, it has to be reconstructed. Fictionality necessarily and overtly enters at this point, 
in this act of imaginative reconstruction” (142). Such fictionality is less evident in the 
documentary than in the book, largely because the documentary is made ten years earlier, when 
first-person accounts of people and events are more available, and because it seemingly involves 
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less of a filter between speaker and audience. Norma, for example, is still alive to tell her story in 
her own words, and viewers can watch her speaking these words. But Cross’s documentary, like 
most professional texts, undergoes an editorial process. The audience does not observe this 
process or receive “before” and “after” copies to see what changes are made, but they observe 
the result of the process—and nothing else. The “reality” represented is skewed.  
  Furthermore, even though Norma is present to speak for herself, Granny is not. Despite 
relying on direct witness testimonies to tell Granny’s story, Cross cannot avoid the problem that 
witnesses remember and interpret facts differently. This constraint becomes apparent in a 
conversation June has with Norma and brother Lary. The exchange, as posted in the transcript 
section of the official FRONTLINE web site, goes thus: 
NORMA STORCH: [Granny] never was loving toward you. She just couldn't 
cross that barrier. She said, "Well, she's a nice little thing, once you get to know 
her," was the most she said. But she never embraced you or-- 
JUNE CROSS: That's funny because I remember that differently. 
NORMA STORCH: How do you remember it? 
JUNE CROSS: I remember her saying, "She's a cute little monkey, once you get 
used to looking at her." 
NORMA STORCH: Oh, well. She used to say to me, you know, "Negroes are 
okay, but you never should sit down and have dinner with them." 
LARY MAY: I would like to think that a lot of it had to do with more 
consciousness of shame than in herself. I mean, there were so many pressures 
about what is respectability. And this was the ultimate in irrespectability or 
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degradation and she just didn't have the strength to deal with it. (Journal 
Graphics) 
Here, not only do Norma and June reveal significantly different recollections of Granny’s one-
sentence assessment of June, but Lary tries to reinterpret, minimize, and explain away what June 
had experienced as traumatizing racism from her grandmother. Everyone in the conversation 
agrees that Granny repeatedly demonstrated racial prejudice, everyone agrees that she had a 
problem with June, and everyone agrees that that problem was race. Despite their consensus on 
these basic facts, all three manage to present dramatically different portrayals of Granny, from 
Norma’s mostly sanitized version, to Lary’s recognition of Granny’s prejudice but his blaming of 
society, to June’s experience of Granny only as a cold-hearted woman who used a humiliating 
racial slur to describe a 4-year-old child—her granddaughter, no less—while that child was 
present and listening.  
 Still, flawed though the “reality” of her investigative journalism might be in this instance, 
the FRONTLINE documentary remains a natural venue for Cross to construct and convey her 
truth. For Cross and her colleagues, Cutler and Klotman explain, “the documentary mode” is “an 
opportunity to be direct and truthful,” and the “‘non-commercial’ [nature of documentaries] 
signals ‘authenticity’” (xvii). Cross recognizes that producing a not-for-profit documentary puts 
her in an advantageous position when it comes to credibility, since the lack of direct monetary 
benefit to her can help to counter any charge that she might have fabricated or sensationalized 
her story for financial gain. Her subsequent decision in 2014 to make the entire film freely 
available on YouTube seems to maintain this stance. Her work thus starts out by aligning with 
what Cutler and Klotman identify as a philosophy held by “many socially and politically 
committed film/videomakers”: that a primary purpose of documentary is “to interrogate and 
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reinvent history,” by “fill[ing] gaps, correct[ing] errors, and expos[ing] distortions in order to 
provide counter-narratives of African American experience” (xvii). Although Cross would later 
expand her Secret Daughter documentary into a printed memoir, the activist orientation of 
documentary makes it a seemingly ideal genre for the first un-/retelling of her mother’s lies. 
However, it is a potentially misleading genre, since it implicitly promises a detachment and 
objectivity that Cross cannot possibly maintain against her own abjection of Norma, in response 
to Norma’s abjection of her. 
 Indeed, as much as Cross desires the truth to be known and uses her work to bring about 
this state, she cannot do so easily. In the 1981 essay “La Prieta” (“The Dark One”), Gloria 
Anzaldúa confesses the emotional costs of writing about her own mother, whom she felt had 
oppressed and wounded her during childhood, partly by shaming her for her dark skin: “above 
all, I am terrified of making my mother the villain in my life rather than showing how she has 
been a victim. Will I be betraying her in this essay for her early disloyalty to me?” (199). Cross 
seems to experience a similar conflict in the unfolding of her narrative, both in her documentary 
and in her book. She has always loved her mother, and she understands some of Norma’s 
reasoning in leaving her with the Bushes. But, as the innocent victim of Norma’s actions, without 
agency or understanding at the time of what was going on, she can no longer deny that she has 
sustained damage, although she can and does downplay the extent of her wounds. 
 Randall Kennedy notes that when the documentary was released, in 1996, Cross did not 
play the part of the embittered daughter lashing out at her mother. Instead, he writes, “even as an 
adult, she declined to condemn her mother” (371). He cites a People interview in which June 
says, “I spent a lot of time looking for unacknowledged anger and resentment, and I didn’t find 
any. […] If you’re going to get angry at somebody, get angry at a society that put [my mother] in 
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a position where she had to do this” (Lipton and Sawicki). In fact, this refusal to speak against 
her mother is so potentially startling that the People article addresses it before anything else. Its 
first words are “There are two things June Cross, […] wants to make clear. First, she bears no ill 
will toward her mother for giving her up […]. Nor, says June, […] can she fault Norma, 74 and 
married to actor Larry Storch, for telling Hollywood friends—to this day—that June, […] is their 
adopted daughter” (Lipton and Sawicki). At the time of the article’s publication, days after the 
documentary’s release, Cross presents an apparent paradox: despite revealing Norma’s “noxious 
combination of cowardice and selfishness” (Kennedy 371) to the world, she is simultaneously 
shielding her mother. Public sentiment would have read anger from Cross, the documentarian, as 
being long-delayed righteous indignation from little June, the documentary’s subject, but Cross 
performs the role of loyal, loving daughter June instead.18  
 Consciously or not, however, Cross indirectly expresses some of her angst by casting 
herself in the documentary as a Tragic Mulatta, destined from her very conception to a lifetime 
of pain and torment, due to race. Cross never uses the term “Tragic Mulatta”; in fact, neither 
“tragic” nor “mulatta” appear anywhere in the documentary’s script (Journal Graphics). 
However, her 1996 documentary characterization of herself and her story aligns closely with the 
common use of the trope, as described by film scholar Freda Scott Giles in 1995: “The mulatto 
character has not escaped being cast as a pariah, a marginalized person. Seldom is the character 
shown within an intact, two-parent family. Seldom is the character permitted a choice or merger 
                                                          
18The article’s authors are not willing to cut Norma this same slack, quoting her as saying her 
motivation for initially resisting June’s request to do the documentary was that “I didn’t want to 
lose my friends—nor Larry to lose his—just over something June wanted to do” and “I wanted 
people […] to have respect for me” (Lipton and Sawicki). Nearly four decades after choosing her 
own desires and her concern for her social status over her daughter, Norma’s first instinct is to 
choose herself again, downplaying what for Cross is a life-changing project and terming it “just 
[…] something June wanted to do.” 
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of identities. Identity is determined by appearance. Sigmund Freud’s observation that anatomy is 
destiny holds very strongly when applied to racial relationships” (78). Giles goes on to say that 
“In most commercial theatre and film, the mulatto character is caught attempting to escape the 
dark (or more recently, the white) ‘other,’ which cannot be escaped” (78). In this respect, 
however, Cross subverts the Tragic Mulatta trope: her documentary focuses not on escape, but 
on embrace, whether seeking Norma’s public embrace of June as her daughter, or June’s 
discovery and embrace of the black and white extended families that she had never been able to 
know as a child. Ironically, despite Cross’s explicit rejection of mixed race identity for herself 
(discussed later in this chapter), her framing of her documentary as beginning in tragic 
fragmentation but ending in hopeful advancement towards wholeness positions the film as a 
point of progress in the slow, ongoing struggle by many in the mixed race community to make 
the specter of the Tragic Mulatta obsolete.19 Thus, paradoxically—much like mixed race identity 
itself—Cross’s documentary works to both reify and explode a still-present, but less common 
cultural stereotype of race. 
A memoir of abjection 
 Whether her pain increases in the ten years between the documentary and the book, 
whether she finds anger and resentment she would not claim in 1996, or whether she simply feels 
greater freedom to express negative feelings after Norma’s death, Cross seems to suffer 
especially acutely in her 2006 memoir. “Nearly fifty years later,” she muses, “as I excavate these 
                                                          
19In the ensuing two decades, such subversions would become more common as “multiracial” 
identities became more culturally acceptable, as newly re-identified “two or more races” 
individuals won official recognition in the 2000 U.S. census, and as the rate of interracial 
marriages and the birth rate of “mixed” children accelerated. See, for example, Danzy Senna’s 
Caucasia (1998), Ronald Fernandez’s America Beyond Black and White: How Immigrants and 
Fusions Are Helping Us Overcome the Racial Divide (2007), Cristina García’s I Wanna Be Your 
Shoebox (2008), Heidi Durrow’s The Girl Who Fell from the Sky (2010), and Caroline Streeter’s 
Tragic No More: Mixed-Race Women at the Nexus of Sex and Celebrity (2012). 
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memories, I find the outlines of a scar. I trace its shape, considering the ways in which it restricts 
my life. Trust eludes me. I never knew how to maintain friendships. I waited until middle age to 
marry. I never had children” (26). Writing her memoir, she has now concluded, is her way to 
“bless that scar and call the pain from its hiding place” (26). The narrative voice in the ensuing 
chapters is sometimes sympathetic and gracious towards Norma, and sometimes filled with bitter 
fury.20 Cross experiences waves of pain as she unearths her memories and labors to bring them to 
light. The fluctuations in her tone demonstrate the emotional depth and complexity of her 
relationship to her mother, and bespeak a trauma that, years after Norma’s death, remains 
unresolved. This cycle of clinging to Norma and pushing her away indicates that Cross continues 
to abject Norma in death, as in life. 
 Despite and perhaps because of these difficulties, Cross needs to (re)tell her tale, this time 
with Norma no longer present to react, contradict, or punish. June needs to stop censoring 
herself, stop allowing fear of her mother to silence her anger and pain, in order for that anger and 
pain to heal. Julia Kristeva analyzes a case in which a little girl loses her mother, first to a 
physical separation, and then to “a reunion when the mother already belonged to another” (40). 
The girl is approximately three-and-a-half years old, the same age as June is when Norma starts 
leaving her with the Bushes, and precocious in the amount and sophistication of her speech. 
Kristeva interprets the girl’s affinity for language thus: “Through the mouth that I fill with words 
instead of my mother whom I miss from now on more than ever, I elaborate that want, and the 
aggressivity that accompanies it, by saying” (41). Following the Freudian model of the oral stage 
                                                          
20Despite Cross’s increased willingness in the book to display her mother’s flaws and 
acknowledge her own pain, psychologist Florence Ladd still criticizes Cross’s treatment of 
Norma as being too gentle. Ladd calls Norma “[a]n insensitive, self-centered, opportunistic 
‘drama queen’” and argues that “Norma is not accorded the ‘Mommie Dearest literary treatment 
she deserves. Instead, Cross rationalizes Norma’s dysfunctional behavior and blames herself for 
the denial and deception that frame their relationship” (14). 
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as the earliest level of a person’s psychological development, Kristeva posits that the withdrawal 
of the mother, represented by the breast, from the mouth of the child when the child still depends 
on her nurturing can cause an oral vacancy that the child must fill. One of the ways the child can 
cope with the loss of the mother and fill the emptiness she has left behind is with language. 
Though an established, independent, self-sufficient adult at the time of Secret Daughter, Cross is 
still haunted by the trauma of the early separation from Norma and all of the subsequent 
separations that would occur at the end of each visit. She, too, can draw comfort and strength 
from filling her mouth with words, first in oral language in the Secret Daughter documentary, 
and then in the material but still verbal language of the written word in her memoir. In both 
cases, Cross fills her mouth not just with words, but with words about her mother, thus evoking 
Norma’s presence even in her absence and adding another layer to the recuperative function of 
the narratives. 
A Secret Daughter’s Filial Abjection 
June’s identification with Norma 
 As described earlier in this chapter, during the first few years of June’s life, she and 
Norma share a nightly ritual of body-based, call-and-response identification with one another. 
June learns her own body by learning that of her mother, and in the early years of living with the 
Bushes in Atlantic City, punctuated with fun-filled weekend trips to see Norma in New York 
City, the little girl finds a measure of security in affirming that her body still resembles her 
mother’s, despite their living apart. At the end of one visit, for example, Cross writes, June 
comforts herself at the close of the all-too-short weekend by “put[ting] my little hand in her 
small one. I compared my clear fingernails to her pink ones to make sure they were still the same 
shape” (32). Interestingly, what is important to her is not color, but size and shape: mother and 
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daughter are connected, both literally/physically in the moment and genetically, by their 
diminutive hands. The fingernails on these hands are explicitly noted as being differently 
colored, probably by nail polish, but that does not disrupt the relationship the child reads in the 
nails’ similar shapes. For June, color matching is not an essential signifier of a mother-daughter 
dyad; she wants to be Norma’s small but similar echo, not her exact copy. 
  Throughout Secret Daughter, Cross cites physical details such as these to establish her 
permanent link to Norma as well as her permanent separation. Oftentimes, mixed-race bodies are 
read as problematizing popular views that frame race as a biological reality, readily apprehended 
based solely on appearance. The visual ambiguity of some mixed-race bodies demonstrates that 
race is not always easily determined, and multiple people viewing the same body can come to 
different conclusions as to its racial categorization. Cross seems to take the opposite approach, 
however: she portrays her body as incontrovertible evidence that race both can and will continue 
to be determined on a visible, biologically based level.  
 Cross recalls attending a meeting for “‘mixed-race’ students” while a first-year student at 
Harvard, musing, “The phrase ‘mixed-race’ always bothered me. Who defined ‘mixed-race’? I 
knew students with two black parents, others with two Arab parents or two Latino parents or, in 
some cases, two white parents, who looked just like some of these ‘mixed-race’ classmates” 
(163-164). This passage is one of many in which Cross presents race as being based solely in 
appearance, whether that of the mixed-race child or that of his/her unambiguously raced parents, 
and does not consider its potential location anywhere else. Linda Martín Alcoff explains that 
“The criteria thought to determine racial identity have ranged from ancestry, experience, self-
understanding, to habits and practices, yet these sources are coded through visible inscriptions on 
the body” (191). According to Alcoff, even those who point to sources other than the body as 
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indicators of racial identity must deal with the reality that those sources are mediated by the 
body. In this interpretation, bodies and their visibility are an essential aspect of race. Alcoff 
continues, “The processes by which racial identities are produced work through the shapes and 
shades of human morphology, the size and shape of the nose, the design of the eye, the breadth 
of the cheekbones, the texture of hair, and the intensity of pigment, and these subordinate other 
markers such as dress, customs, and practices” (191). Here we again see the importance not just 
of color, but of size and shape in defining identity. At 4, June is too young to understand how 
and why color matters, but, through Norma’s training, she realizes the potential implications of a 
silhouette. Color divides, but silhouette keeps the distant loved one close. 
 Cross goes on to quote bitterly one meeting attendee who “asked plaintively, ‘Why 
should we have to choose? Why is it so important to be black or white?’” (164). It is at this point 
that Cross writes that she “turned and left. I was nothing like these ‘mixed-race’ students. There 
was no choice for me to make. I was black by law, laws written during slavery, which decreed 
that one drop of black blood made me black” (164). June’s experience of her body’s race has 
been decidedly unambiguous, so the ability of others with similar racial heritages to pass outside 
of their minority race irks her. It rubs salt in the wound inflicted by Norma when she sent June 
away, effectively banishing the child from the family for life, merely for looking like she came 
from a non-white race. At 19, June knows well that society has determined her racial category 
based largely on her appearance, leaving, as stated above, “no choice for [her] to make.”21 It is 
                                                          
21June is not alone in her forced racial identity: as Jonathan Brennan notes, a precedent exists for 
“mixed race writers [who] have not openly claimed their multiple identities […]. Many writers, 
particularly those with African ancestry, have been denied the opportunity to choose how they 
wish to be identified. Instead, they have been assigned an African American identity” (21). 
Society has (and continues to) interpellated these mixed race writers as singly raced African 
American individuals to such an extent that asserting a different racial identity seems unwise, 
ridiculous, and/or impossible. 
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no wonder, then, that June carries this mindset of the visibility of racial identity through 
childhood and adulthood. Her reliance on the visible to signify race and kinship is noticeable, but 
makes sense in the context of her history and how her visible body determines both her race and, 
depending on Norma’s mood, her kinship. 
 Although appearance is June’s primary and default way of (dis)connecting Norma with 
herself, it is not the only relational signifier she recognizes or values. Words are important to the 
future journalist, as well. As with proclamations of bodily resemblance, this reliance on verbal 
claims is rooted in June’s infant and toddler days and is learned, ironically, from Norma. “They 
said I looked exotic, she classic,” Cross explains. “Together—a bamboo-colored redhead 
carrying her olive-skinned, curly-haired toddler—together, we seemed alien. Skin fractured our 
kinship” (1). Initially, Norma attempts to patch these fractures with words. “When I was young, 
riding in the supermarket cart’s basket, strangers looked from me to her and back again,” Cross 
continues. “‘She’s so cute! Is she yours?’ they’d ask. ‘Yes, she’s mine,’ Mommie would 
answer,” affirming to June, the strangers, and herself that her verbal claim of ownership would 
preclude the seeming visual disclaimers of her and June’s differently raced bodies (1). In those 
moments, the little girl knows security in her mother’s love. The mother verbally identifies the 
daughter with herself, and the daughter reciprocates this identification. 
 Later, after the introduction of “Aunt Norma,” June is still occasionally allowed to attach 
the “mother” moniker to Norma: “Mom loved to take me shopping, and I loved to go. […] We 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Gayle Wald confirms the power exerted in these social interpellations: citing mixed race 
writers Anzaldúa and Charles Chesnutt, Wald states that even though mixed race individuals 
theoretically negate the boundaries of racial categories, “these boundaries impose social 
distinctions whose power supersedes the fluidity and arbitrariness of racial representation. 
Indeed, it is precisely because it operates through representation that race acquires its authority to 
define” (10-11). In other words, a mixed race individual can explode racial categories in theory, 
but the very next person she meets will likely reinscribe those categories upon her by reading her 
body through their lens. 
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walked arm in arm—the cocoa-colored daughter and her mother with skin like bamboo. […] I 
lived for these shopping trips. […] In the anonymity of the store, I got to call her ‘Mom’ in 
public. That was the best part of all” (91). For June, not even “several hundred dollars’ worth of 
new clothes” (91) can compare with the joy of having Norma clearly, for a few hours, revert to 
the Mommie of happier days, the Mommie who willingly acknowledged June as her daughter. 
This public acknowledgement becomes so rare and precious to June, in fact, that she devotes 
decades of her life fighting for Norma to acknowledge her fully and irrevocably. What better 
way to do this than to ask (metaphorically) on national television, “Am I yours?” and wait for 
Norma to answer, however reluctantly, “Yes, you’re mine”? For Cross, then, the release of the 
Secret Daughter documentary is a callback to her childhood days, and to the peace and 
belonging she had once found in her mother’s words. It is a way to identify mother with 
daughter, permanently, for all the world to see. 
June’s (non-)identification with Norma’s whiteness 
 Little June’s reliance on resemblance to signify relationship is troubled when Paul and 
Peggy, in response to June’s confusion over the meaning of the word “colored,” reveal that in 
this area, June and Norma differ. “‘What’s “colored”?’ I asked. … ‘What’s “Negro”?’” Paul 
answers, “We are” before going on to define both words in terms of bodily appearance: 
“Anybody with dark skin—skin that looks tanned. People born with a natural tan. People with 
really kinky, curly hair like we have, wider lips and noses” (Cross 42-43). Somewhat 
predictably, June next asks, “Is Mommie colored?” Paul answers, “Well . . . there are some 
colored women who look like your mother. But she’s not, no”—leaving June to wonder, “Why 
was I colored and Mommie wasn’t?” (Cross 43). By the time she is 10, though, June has moved 
on from this question and disassociated herself from whiteness to the point that she engages in a 
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passionate argument with her best friend over whose skin is lighter. “We were a block away 
from home,” Cross writes, “and we nearly came to blows. I did not want to be the fairer-skinned. 
[…] If I were fairer, I would be so light as to be almost white—but if I were that light, then I 
should have been able to pass, and then I should not be living in Atlantic City. I should be in 
New York with one mother, and I should not then be […] living with Aunt Peggy and Uncle 
Paul” (59). Resemblance has returned to its place as the key signifier of relationship for June: the 
fact that she resembles Norma only in shape and in part, not in color, aligns with her relationship 
with Norma being only in shape and in part—the shape of a mother-daughter pair, part-time. 
Shape binds them together, but skin color differentiates between the two parties, driving them 
forever apart and keeping June from ever fully identifying with her mother. 
June’s perceptions of Norma’s attitude towards June 
 Valerie Smith has analyzed the construction of the Secret Daughter documentary, the 
only version of Cross’s story available at the time of Smith’s writing. The documentary is the 
first time in the women’s forty-two-year relationship that June controls Norma’s narrative, 
instead of Norma controlling June’s story. According to Smith, Cross’s composition and editing 
of the film poignantly reveal the depth of her longing for Norma and her sadness over Norma’s 
rejection of her, even in adulthood. Smith writes, “the film suggests repeatedly that Norma is 
repelled by the body of her daughter as a sign and site of miscegenation. And June yearns for 
that connection and identification as fiercely as Norma wishes to hold it at bay” (265). To watch 
the film, particularly the portions in which Cross herself interviews Norma, is to watch an 
abjection in progress. Cross’s pain and consciousness of Norma’s abjection, however, is most 
evident in the voiceovers, when Cross alone speaks. Smith continues, “in a sequence 
immediately following the opening titles, Cross juxtaposes still photographs of herself and her 
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mother, thus inviting the viewer to consider the similarities of features and expression. In the 
voice-over, she describes herself as a child staring at pictures of her mother, and spending hours 
gazing at her own face in the mirror” (265). The exact words of the voiceover, part of which 
Smith also quotes, are as follows: “I want her to go on national television to tell the world she’s 
my mother. When I was a child I would […] spend hours at the mirror trying to find her likeness 
in my face. I wanted her to acknowledge that evidence of our kinship, but she saw no likeness. 
Even as I grew older, she insisted I looked nothing like her” (Cross 1:16-2:10). In typical 
abjective fashion, Norma both declares and denies the likeness between her own body and that of 
her daughter, contradicting in June’s childhood and beyond the similarities established in June’s 
infancy. 
 Ten years later, Cross would use similar imagery to open and close her memoir. “Mirror 
moments” such as these occur frequently in mixed-race literature: the moment when a mixed-
race protagonist stares at her own reflection in a mirror and realizes—either for the first time or 
more deeply than before—that she is different. She might feel like an equal part of a group, such 
as a family, but her appearance places her elsewhere. The mirror moment thus signifies a turning 
point in her understanding of her own outcast status. 
 Cross uses the first three sentences of her memoir to describe one such mirror moment. 
She writes, “I search for my mother’s face in the mirror and see a stranger. Her face is toffee-
colored and round; her eyes, the eyes of a foreigner, slanted and brown. They are not my 
mother’s eyes: irises of brilliant green, set obliquely in almond-shaped sockets above high 
cheekbones” (1). Interestingly, Cross does not say that she looks in the mirror and sees herself. 
The face she views, filtered through Norma’s shadow, is a face to which Cross cannot relate. In 
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the final sentences of the memoir, however, this mis-recognition changes. Cross writes of going 
out a few months after Norma’s death:  
Crossing Madison Avenue, I caught my breath. A woman was approaching me, 
and she looked familiar: the almond-shaped eyes slightly askew, the prominent 
forehead, the high cheekbones—I started, and I stared. Mom? I drew closer, my 
heart skipping beats. Then, as I stepped up onto the curb, I saw the beige tint in 
the skin and blinked. 
 It was my own reflection I had seen in the window; the woman I thought 
was my mother—she was me. (304) 
 
Here Cross comes full-circle. The first detail she had cited about the face of the “stranger” in the 
beginning of the book was that the face was “toffee-colored.” She had hunted for a resemblance 
in shape, but was so emotionally distanced from Norma that she found none. Now, at the book’s 
end, Cross has found healing in her own childhood innocence. This time, the details she first 
describes are those of shape. Only when she recognizes a difference in color does she realize that 
the reflection is one of her own body and not of her mother. Finally, though, the color difference 
is not enough to break mother and daughter apart. Instead, Cross interprets the color as indicating 
her own identity, which the similar shapes in the “beige” face inhabit. These shapes, identified 
with Norma, demonstrate to Cross that she carries Norma and their relationship inside her self, 
even when she fails to see or feel the connection. 
June’s rejection of Norma 
 As Alcoff notes, “The central constituting Other for psychoanalysis has always been the 
mother, […]. It is the mother with whom the child first experiences a self/other relationship, who 
is first recognized in her ‘otherness,’ whom the self is completely dependent on in every sense” 
(63). This view of the mother as the child's first and most important Other proves especially 
relevant for June. Not only does she go through the normal separation process of the mirror 
stage—learning to differentiate as an infant between “I” and “not-I”—but she learns as a young 
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child that the differences in her and Norma's appearances assign her to one type of race and 
Norma to another. She sees and accepts such physical differences with the innocent non-
comprehension of a child, until she learns that these differences are what separate her 
permanently from her mother.  
 Norma herself is the agent of this disillusionment. In the Secret Daughter documentary, 
the adult mother and daughter discuss June's racial coming-to-consciousness. Norma says to 
June, “I asked you once, ‘When did you ever see yourself as black? When did that first 
realization come?’ Because you were with me until you were almost 5 and brought up in an 
entirely white world” (Cross 1:31:10). In a voice-over, Cross responds that “when I was about 7 
or 8, I was visiting my mother and we were taking a bubble bath. She looked at me and said that 
if I had not grown darker as I grew older, I could have stayed with her. That moment is frozen in 
time-- my mother's bamboo-colored skin, my toffee-colored hand, her straight hair, my tight 
curls, the white bubbles falling in my eyes” (Cross 1:31:45). This moment is one of the most 
important in Norma’s and June’s relationship. Cross's description is stark and visceral, her 
recollection built entirely on visual details that culminate in the fragile delicacy of soap bubbles, 
a profound representation of her situation. These soap bubbles obstruct her vision and likely 
sting her eyes as they enter. On its own, a soap bubble appears clear; it is only when joined by 
countless others in the bubble bath that it appears white and substantive. Similarly, the 
differences in skin shade between mother and daughter have until this point been barely visible 
to the child and therefore have not mattered. Now, though, in the context of 1950s race relations, 
the whiteness of one bubble is joined by countless others, the rest of the white population in the 
U.S. Together, these bubbles represent the whiteness of society, blocking the girl's vision of her 
mother and stinging as they invade her consciousness. 
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 In her memoir, Cross adds that the mother had then told her 7-year-old daughter, “You 
were light. Light as I am, when you were born. If you had stayed that color, I would never have 
sent you to live with Peggy. You could have stayed with me” (55). Since the two had not stayed 
together, Cross learns through this exchange that she and Norma are racial Others. At one time, 
the child realizes, mother and daughter had been the same. Then one had grown to be different 
from the other, and now they are once again “I” and “not-I,” their racial separation producing a 
geographic one. Furthermore, since June was the one whose skin had changed, Norma implies 
that the 7 year old is the one responsible for these separations; any problem that June has or 
would have with their long-distance relationship is her own fault, not Norma’s. 
 In psychoanalysis, notes Alcoff, the moment at which the infant understands for the first 
time that she and her mother are no longer one is a pivotal point in early childhood development. 
Furthermore, the entire process is a source of great trauma for the child, who “initially does not 
even recognize its separation from the mother's body. When it is finally forced to acknowledge 
this separation, it recoils with a terrible anguish and anxiety manifested in a split self, a self that 
cannot simultaneously accept its dependence and its separation” (64). Oliver explains how 
abjection, painful though it is, can function as the child’s coping mechanism in the face of this 
even more painful recognition: “Abjection is a way of denying the primal narcissistic 
identification with the mother, almost. The child becomes the abject to try to avoid both 
separation from, and identification with, the maternal body—both equally painful, both equally 
impossible” (Subjectivity without Subjects 61). Quoting Kristeva, Oliver continues, “If the abject 
‘is a jettisoned object, it is so from the mother.’ The child is this jettisoned object, the waste 
violently expelled from the mother’s body. The ‘subject’ discovers itself as the impossible 
separation from, identification with, the maternal body. It hates that body but only because it 
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cannot be free of it” (61). In response to being abjected, the child attempts to abject her abjector, 
of whom she was once part. She discovers that she must first be connected in order to separate, 
however. Without the mother’s identification with and rejection of her, the child has no 
existence, and therefore no agency. Her abjection must fail before it can succeed. This 
dependence causes resentment, intensifying the desire to abject and with that desire the 
recognition of dependence, further infuriating the wounded child, and so the cycle continues. 
This is the cycle in which June is caught. 
Fulfillment in Maternal/Filial/Matrilineal Abjection 
 In the 49 years that June and Norma know each other, Norma’s main abjection of June 
seems to be the physical/geographical abjection. The early closeness between mother and 
daughter suggests that there was not always an emotional abjection between the two; rather, the 
emotional separation functioned as a coping mechanism to help both deal with the pain of the 
physical distance between them, as well as a consequence resulting from the betrayal June felt in 
response to Norma’s abandonment and continued disavowals of her. 
 Norma loves and stays in contact with her daughter, privately offering June a mother’s 
love but placing the heavy burden of public secrecy on her young shoulders. She tries to see past 
June’s non-white race, not realizing that June cannot (and does not want to) be June without that 
race. Her actions and attitudes prove highly problematic, but evolve in the decade before her 
death to the point that she joins June in breaking the secrecy she had imposed so many years 
before. Her love for June and/or the echoes of her white self that she sees in June empower 
Norma to persist in the relationship she shares with her daughter, despite their conflicts. 
Ultimately, this love seems to crowd out some of the prejudice she has developed against June 
and those who look like her, though the prejudice never completely goes away. 
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 June suffers through decades of frustrated affection for the mother who both loves and 
leaves her, holds and humiliates her. Norma is so blind to her own prejudice that she can neither 
see nor comprehend how little she accepts her daughter, while June, for her part, is all too aware. 
As she grows up and comes to understand her mother’s actions and rationalizations, June 
struggles to embrace the woman who seems to care for her only when convenient. Norma’s 
choice to send June away reifies June’s blackness even while rejecting it. How can the daughter 
accept herself without accepting the whiteness in her that is Norma’s legacy, and how can she 
accept being Norma’s legacy when Norma herself will not allow her to occupy that position? 
Producing Secret Daughter and writing her follow-up memoir become June’s eventual answer, 
because it enables her to distance herself somewhat from Norma while strengthening their 
connection. Whether with Norma’s consent in 1996 or ten years later, after Norma’s death, June 
is able to use writing/narrative to express and explore her abjection of her mother. In doing so, 
she follows in the footsteps of Dostoyevsky, Proust, Kafka, and others, all of whom Kristeva 
cites as literary artists who chose abjection as the setting for their work (18). 
 It should not be discounted that Norma and June, while seeming to be hopelessly 
separated by the color line and its damaging legacy, never stop desiring one another. In 
particular, each desires that the Other voluntarily identify herself with her. The end of the 
memoir, then, bears out Kristeva’s framing of abjection of the Other becoming an “abjection of 
self”: “If it be true that the abject simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject, one can 
understand that it is experienced at the peak of its strength when that subject, weary of fruitless 
attempts to identify with something on the outside, finds the impossible within; when it finds that 
the impossible constitutes its very being, that it is none other than abject” (5). This process takes 
decades for both Norma and June and never truly ends, but when Norma publicly owns her 
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relationship to June, and when June sees her late mother in her own reflection, they demonstrate 
their identification with the abject, and, in continuing to abject, their ultimate abjection—both 









CHAPTER 3: SECRET GENEALOGY 
 
Introduction 
 Secret Daughter clearly exemplifies extreme race-based matrilineal abjection. Louise 
Erdrich’s fictional Pauline “Sister Leopolda” Puyat, on the other hand, adopts the race-based 
filial abjection demonstrated by her mother—also named Pauline Puyat—and translates it into 
race-based maternal abjection with her own daughter, Marie. However, Marie for the most part 
lacks the race-based filial abjection necessary to qualify her and Leopolda’s respective abjections 
as race-based matrilineal. One reason for this difference is that Marie is unaware for much of her 
life that Leopolda is her biological mother. Secondly, when Marie does abject Leopolda, she 
does so because of Leopolda’s physical and psychological abuse, not her race.22 This chapter 
therefore focuses mostly on Pauline “Sister Leopolda,” who presents a strong example of both 
maternal and filial abjection co-existing in a single character.  
A Legacy of Abjection, from Mother to Daughter to Granddaughter 
 The Puyat narrative is distributed piecemeal throughout Erdrich’s Love Medicine (1984), 
Tracks (1988), and The Last Report on the Miracles at Little No Horse (2001). Chronologically, 
it begins with the story of the first Pauline Puyat, told thirdhand in The Last Report to Father 
Jude Miller by Father Damien Modeste, who in turn bases his account on two sources: recovered 
letters written by the priest who had preceded him at the Little No Horse mission, and tales told 
                                                          
22While Leopolda also has strong non-racial reasons for re-/abjecting Marie—namely, that Marie 
may well be the child of rape—I argue that the race of Leopolda’s alleged rapist and, therefore, 
of her child plays a role in the abjection, too. 
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by tribal elder and trickster Nanapush, whom Damien admits “was not entirely to be trusted 
where the Puyats were concerned” (Erdrich 148-49). The first Pauline is the daughter of an 
Ojibwe woman and a French-Canadian trader who “positively hated each other. […] [but] could 
not abide the frustrations of separation” (150). The parents’ dilemma of abjective hatred and 
desire finds physical expression in Pauline, whom Damien describes as “a young girl in whom 
the bitterness of seven generations of peasant French and an equal seven of enemy-harassed 
Ojibwe ancestors were concentrated,” and a “child, created of spilled-over complexity” (150). 
After Pauline’s mother tries to have her husband killed, fails, but then unexpectedly succeeds, 
the dying man’s final words to young Pauline are “that she must kill her mother” (155). Mother 
and daughter alike know that the girl will do as the father has asked; she had loved her father 
more than her mother even before that mother instigated his death. The mother subsequently 
both tortures and fears her daughter because she sees her as the living extension of the murdered 
white husband, the daughter’s vengeance a delayed final act of his agency. Pauline, for her part, 
hates the Indian mother who robbed her of her beloved father. She severely injures her mother, 
disfiguring and ultimately killing her. She grows up and takes a variety of lovers, one of them “a 
Polish aristocrat visiting the wilds of Canada” who has already vanished by the time their 
daughter is born (157). 
 The first Pauline names this daughter after herself and, according to Father Damien, 
bequeaths her the unhappy and duplicitous nature that she had inherited from her own parents. 
Damien, who believes that family/ancestry can dramatically affect—even define—a person, tells 
Father Jude that Pauline/Leopolda “was shaped by the double nature of her mother, and who 
knows what else!” (Erdrich, The Last Report 148). The unknown quantity to which Damien 
refers is due to the nameless Polish father, but the mother’s influence is all too clear, he 
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continues: “This killing hatred between mother and daughter was passed down and did not die 
when the last Pauline became a nun. As Sister Leopolda she was known for her harsh and 
fearsome ways” (157). Comparing this lineage to a horrifying buffalo stampede in which the 
buffalo had “run down their own calves,” he concludes, “Pauline was, of course, the warped 
result of all that twisted her mother. […] She was the residue of what occurred when some of our 
grief-mad people trampled their children” (158).23 Pauline the mother, after killing her own 
mother, metaphorically poisons her daughter Pauline, as well, with the matrilineal abjection that 
has defined her own life. 
Becoming Leopolda 
 Pauline the daughter, the future Sister Leopolda, in turn abjects her daughter Marie, based 
on a number of factors, including race. As a young girl, this second Pauline yearns to be white. 
Towards the beginning of her first narratorial section in Tracks, the then-15 year old explains to 
the reader that “the Puyats […] were mixed-bloods” and that “I wanted to be like my mother, 
who showed her half-white. I wanted to be like my grandfather, pure Canadian” (Erdrich 14). Of 
all of the girls in her family, Pauline appears to have the best chance of achieving this goal. She 
has successfully pestered her father24 to allow her to leave their home in a rural section of a 
                                                          
23Pauline has been identified with dead buffalo before this point in the novel: fifty pages earlier, 
she had adorned herself in buffalo skulls and managed to cause a deadly accident with her 
frightening appearance (108-110). 
 
24Pauline’s “father” is likely a stepfather, since there is no indication that the Polish aristocrat 
who was her biological parent ever knew about—much less met—his daughter. The Last Report 
indicates that the first Pauline Puyat had both Indian and white lovers, including four husbands 
(156-157). If the man/men who fathered the second Pauline’s sisters was an Indian, it would 
easily explain the difference in skin color between her and her sisters, as well as the 
(step)father’s concern for Pauline’s Indian identity. 
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Chippewa25 reservation in the Dakotas. She goes to live with relatives in “the white town” of 
Argus, North Dakota, so that she can “learn the lace-making trade from nuns” (14). She recalls 
her father’s objections to the move: “‘You’ll fade out there,’ he said, reminding me that I was 
lighter than my sisters. ‘You won’t be an Indian once you return’” (14). On a visual level, then, 
Pauline’s racial identity is ambiguous enough that she can pass for white, at least in her father’s 
eyes. 
 Even before moving to Argus, Pauline has tried to accentuate her whiteness by rejecting 
as much of her Indian heritage as possible. Realizing that whiteness is not just skin color, but 
also a culture, she refuses to learn or perform many Ojibwe cultural skills, like beading, that are 
expected of a young woman in her family and community. She insists on speaking English and 
tells her father that she “was made for better” things than the chores her family expects or the 
outhouse-less home her father provides (Tracks 14). Neither Pauline’s family nor her Indian 
community know quite what to do with her, or how or where to categorize her. Tribal elder 
Nanapush states that “She was different from the Puyats I remembered, who were always an 
uncertain people, shy, never leaders […]. She was, to my mind, an unknown mixture of 
ingredients, like pale bannock that sagged or hardened. We never knew what to call her, or 
where she fit or how to think when she was around. So we tried to ignore her” (38-39). Family 
and community alike abject Pauline, because her refusal to follow the rules of Indian and Puyat 
identity threaten these identities for everyone else. Pauline, too, sees the threats these identities 
face, and she does not want to fall victim to them any more than they to her. As Kate McCafferty 
notes, “a smart and sensitive character like Pauline Puyat must understand all too well that to be 
Indian in America is to be inferiorized, disadvantaged, and to exist in mortal danger” (741). 
                                                          
25“Chippewa,” “Ojibwe,” “Ojibwa,” and “Ojibway” are used interchangeably by critics to 
designate the same people group. 
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Faced with the cost of being Indian, Puyat or otherwise, Pauline chooses instead to be white. To 
strengthen her whiteness, she turns to the Catholic Church. Father Damien confirms in The Last 
Report that “[Pauline’s] blood is at least half Polish, and for the most part she was considered a 
métis, Indian to some slight degree, if that, for she had apparently repudiated her own past and 
was eagerly engrossed in taking on every aspect of the Faith” (Erdrich 145-146). For Damien 
and Pauline alike, the whiteness Pauline so craves is best symbolized by her eventual black habit. 
 Pauline’s choice becomes both easier and more urgent when her entire Puyat family 
vanishes, likely victims of an influenza epidemic.26 Once she realizes she is alone in the world, 
Pauline has lost her primary ties to her Indian identity. McCafferty continues, “Educated in 
Catholic school, feeling the power of its struggle against the old ways of her people, [Pauline] 
disguises herself in piety and meekness” by eventually entering a convent and devoting her life 
to Catholicism (745). Meldan Tanrisal explains the significance of this vocation: “Since no 
                                                          
26Tracks is inconclusive as to whether Pauline’s family abandons her via death or by simply 
moving elsewhere and leaving her behind. They do not communicate with her during or after the 
influenza epidemic, and Pauline has nightmares about her mother and sisters being dead and 
“buried” in the trees (Erdrich 15). Fleur Pillager, a survivor of the epidemic, then moves to 
Argus from the reservation and becomes Pauline’s coworker at a butcher shop. When questioned 
about the Puyat family’s fate, Fleur offers the possible explanation that “perhaps [Pauline’s] 
family had moved north to avoid the sickness, as some mixed-bloods did” (15). This more 
hopeful—but also more hurtful to Pauline—theory is supported by Pauline’s subsequent 
description of Bernadette Morrissey as one who “had known my mother, and disapproved of the 
way I had been left behind” (64), suggesting that the first Pauline’s abandonment of her daughter 
was both voluntary and avoidable.  
 The daughter, however, clings to the idea that her family is dead. Years later, back on the 
reservation and again with Fleur, she has a vision or dream sequence about entering the land of 
the dead with Fleur and Fleur’s dying newborn. In this sequence, Pauline states that she and 
Fleur “passed my mother and father walking” with “all of the people I’d blessed, washed, and 
wrapped” in Pauline’s work as an undertaker (160). As Fleur gambles for her baby’s life and 
loses, Pauline says, “A woman appeared, from behind she was the size and weight of my mother. 
I heard the whispers, the low talk, of how in her eagerness to die this woman had left her child 
among the living” (161). By now, the second Pauline views even her mother’s hypothetical death 
as voluntary and worthy of blame. Thus, whether the first Pauline separates from her daughter 
geographically or mortally, the Pauline left behind perceives herself to have been abjected by her 
mother, who vanished without a word. 
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Indian girls would be admitted to the order, to be a nun meant to be a non-Indian. Now her task 
was to ‘fetch more’ Chippewa souls to Christ. After renouncing her Indianness, her family, her 
body and her daughter, she finally renounces her name (takes the name Leopolda) in order to 
enter the Christian world” (75-76). Without her Indian family, Pauline aligns herself with the 
only family she feels she has left, the white nuns in the convent. Her adoption of a new name is 
the final step in accomplishing her goal of becoming white. 
 Before entering the convent permanently, however, Pauline returns to the reservation. 
She lives with the Morrissey family, who are also of mixed race; her sense of kinship to them is 
less biological and more based on their common experience of being outcasts who use the power 
they gain from whiteness to take advantage of the full-blood Indian community that rejects them. 
Pauline, grieving her missing family, particularly latches on to Bernadette Morrissey, who 
becomes a mother-figure for her. In introducing Bernadette to the reader, Pauline declares, “I do 
believe I was kin to Bernadette Morrissey. We looked so alike coming down the road, stark and 
bony as starved cows, and I was similar in mind, much more so than her own daughters” 
(Erdrich 64). She proceeds to apprentice herself to Bernadette and becomes, like her mentor-
mother, a de facto undertaker for the reservation.27  
 Bernadette is not the only Morrissey to whom the teenager grows close. Pauline claims in 
Tracks to have had multiple consensual sexual encounters with a patriarch of the family, 
                                                          
27This association with death does not help the full-blood Indians’ perceptions of either 
Bernadette or Pauline. The full-bloods’ contempt for mixed-bloods is demonstrated when 
Kashpaw speaks with Father Damien, for example, rejecting both the white religion and the 
mixed-bloods. Kashpaw refers to the latter as “half-burnt wood” and aligns them with the white 
community via the possessive “Your,” addressed to Damien: “Leave us full-bloods alone, […]. 
Your wiisaakodewininiwag, half-burnt wood, they can use your God as backup […]. Our world 
is already whipped apart by the white man. Why do you black gowns care if we pray to your 
God?” (Erdrich, The Last Report 63). Pauline, at least, accepts this racial relocation, as 
evidenced by her later use of the nuns’ black habit to prove her white religion and therefore her 
white identity. 
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Napoleon Morrissey; however, in The Last Report, Father Damien reveals that at least one 
encounter may have actually been rape.  Whether the encounter in question might have actually 
been consensual is open for debate. The only living witness, Pauline, gives conflicting accounts 
in Tracks, where she claims not to have had sex on that occasion but to have fantasized about it, 
versus in The Last Report, where she repeats several portions of her Tracks narrative verbatim 
but claims that the fantasy was in fact real and non-consensual. 
 Known to adjust her narratives according to her audience and her desired outcome, 
Pauline is characteristically ambiguous and self-contradicting in her narrations of the encounter. 
Each discrepancy has at least one plausible explanation for why it might differ from its 
counterpart, though, keeping the facts of the matter clouded for the reader. In Tracks, where 
Pauline insists that nothing happened, she may have actually been raped and still be so 
traumatized at the time of her narration that she has dissociated from and denied the reality, 
believing herself to have only imagined it. Alternatively, she may be trying to preserve an 
illusion of virginity and sexual purity after a consensual sexual liaison. (She still claims to have 
had several consensual encounters with Napoleon afterward, but these are mostly glossed over.) 
The latter hypothetical effort at preserving her sexual morality is seemingly contradicted by her 
later descriptions of her pregnancy. However, it is possible that by framing herself as a virgin 
who subsequently gives birth, she means to cast herself as the Virgin Mary, the most powerful 
and revered woman in the whole of Catholicism. She even portrays the Immaculate Conception 
as a rape of sorts (95). 
 In The Last Report, on the other hand, Pauline seems to be both manipulating Father 
Damien and, at least in Damien’s eyes, genuinely asking for absolution. Much of her narrative is 
directly quoted from her own words in Tracks—but with certain key details changed. For 
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example, in Tracks, she states, “we did not go through with it after all. He stopped for some 
reason, nothing we said or did, but like a dog sensing the presence of a tasteless poison in its 
food.” A few sentences later, she describes her fantasy version of the encounter: “In my picture, 
we coupled in a blinding darkness. […] I snapped him in my beak like a wicket-boned mouse” 
(Erdrich 73). In The Last Report, she retains many of these same words, but shifts all agency to 
Napoleon and changes the moment-by-moment chronology: “He pressed on me in a blinding 
darkness. […] Snapped me in his beak like a wicket-boned mouse. […] He drew back, not like 
he was finished with me, Father, but like a dog sensing the presence of a tasteless poison in its 
food. Then went on, which he should not have done” (Erdrich 125). The third-person narrator of 
The Last Report notes that as Damien hears this confession, he doubts Pauline, wondering 
whether she is telling the truth about “her rapist or uncle or even someone she half allowed . . . 
he could not tell for sure” (125).28 
 This variability may indicate an attempt by Pauline to construct her own oral tradition 
about her life and character. A nonexistent rape (either a nonexistent encounter or a consensual 
                                                          
28“Damien,” of course, is actually a woman, Agnes DeWitt, and there are striking similarities 
between her story and Pauline’s. Agnes, like Pauline, had pursued a vocation in the Church, in 
Agnes’s case under the name “Sister Cecilia.” Also like Pauline, she had left her convent, 
become homeless and dependent on the kindness of others, and eventually become the lover of 
the man who had taken her in. Agnes’s relationship with her lover, Berndt, was sexually wild 
and passionate; Pauline’s relationship with Napoleon, when consensual, seems to have been 
similarly sexually intense. Agnes’s relationship with Berndt was fully consensual and lasted until 
he, like Napoleon, was murdered; however, Berndt was granted the nobility of a death that came 
about when he heroically pursued a bank robber who had kidnapped Agnes. Napoleon died 
ignominiously at the hands of his lover/victim. After their respective relationships have ended, 
both women retreat back to the Church, Agnes assuming a male identity in order to pass as 
Father Damien, and Pauline, as mentioned previously, assuming a white identity to pass as the 
no-longer-Indian nun Sister Leopolda. 
 Erdrich does not address whether any of these commonalities affect “Damien’s” 
reception of Pauline’s tale. On the one hand, their common womanhood makes Damien’s 
stereotypically masculine skepticism somewhat surprising; on the other hand, Agnes’s wholly 
positive history with Berndt may make it difficult for her to feel any sympathy towards Pauline, 
whom she has never liked or trusted. 
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one) in Tracks becomes rape in The Last Report, a sexual martyrdom, a victimization and 
infliction of suffering upon the abject and innocent future nun. In her restaging of the narrative, 
the now-Sister Leopolda transmits a revised oral account to Father Damien, who later carries on 
the new oral tradition by speaking it to Father Jude. Paula Gunn Allen describes the significance 
and fluidity of such oral traditions. She notes that  
Since the coming of the Anglo-Europeans beginning in the fifteenth century, the 
fragile web of identity that long held tribal people secure has gradually been 
weakened and torn. But the oral tradition has prevented the complete destruction 
of the web, […]. The oral tradition is vital; it heals itself and the tribal web by 
adapting to the flow of the present while never relinquishing its connection to the 
past. (45)  
 
Pauline’s shifting narratives can thus be read as a microcosmic representation of this pattern. As 
one who has become increasingly identified with whiteness, and indeed must become and remain 
white in order to be a nun, she has deliberately lost touch with much of her pre-convent Indian 
identity. Her story to Father Damien relates an intimate connection that she had once had, 
psychologically and perhaps physically, with an Indian man that ultimately (re)produced an 
Indian daughter. In telling this story, the now-Sister Leopolda simultaneously preserves her past 
connection to Indianness along with her present whiteness by turning that connection into an 
involuntary invasion. As Damien himself then tells her, the connection becomes a “violat[ion] 
[…] that could not be helped” (Erdrich, The Last Report 126), and the Indian Pauline’s past 
connection therefore remains, enduring into the present but no longer threatening Sister 
Leopolda’s present whiteness.  
 Allen points to lived experience and her personal perspective as “a half-breed American 
Indian woman” (44) to demonstrate the real-life existence of such microcosmic reflections of 
identity-based tribal turmoil. Allen writes, “though [the modern American Indian woman] is at 
times beset by her knowledge of the enormous gap between the life she lives and the life she was 
100 
raised to live, and while she adapts her mind and being to the circumstances of her present life, 
she does so in tribal ways, mending the tears in the web of being from which she takes her 
existence as she goes” (45-46). This statement comes in the context of Allen’s discussion of the 
importance of oral tradition, specifically, as one of these healing “tribal ways” (46). Pauline 
exemplifies this situation: raised to be an Indian woman, she finds herself a white nun in an 
Anglo Christian patriarchy. Her portrayal of herself as powerless against the force of male 
sexuality then aligns with what Allen says is a common coping strategy of self-abjection and 
learned helplessness: “Indeed, it is only when I am trying to get non-Indian approval, 
recognition, or acknowledgement that my ‘weak sister’ emotional and intellectual ploys get the 
better of my tribal woman’s good sense. […] Nor is my contradictory behavior atypical. Most 
Indian women I know are in the same bicultural bind: we vacillate between being dependent and 
strong, self-reliant and powerless, strongly motivated and hopelessly insecure” (48). In a similar 
way, seeking the approval and absolution of Father Damien and his god in The Last Report, 
Sister Leopolda abandons her earlier claims of sexual power and agency and pleads helplessness 
against Napoleon’s fierce, animalistic sexual desire. She thereby retains a coherent self-
identification as a pure, American Indian-turned-white female. 
 In any case, whether willing or tragically forced, Pauline becomes pregnant by her 
alleged rapist and desperately tries to abject her baby, literally. In doing so, perhaps she can 
expel the added Indianness that Napoleon has forced inside her. Eventually, under great protest, 
she gives birth to a daughter, Marie, who is taken from her and raised by first the Morrisseys and 
then a kindred clan, the Lazarres, whose surname Marie adopts.  
 Pauline’s account of her own actions and feelings during her pregnancy and Marie’s birth 
closely mirrors the feelings of abjection that Kristeva describes. In Tracks, Pauline explains that 
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“since I had already betrothed myself to God, I tried to force [the baby] out of me, to punish, to 
drive it from my womb. Bernadette caught me out back of the house one afternoon, pushing the 
handle of an axe against my stomach. But though I fell upon the wooden pole again and again, 
till I was bruised, Napoleon’s seed had too strong a hold” (Erdrich 131). To Pauline, the unborn 
Marie is an inescapable sign of moral and racial impurity,29 endangering the identity she longs to 
build as an Indian-turned-white nun. Kristeva’s opening description of abjection in Powers of 
Horror sheds light on the intensity of Pauline’s reaction: “There looms, within abjection, one of 
those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an 
exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the 
thinkable” (1). For Pauline, the unthinkable threat is the child inside her own body. The threat is 
so great that she stages a “violent, dark revolt” against her own body by means of the axe, with 
which she hopes to sever the connection between herself and the fetus.  
 Thwarted in her attempts to expel the child, Pauline endures months of agony as she is 
forced to carry the unborn baby she sees as her enemy and Satan-sent persecutor. She recounts 
how “as it grew, or she grew, she punched with her powerful head and rolled and twisted like an 
                                                          
29Elaine Tuttle Hansen posits shame as “Pauline’s most obvious motive for refusing 
motherhood,” shame that is specifically “born of her obsession with Catholicism” and centers on 
“the sins of her own flesh” (143). In The Last Report, Pauline’s juxtaposition of her confessions 
of being raped and, immediately after, of bearing a child heavily implies that Marie is the 
product of Napoleon raping Pauline, in which case Napoleon is theologically/morally culpable, 
but not Pauline. In Tracks, however, Pauline describes having had a series of consensual 
encounters with Napoleon (Erdrich 95) and later states that she does not actually know when 
Marie was conceived, because her self-imposed starvation had already caused amenorrhea and 
thereby masked the natural absence of menstruation due to pregnancy (131). Therefore, neither 
Pauline nor the reader ever knows for sure whether Marie is the product of the alleged rape or of 
consensual sex, so it also remains unclear whether the child is a sign of violation or fornication 
on the part of Pauline. It should be noted that Pauline herself consistently seeks absolution for 
having a child, yet Pauline’s desire in the above quotation to “punish” the fetus further 
complicates matters by suggesting that she blames Marie, not Napoleon or herself, for the unborn 
child’s existence. 
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otter. When she did this, the fits of hate took me so hard that I wept, dug my sharp fingernails 
into the wood of the table” (Erdrich, Tracks 133). In both Tracks and The Last Report, she uses 
similarly antagonistic language to describe the later stages of her pregnancy, when “every breath 
was forced, fought for against that baby’s weight” (Erdrich, The Last Report 123). Pauline, who 
in Argus had valued how she “could fade into a corner or squeeze beneath a shelf [and therefore] 
know everything” (Tracks 16), and whose long-term, self-imposed, severely restrictive eating 
habits and emphasis on descriptions of thinness suggest anorexic tendencies, seems to especially 
resent the fact that the unborn Marie’s presence within her body makes that body larger. 
Watching Bernadette’s daughters dancing outside, she complains that “[t]hey grew thinner and 
wilder while I grew large. […] I thought I could bear it if only [the baby] would come soon. Yet 
I continued to expand, a risen loaf that birth would punch down. I hoped, I prayed to be 
delivered. […] I swelled so tight” (133-134). Pregnancy destabilizes not only Pauline’s racial 
and religious identities, but also her physical body and her self-image. Kristeva notes that “It is 
thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, 
order” (4). On multiple levels, Pauline experiences the presence of Marie inside her as the loss of 
her own agency. She abjects her unborn daughter because out-of-wedlock pregnancy dismantles 
her carefully cultivated identity as a devout and holy white woman, and because motherhood is 
irreconcilable with her chosen system of extreme masochism and religious fervor. 
 Abjection, as has been noted, involves not just separation and rejection, but also 
fascination and an inability to let go. Pauline foregrounds the former during her pregnancy, but 
unexpectedly displays the latter when the pregnancy is about to end. She suddenly realizes that 
“If I gave birth, I would be lonelier. […] I would be an outcast, a thing set aside for God’s use, a 
human who could be touched by no other human” (Erdrich, Tracks 135). Panicking, she tries to 
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hold the baby in during delivery: “I shook with the effort, held back, reduced myself to 
something tight, round, and very black clenched around my child so that she could not escape” 
(135). This passage is only the second time in the entire pregnancy narrative that Pauline 
associates the word “my” with Marie, owning their relationship.30 Unfortunately, Pauline’s 
efforts to keep the child are no more successful than her attempts to get rid of it. Just as the 
abject cannot be escaped, it also cannot be absorbed or retained: “It lies there, quite close, but it 
cannot be assimilated” (Kristeva 1). Pauline has carried the child and now must relinquish her 
through birth—or, as Kristeva describes it, “in the immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separated from another body in order to be” (10). Pregnancy had disrupted Pauline’s 
former identity, and now she faces the frightening prospect of becoming and knowing yet 
another new self, one utterly bereft of both mother and child. 
 At this point, Pauline’s relationship to the unborn Marie clearly contains both poles of 
abjection: revulsion and magnetism. According to Elaine Tuttle Hansen, “There is a sense in 
which Pauline seems at this most gruesome, unnatural of moments to belong with other women 
who are forced to separate from their children. Her resistance to delivery itself marks in a 
perverse way her impossible desire […] to hold on to what no mother of any culture can keep—
the perfect and inviolable intimacy with the child inside her body before birth” (143-144). Now, 
at the moment of Marie’s departure, Pauline sees her daughter as valuable—albeit only as a 
captive kept inside Pauline’s body to fulfill her narcissistic desires for companionship and 
dependence. But sudden longing for intimacy with her daughter is not the excuse Pauline gives 
to Bernadette, who acts as midwife. Instead, she says, “I told Bernadette I had decided to die, and 
let the child, too, no taint of original sin on her unless she breathed air” (Erdrich, Tracks 135). 
                                                          
30The first time is on the preceding page, when Pauline indicates the beginning of the delivery 
process with the words “my baby arrived then” (Erdrich, Tracks 134). 
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Bernadette responds to Pauline’s declaration by tying her to the bed and using “two black iron 
cooking spoons, wired together” to pull the child from her body (135). In her analysis of birth as 
abjection, Kelly Oliver explains that, at the moment of birth, “The mother is made abject to 
facilitate the separation from her. At this point the mother is not-yet-object and the child is not-
yet-subject. The mother cannot tell whether this other in her is her or not, and either alternative 
seems equally impossible. The child in this abject relation to its mother is not yet separated from 
her but is no longer identical with her” (Subjectivity without Subjects 60). I wrote in Chapter 1 of 
this project that separation is the ultimate goal of abjection. Total separation—no longer having 
any relationship with the abjected, even a negative one—is also an abjector’s worst nightmare. 
This moment of birthing, then, with relief from pregnancy and from the child so close, and the 
loss of these things so imminent, is, to Pauline, the most painful of all. 
 Experienced in midwifery and ever practical, Bernadette knows that allowing Pauline to 
linger in this state is dangerous. Pauline’s and Marie’s bodies have already chosen separation; it 
is, after all, the borders of their bodies that pregnancy threatens, due to the constant, never-yet-
severed physical connection unifying the body/-ies of mother with child. Pauline’s mind, on the 
other hand, has been, is now, and always will be entirely her own, so when her mind starts to 
work against her body, Bernadette steps in and sides with physicality. To the reader, Pauline then 
laments simply, “We were divided,” three words of loss so profound that they, echoing Pauline’s 
position in her community, stand alone as a single paragraph (136). In The Last Report, she 
bitterly tells Father Damien that Marie was “taken from me, born, however you put it, there was 
no stopping it” (126). Both narratorial reactions support Hansen’s reading of Pauline as desiring 
primarily intimacy with her daughter.  
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 Pauline’s conflicted feelings have several layers, however, and produce a dizzying vortex 
of statements and actions. To Bernadette, Pauline continues to frame the birth in religious terms. 
The sight of her newborn does not arouse the young mother’s feelings of love or joy or pride or 
relief, but rather disgust: “She was soiled, formed by me, bearing every defilement I had known 
by Napoleon Morrissey. The spoons had left a dark bruise on both temples. […] [T]he child was 
already fallen, a dark thing” (136). Pronouncing the child “‘marked by the devil’s thumbs,’” 
Pauline swings back to the revulsion side of abjection and refuses to nurse her baby (136). Sheila 
Hassell Hughes attributes Pauline’s behavior not to a desire for intimacy, but an obsession with 
religion and race:  
Denying her sexual relationship with Napoleon Morrissey, [Pauline] claims that 
the fetus she carries is the result of a Satanic rape, redeemable only by her own 
sacrificial absorption of it. She therefore fights the pangs of labor and struggles to 
retain the infant that would be born to her. When she fails, Pauline rejects her 
offspring utterly. […] Because it cannot tolerate internal division, the white 
identity and family Pauline is forming ejects the dark and abject child. Just as she 
has denied and disowned her Native parents and ancestors, the young woman thus 
severs her relational ties to a future generation. (99)  
 
At this point, Pauline has tried to expel Marie from her body as a source of defilement; to keep 
and sustain her in accordance with Bernadette’s wishes, despite resenting the fetus for 
disrupting/counteracting her self-starvation and making her body larger; to hold the baby inside 
her body during labor in order not to be left alone; to use that same body to smother Marie while 
she is still inside, ostensibly so that both mother and daughter can die and remain pure; and, 
finally, to starve the newborn for looking imperfect. She prefers to keep the breast milk inside 
her body, rather than release it to Marie or spend even a second with her, nursing. 
 Bernadette’s actions had crushed Pauline’s fledgling narcissistic love for Marie. Whereas 
new mothers tend to be culturally expected to have bonded with their newborn pre-birth and to 
care (in both the affectionate and the assistive senses) for her after she is born, Pauline had 
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started to form an emotional bond with Marie only at the last moment. That emotional 
connection died with the physical one, and, now that the dreaded calamity of separation has 
taken place, separation is all Pauline wants. The desiring aspect of her abjection smothered, 
Pauline is left only with revulsion. Oliver points out that “Kristeva says that the maternal body 
enrages because it carries the child (1988, 138). The rage is directed not just against the outside 
of the maternal body, which nourishes and weans; it is also directed against the inside of the 
maternal body, and especially the inside that becomes outside, the child among other things” 
(Oliver, Subjectivity without Subjects 61-62). Kristeva and Oliver are speaking here from a 
newborn child’s point of view, but their words could easily explain the post-birth actions and 
attitudes of Pauline, or perhaps her post-pregnancy self, newly born of her pregnant self.  
 The extent to which Pauline demonstrates abjection and disgust towards Marie during 
this time is best understood in the context of Pauline’s attitude towards her own body. Sara 
Ahmed writes, “When thinking about how bodies become objects of disgust, we can see that 
disgust is crucial to power relations. […] Does disgust work to maintain power relations through 
how it maintains bodily boundaries? The relation between disgust and power is evident when we 
consider the spatiality of disgust reactions, and their role in the hierarchizing of spaces as well as 
bodies” (88). Marie has disturbed the boundaries of Pauline’s body for nine months, and now 
that the two are separated, Pauline is determined to re-establish her bodily boundaries as soon as 
possible. To nurse Marie would undermine this mission. It would mean allowing the onetime 
invader to re-attach herself to Pauline’s body, multiple times per day. It would also mean that the 
nourishment that Pauline takes in, that becomes part of her, would flow directly out of her body 
and into the mouth of the child, never being exposed to the outside world, quickly becoming part 
of the child’s body instead. Nothing will undo the birth-separation of Pauline’s body from 
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Marie’s, but nursing mimics the attachment, with the connection between mouth and breast 
taking the place of the placenta. Furthermore, nursing would entail Pauline being confronted 
repeatedly, more than daily, with the body of this child, a body she despises, that was once (part 
of) her body. Between the threat to her bodily integrity and the prospect of having to sit every 
day with the physical embodiment of the Marie-hatred that is really Pauline-hatred, Pauline’s 
refusal to risk such an intimate re-encounter becomes more comprehensible. 
 Boundaries alone are not what Pauline fears Marie will destroy, but also status. Drawing 
on the work of William Ian Miller, Ahmed continues, “disgust reactions are not only about 
objects that seem to threaten the boundary lines of subjects, they are also about objects that seem 
‘lower’ than or below the subject, or even beneath the subject” (88-89).31 Ahmed then returns to 
the phenomenon of abjection and states, “Lower regions of the body – that which is below – are 
clearly associated both with sexuality and with ‘the waste’ that is literally expelled by the body. 
It is not that what is low is necessarily disgusting, nor is sexuality necessarily disgusting. 
Lowness becomes associated with lower regions of the body as it becomes associated with other 
bodies and other spaces” (89). A biological daughter, in this case Marie, is doubly associated 
with this lowness: first, she is the product of the mother’s sexual contact, which, in mixed-race 
scenarios like Pauline’s, has taken place with one whom she considers to be a member of another 
(lower) race. Second, a daughter is expelled/abjected by the mother in the process of giving birth, 
thereby removing the racial contamination from the mother’s body but preserving it in the person 
of the daughter, whose body forever represents the mother’s body’s forced nine-month physical 
                                                          
31See Miller 1997: 9. 
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harboring of a race not her own.32 This method of preserving and even reinforcing the mother’s 
racial hierarchy and its resultant biases requires the mother to approach her “not” race(s) more 
closely and intimately than most. For a mother in Pauline’s position, believing fervently in racial 
hierarchy and her own high status in that hierarchy, the body of her mixed race daughter is an 
enduring sign of degradation. As long as the mother is associated with her daughter, she feels 
herself associated with her own (consensual or not) degradation, nor can she stop feeling 
degraded. 
 The physicality and trauma of pregnancy and birth set the mother up further to feel her 
disgust on a visceral level later when encountering those she deems to be below her in her 
personal racial hierarchy, particularly her mixed-race daughter. Ahmed notes, “The spatial 
distinction of ‘above’ from ‘below’ functions metaphorically to separate one body from another, 
as well as to differentiate between higher and lower bodies, or more and less advanced bodies” 
(89). A mother like Pauline, then, in reacting with disgust to her daughter’s racial identity, and in 
viewing the daughter’s race as being below her own, is always again separating her body from 
that of her daughter—always again metaphorically birthing that body, expelling it, abjecting it. 
According to Ahmed, “disgust at ‘that which is below’ functions to maintain the power relations 
between above and below, through which ‘aboveness’ and ‘belowness’ become properties of 
particular bodies, objects and spaces” (89, emphasis original). Disgust becomes essential to the 
                                                          
32In the context of a mixed race birth like Maries, during these nine months, the mother’s 
physical body literally contains multiple racial identities. She is not herself multiply raced, since 
others do not necessarily know about the situation or attribute multiple races to her, but she is 
physically connected to two or more races instead of the one that she had always been and will 
again become when the daughter’s multiply raced body is no longer part of her own. Thus, this 
time of pregnancy and duality is the closest physical experience the mother will ever have to her 
daughter’s multiracialism. The multiplicity of races in her womb is completely internal and 
invisible to the outside world, but present in the mother’s own consciousness. Then, during the 
birthing process, the mother finds that, for her, such multiplicity is unsustainable: her own body 
abjects and expels the foreign race(s) to return the mother to her singly raced identity. 
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mother’s own sense of racial intactness, wholeness, dominance, and priority. Again turning to 
Miller, Ahmed concludes with this insight: “Given the fact that the one who is disgusted is the 
one who feels disgust, then the position of ‘aboveness’ is maintained only at the cost of a certain 
vulnerability […], as an openness to being affected by those who are felt to be below” (89). Even 
in situations that lack racial difference, the process of sex (invasion), pregnancy (occupation), 
labor (revolution) and birth (victory) represents/contains what might well be a woman’s ultimate 
vulnerability. Having added to this stress the experience of interacting so intimately with the 
threat and danger of racial foreignness, a mother who thus places herself above her daughter in 
her racial hierarchy will be primed to preserve her hard-won status in that hierarchy all the more 
fiercely. 
 In Pauline’s case, the fight is not just fierce, but swift. Within days of Marie’s birth, 
Pauline has abandoned her entirely to Bernadette, which means abandoning the girl also to her 
mixed-blood Indian father, Napoleon. For a time, as Sheila Hassell Hughes notes, Pauline 
transitions between the reservation and the convent and back again. She wears the gray habit of a 
Catholic novice, signifying her not-quite membership among the black-habited white nuns. She 
also claims to have a vision of Christ telling her that she is actually a white woman, not Indian or 
mixed-blood, and that she is “forgiven of [her] daughter” (Erdrich, Tracks 137).33 Freed of 
mother(s) and daughter alike, Pauline can present herself at last to God and the Church as one 
purified of the twin defilements of Indianness and sin. Hughes argues that by now Pauline “is 
more of an outsider to the tribe, and she basks in this particularity. While she sojourns 
temporarily in a liminal space, moving back and forth between the worlds of the reservation and 
                                                          
33Later, when confessing her alleged rape to Father Damien, Pauline demonstrates how 
completely she has embraced this secret forgiveness, telling Damien that her daughter was 
simply born dead—another Tracks fantasy presented in The Last Report as fact. 
110 
the convent, her ultimate direction is clear: she is moving out of the Native community, and 
upward, to the cloister on the hill” (98). Father Jude Miller confirms this whiteward/Churchward 
trajectory in The Last Report: “When her efforts to meld the two cultures failed, she chose 
decisively for the one true church and diverted the fever in her soul to the zeal of conversion. She 
was assiduous in her attempts to lead her people to the knowledge of the Holy Trinity, and used 
whatever means were at hand to effect enlightenment” (Erdrich, The Last Report 339). In fact, 
Pauline’s thirst for conversions and mindset of conversion “by any means necessary” to bring her 
birth community to whiteness—or at least to white religion—is so great that Father Damien 
suspects her of baptizing dead bodies while acting in her capacity as undertaker (122).  
 The thing Pauline demonstrates that most closely approximates love for her fellow 
Chippewa is this desire she demonstrates to bring them with her into whiteness. She eventually 
convinces many of the local Catholic faithful that she has endured great suffering “for her people 
though she was of and not of them, though she was a betrayer and yet, too, betrayed by her 
raging Puyat mother. Though she was the half sister of a medicine man gravely feared and the 
rumored mother of a child raised by dog Lazarres, she was holy. Anybody can be holy, even a 
Puyat, that proved” (Erdrich, The Last Report 129). Father Damien describes Pauline’s attitude 
towards the Indians in classic abjective love-hate terms: Pauline, he argues, displays “The love of 
a mixed blood for what is darkest communion in her nature, both the comfort and the downfall, 
source of pain and expiation, a complicated love. She loved her people but she had no patience 
with them” (Erdrich, The Last Report 238). Pauline, for her part, betrays limited ambivalence as 
whiteness crowds out her Indian self. In Tracks, she gloats, “‘The Indians,’ I said now, ‘them.’ 
Never neenawind or us” (138). She apparently forgets her longstanding refusal to speak English, 
however, and seems surprised, confused, and somewhat resentful when her formerly closest 
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friends acknowledge this shift in her allegiance: “They treated me as they would a white. I was 
ignored most of the time. When they did address me they usually spoke English,” she complains 
(145-146). In this transitional period, Pauline both loves and hates Indian identity, whether her 
own or that of others. She turns to the Catholic Church to purge her white body of its Indian—or, 
according to her, evil—contamination. In doing so, she rejects her Ojibwe community, but she 
simultaneously tries to cling to it and turn it white alongside her.  
 As has been discussed, Napoleon and Marie threaten this lifelong quest of Pauline’s for 
whiteness, putting back in her body the Indian blood she has worked so hard to abject. Pauline 
later murders Napoleon, claiming to believe that she is strangling Satan and not a man (Erdrich, 
Tracks 201-203), a story she repeats, again at times verbatim from Tracks, in The Last Report 
(272-273). Tellingly, her chosen weapon to vanquish Satan/Napoleon and their dark threat is her 
rosary, a symbol of her Catholic whiteness. In giving Marie away, meanwhile, she becomes the 
child’s secret mother—secret even to Marie herself for most of Marie’s life. In return for her 
sacrifice, she finally achieves her coveted black habit and the whiteness it connotes. 
 Thus, Pauline, alone and outcast, narcissistic and needy, finds fulfillment in using 
religion to abject her race and, as one contaminated by that race, her daughter. As the final step 
in her transformation, Pauline sheds her birth name, calling this last vestige of her Indian Puyat 
identity “no more than a crumbling skin” (Erdrich, Tracks 205). To signify her new self, she 
adopts a new name, assigned to her by the white Mother Superior: Leopolda. 
“Marie, Star of the Sea” 
 Living now as Sister Leopolda, Pauline (hereafter referred to as “Leopolda”) watches her 
daughter from afar. When Marie attends the convent’s Catholic school, Leopolda is her teacher. 
Her attentions to Marie are harsh; in Love Medicine, Marie recalls Leopolda trying to lure Marie 
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to the convent by telling her, “You have two choices. One, you can marry a no-good Indian, bear 
his brats, die like a dog. Or two, you can give yourself to God” (Erdrich 45). Surprisingly, this 
blunt, reductive approach works. Marie continues, “I could have had any damn man on the 
reservation at the time. […] I looked good. And I looked white. But I wanted Sister Leopolda’s 
heart. And here was the thing: sometimes I wanted her heart in love and admiration. Sometimes. 
And sometimes I wanted her heart to roast on a black stick” (45).  Sensing Leopolda’s conflicted 
feelings towards her, Marie reflects them back towards the woman she does not yet know to be 
her biological mother. At the same time, at least a part of her trusts Leopolda’s claims of love: 
“she had loved me, or offered me love. And she had tried to hunt the Dark One down” (46). Both 
mother and daughter use “the Dark One” to mean the devil, who wants to keep them away from 
the white religion, so Marie at this point believes that “try[ing] to hunt the Dark One down,” like 
Leopolda’s other attempts to purify her, is a sign of love.   
 What Marie does not realize is that Leopolda has already hunted the Dark One down in 
the form of Napoleon and his Indianness. Having killed Napoleon, Leopolda must now eradicate 
what remains of his supposed darkness, namely the Indian identity of Marie. This task is made 
doubly important by Leopolda’s own whiteness being comingled with Napoleon’s Indian 
darkness in the person of Marie. Kristeva sheds light on Leopolda’s plight, asking, “How can I 
be without border?” (4). For Leopolda, the whiteness and purity she professes depend on their 
absolute distinction from Indianness and impurity. In order to preserve her own whiteness, then, 
Leopolda must rescue that whiteness from the Dark One’s dark contamination within Marie. Her 
project is primarily narcissistic: she must abject her daughter, exclude the Indian, and purify 
Marie in order to keep her own image pure. Like Norma Storch, at this point Leopolda cannot 
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tolerate her daughter, who unknowingly represents her, to be less wholly white than she herself 
claims to be. 
 As with most things that Leopolda does, her attempted purification of Marie is both 
zealous and cruel. Referring again to the Dark One, she warns Marie, “I see right into you like a 
clear glass […]. I always did. […] You brought him in. […] Don’t let him touch you. We’ll be a 
long time getting rid of him” (Erdrich, Love Medicine 47). One way she tries to expel the Dark 
One from Marie is by deliberately pouring a kettle of scalding water onto the girl’s back, saying, 
“I will boil him from your mind if you make a peep, […] by filling up your ear” (49). In abusing 
Marie, Leopolda again demonstrates her abjection of Indianness in favor of whiteness in both her 
daughter and her own person. Paula Gunn Allen explains that “Native Americans did not believe 
that physical or psychological abuse of children would result in their edification. They did not 
believe that children are born in sin, are congenitally predisposed to evil, or that a good parent 
who wishes the child to gain salvation, […] can be helped to those ends by physical or emotional 
torture” (216-217). Thus, Leopolda’s view of Marie as fallen indicates a white outlook that finds 
in Marie what white society deems a problem: the corruption of not being wholly white. 
Similarly, Leopolda’s response of physically tormenting Marie’s body to expel the fallenness 
from her soul is a white strategy to reach what the white Church views as a solution: physical 
mortification, producing total conversion to a new, white identity. 
 Marie, for her part, values the whiteness she shows, and unconsciously echoes her 
mother’s desires when she dreams of becoming a saint. Mark Shackleton argues that “Marie, 
[…] is a fraud, passing as white” in order to join the convent (192), much like her mother before 
her, who had claimed in Tracks to have had a vision of Christ telling her that “despite my 
deceptive features, I was not one speck of Indian but wholly white” (Erdrich 137-138). After 
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deliberately boiling her own hands, Leopolda had exulted, “I knew there never was a martyr like 
me” because “I was hollow unless pain filled me, empty but for pain” (192). Marie lacks her 
mother’s masochism, but shares her ambition: “No reservation girl had ever prayed so hard,” she 
says at the beginning of her first narration in Love Medicine, titled “Saint Marie.” “There was no 
use in trying to ignore me any longer. I was going up there on the hill with the black robe 
women. They were not any lighter than me. I was going up there to pray as good as they could. 
Because I don’t have that much Indian blood. And they never thought that they’d have a girl 
from this reservation as a saint they’d have to kneel to. But they’d have me” (Erdrich 40).34 
Neither Leopolda nor Marie sees Indian heritage or the Church’s prejudice against Indians as 
insurmountable obstacles. Rather, both view themselves as being more truly white than Indian, 
and both believe themselves to be worthy of sainthood and worship. 
 Leopolda’s purification, however, proves to be too much for Marie. After the scalding, 
Marie temporarily loses her sense of identity: “I despaired. I felt I had no inside voice, nothing to 
direct me, no darkness, no Marie” (Erdrich, Love Medicine 50). Her cooperation and continued 
presence with Leopolda signify acceptance of Leopolda’s project, but at great cost. Marie 
experiences a psychological version of the physical revulsion and vomiting Kristeva describes as 
                                                          
34Also like Leopolda, Marie repeats her tale in The Last Report, with slight variations from the 
original. In the later version, she deemphasizes the clear division between the white nuns and 
herself by leaving out the part about being ignored and, instead of “going up there on the hill 
with” the nuns (Love Medicine 40), says she “was going up the hill with” them (The Last Report 
137), a rephrasing that suggests a shared expedition and a common destination. Instead of “I was 
going up there to pray as good as they could. Because I don’t have that much Indian blood” 
(Erdrich, Love Medicine 40), she says simply, “I’d make a saint” (The Last Report 137). She also 
shifts the focus from her resentment of the nuns’ pride in Love Medicine—“And they never 
thought that they’d have a girl from this reservation as a saint they’d have to kneel to” (40)—to 
the lack of precedent: “They never had a girl from this reservation they had to pray to” (The Last 
Report 137). The fact that Marie’s audience in The Last Report is Father Damien may explain 
why Erdrich seems to soften her account there, allowing Marie to avoid directly antagonizing the 
priest and the Church he represents. 
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the body’s response to trying to eat spoiled food: “I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself 
within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself. […] ‘I’ am in the process of 
becoming an other at the expense of my own death” (Kristeva 3). For Marie to become 
wholly/holy white, she must reject her Indian self. Leopolda had gone through a similar process, 
but at a much slower pace; Marie is being driven into her new identity by her fanatical mother 
with disorienting speed. Shortly after the scalding, Leopolda introduces Marie to some other 
nuns with the words “She is mine. […] A very good girl. […] She will shine […] when we have 
burned off the dark corrosion” (Erdrich, Love Medicine 51). Here Leopolda is drawing on 
Marie’s nickname, “Star of the Sea,” a reference to “Our Lady, Star of the Sea,” one of the 
Virgin Mary’s titles in the Catholic Church. “Our Lady, Star of the Sea” posits the Virgin Mary 
as a metaphorical guiding star, and Leopolda and Marie aim to place Marie in a similar position 
as a saint. Marie changes her mind and abandons the goal when Leopolda continues to take her 
task of “burn[ing]” literally, stabbing Marie in the hand with a poker and knocking her out. 
When Marie regains consciousness, she learns that Leopolda has explained the fresh wound on 
Marie’s hand as miraculous stigmata. Young mother Pauline/Leopolda had pronounced Marie 
marked by the devil at birth; Marie now gloats to Leopolda that “‘Christ has marked me’” (56). 
Marie then leaves the whitewashed convent with its white nuns and white Leopolda and returns 
to the reservation, marrying a full-blood Indian who, with her help, becomes the tribal chairman. 
Leopolda’s brutal attempted abjection of Marie’s Indian identity has caused Marie to do the 
opposite and embrace her Indian self, abjecting her whiteness and, unintentionally, her secret 
white mother instead.  
 In true abjective fashion, neither Marie nor Leopolda can ever quite let go of each other. 
Decades later, Marie would describe the relationship between mother and daughter thus: “There 
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was something about that nun that drew me to hate her with a deep longing. […] But the worst 
thing of all was that Sister Leopolda loved me. […] It is hard to hate a person if they love you. 
No matter what they do. What you feel in return twists between the two feelings. Not one. Not 
the other. But painful” (Erdrich, The Last Report 318). They are repelled by one another but 
drawn to each other at the same time. Marie goes to visit the dying Leopolda and finds her 
shrouded in white but wielding a “heavy black spoon” of iron and “knocking flakes of white 
paint off” her iron bedstead with it (Love Medicine 119-120). After spending her life destroying 
all vestiges of her Indian self, Leopolda has now turned on the whiteness that surrounds her. The 
spoon also evokes images of Marie’s birth, when Bernadette had used similar spoons to fight the 
young Pauline/Leopolda and draw Marie from impending death into life. Now on her deathbed, 
Leopolda tries to use the spoon to beat Marie as she had with the poker, but Marie evades and 
wrestles her mother for the weapon. She becomes transfixed by the death she sees in Leopolda’s 
eyes and feels herself sliding into it. Terrified, she calls for Leopolda to “‘Hold on!’” to the 
spoon that both still grip (122). Leopolda not only does so, but she then uses the spoon to pull 
Marie back to safety. Perhaps now that she is dying, she can, like Bernadette, use the spoon to 
draw Marie into life—a final, ultimate abjection, since life is where Leopolda will no longer be. 
Conclusion 
 Racial difference, combined with a profound lack of social support, triggers lengthy 
legacies of abjection in both Secret Daughter and Erdrich’s Pauline Puyat/Sister Leopolda saga. 
Norma and Pauline/Leopolda both find themselves carrying within their bodies daughters from 
races they otherwise dislike, even despise. Both feel that their social standing will be threatened 
if they acknowledge the daughters as their own, so they give them to other women to raise.  
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 Pauline rejects Marie from the moment she becomes aware of Marie’s conception, yet 
she can neither kill nor escape her. Marie’s existence interferes with Pauline’s plans for a life of 
holy whiteness, so Pauline’s answer is to try to end that existence. Failing in this, she moves to a 
strategy of silence and denial, an arrangement that works for years. Marie is too like her mother 
not to cross paths with her, however, which stirs up feelings in both mother and daughter that 
Pauline alone can explain, knowing their true relationship, and neither one can fully understand. 
Like Norma, Pauline fixates on the whiteness of her daughter, identifying with and promoting it 
to the point of seriously damaging the daughter—Norma psychologically, Pauline both 
psychologically and physically. She represses but cannot get rid of the maternal attraction she 
feels toward Marie, which Marie interprets as love. Even at the end of her life, she would rather 
destroy the girl-turned-woman than reconcile with her, but finds she cannot do either, so she 
resorts once again to trying to hold onto her through manipulation and abuse. She seems 
eternally set on protecting Marie’s whiteness while damning her darkness; when the two goals 
conflict, the damning wins out. 
 In social contexts that are openly hostile toward minority races, a majority woman 
aligned biologically with a minority Other can face overwhelming stigma that threatens not only 
her happiness, but also her livelihood, liberty, and life. She may find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to build a strong support network for herself under these circumstances. Without 
such a network, however, her chances of psychological and/or physical survival become even 
less. If she is supporting a daughter, and if that daughter is also the primary sign of her border-
breaking liaison with the Other, self-interest and the daughter’s interest alike can pressure her to 
hide their relationship from society’s disapproving gaze. Such strategies, whether temporary or 
permanent, seem to appear especially often in literature dealing with the U.S. before the Civil 
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Rights Era, when socially sanctioned racial prejudice was generally at its most blatant and 
widespread. To complicate matters, the woman in question in these texts might have her own 
socially cultivated biases to counteract. Her desire to separate from what she and/or her 
community deem defiling may then conflict with any love or loyalty she feels for her Self in her 
daughter. If the daughter senses her mother’s race-based abjection of her, or if her mother does 
not abject her on the basis of race but the daughter abjects the mother as a source of social 
shame, the family rift may never heal. 
 Loving v. Virginia would change the contours of race-based mother-daughter abjection, 
but not eradicate it. Instead, as outright physical separation became less common in these 









CHAPTER 4: SECRET ABJECTION 
 
Introduction 
 Before 1967, societal pressures against race mixture in the U.S. tore apart relationships 
and divided families, including physically and emotionally separating mothers and daughters 
through race-based matrilineal abjection. Amid growing unrest over racial discrimination, many 
young people, from a variety of racial backgrounds, engaged in protests and other forms of civil 
disobedience across the southern U.S. in the 1960s. Efforts like Freedom Summer, which sought 
to increase voter registration among African Americans in Mississippi in 1964, attracted college 
students, mostly white, from the North to join white and black activists in the South. The 
interracial partnerships forged in activism, made stronger through shared passion and shared 
danger, led to interracial romances, as well. 
 As late as June 11, 1967, however, sixteen states still had anti-miscegenation laws in 
place. June 12, now remembered as “Loving Day,” was the day when the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued its ruling against such laws in Loving v. Virginia. The Court sided in this case with 
Richard and Mildred Jeter Loving, an interracial couple who had been jailed by the State of 
Virginia for violating the State’s anti-miscegenation laws that forbade marriage between a 
“white” person and a non-“white” person.35 Writing on behalf of the Court, Chief Justice Warren 
                                                          
35Marriages between two non-“white” people were legal in Virginia, regardless of the race(s) and 
ethnicity/-ies of the parties involved. Chief Justice Warren cited this fact as evidence that 
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stated that “There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial 
discrimination which justifies this classification [that certain marriages are criminal based solely 
on the colors of the participants’ skin]” (Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia). Rather, he 
continued, such laws are “measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. We have 
consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on 
account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of 
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia). The Court thus overturned the 
criminal convictions of Richard and Mildred and declared their black36-white interracial 
marriage—and all interracial marriages in the U.S.—to be fully legal. 
 This decision had a slow but dramatic effect on societal acceptance of mixed-race 
individuals and their parents, ultimately inviting these families to embrace one another openly, 
without shame or fear of legal repercussions. As the number of black-white interracial unions 
and offspring rose, influxes of Latinx and Asian immigrants in the second half of the twentieth 
century also increased the number of interracial unions that did not conform to the strict black-
white binary. As discussed in the introduction to this study, within 50 years, millions of 
Americans would proudly elect and re-elect a mixed-race African American man to be President 
of the United States. “Strange to wake up and realize you’re in style,” wrote black-identifying 
mixed race author Danzy Senna in 1998. “Pure breeds (at least the black ones) are out and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Virginia’s contested law was designed to maintain the so-called racial purity of only the white 
race, a clear sign of white supremacist motivations (Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia). 
 
36The prevailing narrative of Loving v. Virginia is that Mildred Jeter Loving was a black woman. 
Arica L. Coleman notes that Mildred actually self-identified as Indian; Coleman argues that she 
was likely Afro-Indian but chose to identify as what was then the more socially acceptable—
non-black—portion of her mixed race identity. 
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hybridity is in. America loves us in all of our half-caste glory” (“The Mulatto Millennium” 12). 
From Senna, to the mixed race activists and allies who successfully fought for governmental 
recognition of multiracial identities in the 2000 U.S. Census, until the 2013 advent of Black 
Lives Matter and the open racial hostility of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, much 
of the U.S.—particularly its white inhabitants—bought into the cruelly optimistic illusion of a 
postracial America, its interracial couples and their mixed race offspring the racial canaries in the 
coal mine of U.S. culture and society.  
 Even in the racist backlash against President Barack Obama that helped to sweep white 
nationalists and their sympathizers into political office and public discourse, being of mixed race 
has generally proven no greater a liability than being identified as a non-mixed member of one’s 
minority race(s); many people would argue that identifying as a mixed race minority carries 
more social privilege than its non-mixed minority alternative. Indeed, since the early days of 
European colonization, the dominance of supposed visual markers in popular determinations of 
racial identity has often translated into a robust colorism.37 Today, as in the twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries, the closer a person’s phenotype to the Anglo-Saxon ideal, the more 
acceptable he or she is likely to be to mainstream (white) tastes—even if that acceptance can 
                                                          
37Joanne L. Rondilla and Paul Spickard explain that colorism, in which being light-skinned or 
similarly marked as a person with limited white ancestry means that one ranks lower than a 
supposedly fully white person in the social color hierarchy, but higher than someone whose body 
might be read as even less white-assimilated, is historically rooted in socioeconomic inequality. 
“For the most part, colorism in Asia is a class imperative,” they write, because “to be light is to 
be rich, for dark skin comes from working outside in the sun. The yearning to be light is a desire 
to look like rich Asians, not like Whites” (4). They argue that colorism among Asian Americans 
is similar to colorism among Asians, but also different. Colorism among Asian Americans “has 
both indigenous Asian class roots and also a colonial or post-colonial Whiteness element laid 
over it. […] Asian Americans, immigrants especially, who show a preference for light skin 
articulate their desire in old-country class terms. But […] behind that class desire lies a yearning 




only ever be marginal, due to the person’s status as essentially non-white and therefore 
permanently less-than.38  
 Momentous as the legal and cultural evolutions of the past half-century have been, it is 
increasingly evident that Loving v. Virginia did not—and arguably could not—erase centuries of 
deep-rooted American racism; rather, it contributed to pushing racism-inspired prejudices into 
the shadows. Whereas Norma Storch had all but disowned her mixed race daughter in the 1950s 
for fear of social condemnation, forcing one’s daughter out of one’s home because of her race 
would today be far more likely to trigger severe social shaming than owning the relationship. 
Nevertheless, the colonial legacies of structural racism and implicit biases have remained. Race-
based matrilineal abjection has therefore shifted from literal and physical separations to more 
subtle strategies of psychological distancing, with one such strategy being a subconscious 
objectification of a mixed race daughter by her differently, often singly raced mother. 
Abject/Object 
Abject vs. object 
 It is important to note that abjection is not, in itself, objectification. Kristeva states, 
“When I am beset by abjection, the twisted braid of affects and thoughts I call by such a name 
does not have, properly speaking, a definable object. The abject is not an ob-ject facing me, 
which I name or imagine” (1). An object—such as Kristeva’s examples of a corpse or spoiled 
food, as mentioned in Chapter 1—can lead to abjection, but the power and scope of the 
existential threat triggered in abjection transcend those of a simple object. Instead, objectification 
                                                          
38Carol Roh Spaulding, in her 2002 essay “Mongrelese,” recalls, “Gradually, I came to 
understand that being white was something I only approximated, not something I could relax 
into, taking its privilege and its anonymity for granted. I would always be white enough to pass. 
But I would never be white enough to forget how much whiteness mattered” (14). 
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can function as a technique of abjection, as will be demonstrated through the mothers and 
daughters of this chapter. 
 Objects are finite: they can be labeled and defined, caught within the boundaries of 
words, and therefore subjugated to the consciousness of the one perceiving them. In other words, 
understanding can be a form of power.39 When a person fully understands something, she 
demonstrates dominance over that thing, because she is able to take in the meaning of the thing, 
and more besides. She is epistemologically greater than the thing; her power and capacity 
encompass and exceed those of the object.40  
 The horror felt in abjection is, for the individual struggling with it, effectively infinite: it 
consumes everything else in the individual’s consciousness. It cannot be limited or contained by 
an object that might then be dismissed. The perception that one has met one’s existential match 
and now stands in real danger of being somehow swallowed up—that perception is the terror, 
and the power, of abjection.  
                                                          
39This idea is related to Michel Foucault’s linkage of knowledge and power (“Between 
techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have 
specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their difference”) (Foucault 98), but not 
quite the same. Though it suggests an active power or active dominance—some form of control 
being exerted because of the power endowed by knowledge, and in service of some goal—what I 
reference here is simply the relationship, not its result. 
 
40This is not to say that understanding something is automatically an act of aggression or 
oppression; the difference lies in the understanding that is claimed. Telling a friend, “I 
understand” or “I understand you” is usually a shorthand for “I understand that to which you are 
referring,” “I understand what you mean to say,” “I understand this facet of you,” or “I 
understand you from an outsider’s perspective (as opposed to experientially sharing your 
consciousness).” All of these examples assume some sort of qualification, whether limiting the 
thing that is understood and/or the quality, type, perspective, extent, or degree of understanding. 
All of these examples also translate that which is being understood into an object, not a subject.  
 When a person fully understands a concept or issue, on the other hand, she or he is said to 
have “mastered” it, and this kind of thorough comprehension is the type of understanding to 
which I refer here.  
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 Abject and object are not so distinct as to be wholly unrelated, however; they can 
reasonably be examined together, because they share an ontological commonality. Kristeva 
continues, “What is abject is not my correlative, which, providing me with someone or 
something else as support, would allow me to be more or less detached and autonomous. The 
abject has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I” (1). The one thing that 
abject and object will always have in common is that neither is the subject; neither is the I. 
Rather, from the standpoint of the subject, abject and object alike are existentially defined by one 
thing: the negation of I. The fact of their being demonstrates the finitude of I, since the existence 
of each inherently proves that not-I exists. 
 Despite this relationship, abject and object are not the same, nor should they be 
thoughtlessly conflated. Kristeva explains, “If the object, however, through its opposition, settles 
me within the fragile texture of a desire for meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me 
ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it, what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, 
is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses” (1-2). An object 
can be apprehended, its meaning understood. It can, in turn, endow the subject with meaning. 
The object and the subject exist in the same plane, so to understand one helps to understand the 
other, because the other is not the one—that is, the other is not the thing that has first been 
understood. This relationship means that the subject can be read as having a measure of 
dependence on the object, because the subject in this sense is the not-object. One example of this 
phenomenon is the juxtaposition of light and dark. We understand light to be the not-dark, and 
dark to be the not-light. Without knowing one, we cannot fully perceive or know the other. In the 
same way, if the subject is defined against the object, then the object will always be necessary to 
be the thing against which the subject is defined. Subject and object are, in these cases, 
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interdependent. The existence of each and their relationship of opposition are essential 
components of apprehending and/or constructing their meaning. 
 The abject, on the other hand, by representing the subject, but doing so in the form of 
existential threat to the subject, undoes meaning. The abject is the subject, in a sense, but also 
not. According to Kristeva, “If it be true that the abject simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes 
the subject, one can understand that it is experienced at the peak of its strength when that subject, 
weary of fruitless attempts to identify with something on the outside, finds the impossible within; 
when it finds that the impossible constitutes its very being, that it is none other than abject” (5). 
The abject might in this way have some sort of relationship to the object, perhaps sharing in the 
subject’s relationship to the object, or it might not. Rather than being interdependent, its meaning 
and relationships are wholly independent of the relationship between subject and object. Its 
relationships with the subject and with the object are independent of one another, as well. 
Furthermore, “To each ego its object,” writes Kristeva, and “to each superego its abject” (2). The 
mission of the ego is both pursuit and acquisition: it strives to obtain its desired object. The 
mission of the superego, the part of the psyche that regulates morality and judgment, is to repress 
the abject, to preserve in this and in other instances the integrity of the subject. Whereas the ego 
moves towards an object to include it, the superego moves both towards and away from the 
abject to exclude it. 
Both abject and object 
 In this chapter, I argue that the mother-daughter pairs referenced above abject not the 
entirety of each other, but rather a single, significant part: racial identity. Even though abject and 
object are not the same, the abjection of such a key element of the other person is so strong that 
it results in the objectification of the whole person.  
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 Objectification can be a technique of abjection, since it creates emotional separation 
between subject/abjector and object/abject via detachment or even dehumanization. 
Objectification becomes a way of coping with the horror of the existential threat presented by the 
abject; it allows the abjector to affirm to the abjected object, “You are not like me; we are two 
entirely separate entities. As I and not-I—even more as human and inhuman—we are 
ontologically dissimilar, and therefore you no longer threaten my sense of the being and meaning 
of I, because (now) you are irrelevant to both.” As long as the objectification continues, the I is 
prevented from identifying or being identified with the abject. The I thus saves itself, however 
temporarily, from that which would otherwise undo it.  
 Objectification often evokes a sense of dominance of subject/abjector over object/abject. 
This, combined with the safety discussed above, relieves the fear inherent in abjective horror by 
empowering the abjector and diminishing the abjected. At the same time, objectification also 
bespeaks the paradoxical desire the abjector has for the abject. Through objectification, she who 
is objectified becomes ontologically irrelevant to the abjector, but remains highly emotionally 
and psychologically relevant, because objectification requires the ab-/objectifier to engage with 
the ab-/objectified. To objectify someone, the abjector must consider her; she must look at and 
pay attention to her. This attention might be negative or distasteful, but it is attention 
nonetheless.  
 Objectification thus reduces the terror the abjected object holds for the abjector, but it 
also preserves that lessened terror by establishing the ongoing relationship of objectification 
between abjector and the abject now-object. What makes abjective objectification all the more 
insidious in human relationships is that it need not appear hostile or unloving. The separation 
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between abjector and abjected is emotional and psychological, not necessarily physical, and it 
can easily be masked—including to the abjector herself.41  
 For each mother and daughter analyzed here, the abjection of her respective other’s race 
threatens to overwhelm any other aspect of character or relationship between the two women. 
This abjection comes to define the other and reduces the rest of her being to a shell whose 
function is to contain the abjected race. To the abjector, the whole, multifaceted, complex 
woman becomes a one-dimensional symbol of the thing abjected. In this distorted view, the 
woman identified with the abjected race is objectified. She is objectified because her function, to 
the abjector, is to represent the entirety of the abjected race; her relationship to the abjector 
thereby represents the abjector’s engagement with that race. She is a static, passive stage upon 
which the abjector enacts and displays her own racial progressiveness. 
Tangible abjection and intangible racial hierarchy 
 Unlike Norma Storch and Pauline “Sister Leopolda” Puyat, the mothers in this chapter 
fight for proximity to their daughters. They clearly prioritize public, geographical, and emotional 
closeness to their little girls. All three separate from their respective spouses but maintain 
primary or joint custody of their minor daughters, and the evolving mother-daughter 
relationships seem to outsiders to be healthy and loving. These mothers further all have a track 
record of consciously affirming their daughters’ minority racial identities, regardless of whether 
they themselves share those minority identities. Next to Norma and Leopolda, the mothers in this 
chapter evidence admirable responsibility and care—at least on the surface. 
                                                          
41For example, what appears to be careful, protective parenting on the one hand can also be an 
objectification that frames the child as property to be guarded at all costs, including the child’s 
voice and agency. 
128 
 Loving one’s daughter does not preclude instinctively recoiling in abjective disgust from 
some aspect of her identity42, however, and this disgust can be well hidden. In considering how 
some loving mothers can become paradoxically disgusted by their daughters’ racial identities, it 
is helpful to consider racial hierarchy as observed in society; internalized; flipped if necessary in 
order to revalue the mother’s supposedly pure race above the daughter’s contaminated hybridity; 
and then exported, consciously or unconsciously, by the mother. The mother has a variety of 
coping mechanisms available to her to camouflage the disgust, including denial of the racial 
difference or its significance, as well as the abjective objectification explored in this chapter. 
 Even if the mother’s disgust appears to pertain to the daughter herself, rather than to her 
racial identity, in a mixed race situation such an interpretation merits further interrogation. The 
daughter could actually be a secondary object of disgust, with the true object being her race. 
Through association, the daughter in this scenario becomes a substitute or stand-in for her entire 
race, as when Ahmed writes, “Through sticking […] two objects together (adherence), disgust 
allows the subject to recoil, as if from an object, even given the lack of an inherent quality to the 
object. It is the metonymic contact between objects or signs that allows them to be felt to be 
disgusting as if that was a material or objective quality” (88). A daughter is not her race, but the 
mother might unconsciously equate the two, repress the prejudice and/or the equation, and 
change her treatment of the daughter as a result—implicit bias, family-style. 
Resisting abjection-driven objectification 
 The woman embodying the abjected race frequently resents this perceived objectification 
of her multidimensional self. She struggles to show herself as more than her racial identity to her 
abjector. Her goal is that the abjector will one day recognize that she is, in fact, a whole, complex 
                                                          
42Rather, one demonstrates the strength and quality of one’s maternal love by overcoming any 
instinctive disgust and continuing to love. 
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human person, not just a container for an abjected race. She will not be satisfied until she sees 
that the abjector has developed beyond the objectification. The abjector may still abject the race, 
or not; the other is simply looking for the abjector to prove that she truly sees the other as more 
than a racial incarnation. Until the other believes that the abjector has changed in this way and no 
longer objectifies her, the two parties will be locked in conflict. 
 This pattern is not gender-bound or exclusive to mothers and daughters. In John Blake’s 
study of adult children of leading civil rights activists, Blake notes a variety of mixed-race 
parent-child relationships with a similar dynamic. Of the 24 adult children interviewed, Blake 
writes, “A large number […] are emotionally distant from their parents who, they say, are more 
suited for protest than parenthood” (xi). Such feelings of alienation appear on both sides of the 
relationship: “Many movement veterans […] have not been able to build close relationships with 
their children. They lead lives that are adrift, rarely connecting with anyone or anything” (Blake 
38-39). Despite—or perhaps because of—successfully birthing and raising a movement, these 
parents simultaneously ended up forming dysfunctional relationships with their children. 
 Some adult children even seem to have experienced a dynamic similar to sibling rivalry 
with the movement. Their activist parents struggle(d) to convince them that, although the 
movement required the bulk of the parents’ time and attention, the children were also always 
important and beloved, too. For example, in 1979, Alice Walker wrote, “I feel very little guilt 
about the amount of time ‘taken from my daughter’ by my work. I was amazed that she could 
exist and I could read a book at the same time. And that she easily learned that there are other 
things to enjoy besides myself. Between an abstracted, harassed adult and an affectionate sitter 
[…] there is no contest” (In Search of Our Mother's Gardens 381). Yet, more than three decades 
later, in 2012, Walker would write in her foreword to Mama’s Child: “These children, […] 
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would later critique everything their parents had done, and find us wanting. For we were focused 
on ‘changing the world’ at a time—their childhoods, when they rightly felt we should have been 
focusing solely on attending to them” (viii). As this chapter will demonstrate, in some of these 
cases, what the parent experienced as peace, the child experienced as neglect. 
 The cases of mother and daughter are complicated by the added factor of betrayed 
sisterhood. Historically, civil rights race activism and women’s rights activism in the U.S. 
overlapped chronologically and ideologically, and many women became activists for both causes 
simultaneously. The concepts of sisterhood, coalition-building, and “the personal [being] 
political” fostered an expectation among the daughters of these activists that they would be their 
mothers’ daughters and sisters. Indeed, in her 1979 essay “One Child of One’s Own,” Alice 
Walker herself wrote of then-10-year-old Rebecca, “We are together, my child and I. Mother and 
child, yes, but sisters really, against whatever denies us all that we are” (382). To be not only 
seen as less than their mother-sisters’ equals, but racially abjected and publicly objectified 
instead on top of that was doubly injurious.  
 Three decades after Alice Walker publicly declared that Rebecca was her sister, Rebecca, 
writing bitterly of her then-estranged mother, would recall, “According to the strident feminist 
ideology of the Seventies, women were sisters first, and my mother chose to see me as a sister 
rather than a daughter” (R. Walker, “How my mother's”). Meanwhile, Alice and other activist 
mothers expected that their daughters would, as dutiful daughters and activist sisters, support a 
movement that the daughters had come to see as harmful and hypocritical. In that same 2008 
article, Rebecca says of her mother’s neglect, “I never complained. I saw it as my job to protect 
my mother and never distract her from her writing. It never crossed my mind to say that I needed 
some time and attention from her” (R. Walker, “How my mother's”). Rebecca appears to have 
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reached adulthood viewing herself as a guardian of Alice and her work. As an adult, however, 
Rebecca took on the paradoxical roles of heir and counterbalance/corrective to Alice’s legacy. In 
2007, Rebecca gave an interview to The Guardian and suggested that her familial rift with Alice 
could be traced to their first major philosophical one: “The problems began when I did my first 
book [To Be Real in 1995] and really raised the issue of dogma in feminist communities. There 
was a sense I was undermining her work” (Krum). Given the subtitle of To Be Real: Telling the 
Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism, Alice’s interpretation of Rebecca’s new, relatively 
untested work as somehow going against Alice’s own decades-long, hard-fought oeuvre is 
understandable. Thus, the respective expectations and resentment of Alice and Rebecca and 
similar mother-daughter pairs sometimes compounded each other until one or both parties 
focused on them and ignored or forgot other aspects of their mother-daughter relationships. For 
some, their relationships cracked and then broke under the strain—one of many factors at work 
in the rise of mixed-race activism and third wave feminism.  
 Mothers of mixed race daughters sometimes abject the racial heritage of their daughters 
that they do not—cannot, and may not desire to—share; daughters, for their part, can abject their 
mothers’ race(s) or what, compared to their own multiple racial identifications, they may see as a 
lack of race(s) in their mothers. Such abjections need not be conscious or deliberate. Even if they 
do not lead to physical separation, they can still result in psychological separation and emotional 
distancing. Depending on the strength of the abjective reaction to the mother’s or daughter’s 
race(s) (or lack thereof), such abjection, rooted in race, can overwhelm other aspects of the 
person in the mind of the abjector, causing the abjected person to be objectified. The effects of 
this abjection-objectification then worsen when combined with other significant social pressures, 
such as feminist activism. We see this narrative fully enacted in the fictional works of Mama’s 
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Child, by Joan Steinau Lester, and Caucasia, by Danzy Senna. Its real-life counterpart is best 
seen in the relationship of author-activists Alice and Rebecca Walker. 
The Narratives: Mama’s Child, Caucasia, and Alice and Rebecca Walker 
Mama’s Child 
 Joan Steinau Lester’s Mama’s Child, published in 2013, records roughly thirty years of 
the tempestuous relationship between Elizabeth “Lizzy”/“Liz” O’Leary Jordan and her daughter, 
Ruby Jordan. Liz, a college dropout and lifelong activist from a white working-class family in 
Ohio, meets and marries Solomon Jordan, a talented black musician and visionary, in Mississippi 
in 1964, when both are volunteering as part of Freedom Summer. The couple move to Berkeley, 
California, and have two children: a son, Che, and a daughter, Ruby. 
 As the 1960s become the 1970s, both Solomon and Liz are working full-time, Solomon 
as a musician and Liz as a college English instructor. Both remain politically active, but Liz 
struggles to juggle her activism with her job and with raising the children, a responsibility 
Solomon leaves mostly to her. They no longer bond over shared activism: with the rise of the 
Black Power Movement, Liz becomes more conspicuous and less welcome at African American 
protest gatherings. Overworked and overwhelmed, Liz shifts her focus to women’s liberation, 
specifically in her own home. Solomon is unreceptive, and the couple divorces. 
 After the split, Solomon takes 13-year-old Che to live with him, while 11-year-old Ruby 
is forced to stay with her mother. Neither sibling supports this arrangement, but Ruby feels 
especially bitter, blaming Liz entirely for the divorce and the subsequent separation of brother 
from sister. Liz makes matters worse by suddenly rejecting many traditional aspects of 
motherhood, including the moniker “Mom.” Ruby interprets Liz’s self-liberation as maternal 
abandonment. When Liz tries to restore a measure of their former mother-daughter bond, Ruby 
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cannot see her efforts as anything more than selfish hypocrisy. Solomon, Che, and later Ruby 
move to New York City, where Ruby replaces the woman she sees as a wannabe black mother 
with an actual black mother, then cuts off all contact with Liz for several years. It requires a 
promise to Solomon on his death-bed for Ruby to consider letting go of her grudge. In the 
meantime, Liz must learn to let go of her daughter. 
Caucasia 
 Caucasia starts out with a similarly dysfunctional, activist family, again a white mother, a 
black father, and two children. Here, however, both children are female, and the major 
distinction between them is one of skin tone, not gender. Cole, the elder sister, appears to be 
unmistakably black like the girls’ father, Deck; Birdie, the younger sister and the narrator of 
Caucasia, can pass as being wholly white like the girls’ mother, Sandy. 
 Once again, racial activism combined with divorce is the catalyst for sibling separation. 
Like Liz and Solomon in Mama’s Child, Sandy and Deck meet through their participation in 
1960s racial activism. They marry, have their two daughters, and remain heavily involved in 
protests and other civil disobedience on behalf of racial equality. When their relationship 
disintegrates in the 1970s, Sandy, like Liz, continues her activist work on her own. Sandy is 
more volatile than Liz, however, and participates in an underground group that is willing to use 
violence to achieve their goals. Fearful that the FBI is monitoring her illegal activities, Sandy 
convinces her now ex-husband Deck that they both must go into hiding. They decide that they 
will be less conspicuous if they split up and each take the daughter whose skin tone more closely 
matches their own, and so one night, Deck and Cole vanish, while Sandy and Birdie embark on a 
four-year period of nomadic living at various locations throughout New England. To aid in their 
ruse, Sandy and Birdie change their names to “Sheila” and “Jesse,” respectively, and they invent 
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a dead Jewish husband for Sheila to explain any perceived ethnic differences between mother 
and daughter. 
Alice and Rebecca Walker 
 Writer and activist Alice Walker married white Jewish civil rights activist and lawyer 
Mel Leventhal in 1967 in Mississippi. Their daughter, Rebecca Grant Leventhal,43 arrived two 
years later. The family moved north, but the marriage, unfortunately, did not last.44 At first, 
young Rebecca stayed with her mother, but when Alice decided to leave Washington, D.C., for 
California, the parents worked out a new custody agreement in which Rebecca would alternate 
between their homes for two years at a time. 
 Living her life in two-year intervals, Rebecca moved through her adolescence with 
shifting and conflicting loyalties. She changed her name from “Rebecca Leventhal” to “Rebecca 
Walker” in order to align herself more closely with her biological mother; she has spoken on 
multiple occasions of guiltily catching herself calling her white stepmother “Mom.” Kristi Siegel 
notes that “for [a] daughter the mother functions as a distant mirror; the daughter, early on, 
constructs herself around the figure of the mother and sees the mother as the projection of her 
own future” (8). Rebecca indeed followed in Alice’s footsteps as a writer, speaker, and feminist 
activist, but the content of her message has often differed dramatically from that of her mother, 
as will be explored throughout this chapter. 
                                                          
43Wanting to foreground her mother’s name over her father’s, Rebecca would later legally 
change her name to “Rebecca Leventhal Walker.” Her writing and activism as an adult have 
been carried out under the name “Rebecca Walker.” To distinguish between the mother and 
daughter Walkers, I will refer to each by her first name. 
 
44All three of the family situations analyzed in this chapter involve 1960s-/1970s-/1980s-era race 
activists who marry across racial lines but divorce while their children are young. This narrative 
reflects that of many couples who married interracially during that time. A 2008 study found that 
46.3% of interracial couples who married before 1980 had divorced within the first ten years of 
marriage (Bratter and King). 
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 A major difference between Rebecca’s two homes was that the place she shared with 
Alice in San Francisco was a single-parent home, while her father’s home had two parents. 
Alice, whose writing career exploded during Rebecca’s teenage years—The Color Purple was 
published in 1983, when Rebecca was approximately 16—was often called away on writing and 
speaking engagements, leaving Rebecca to stay home in order to attend school and, with a pre-
arranged allowance for groceries, largely fend for herself. Rebecca thus grew up feeling that her 
mother objectified and neglected her. As an adult, she would make many of her grievances 
public in a series of books, articles, and other writing and speeches of her own. The rift between 
the women eventually became so great that by the mid-2000s they no longer spoke directly to 
each other, instead making passive-aggressive comments about one another in various 
interviews, blog posts, and more as the years went by. 
Mother’s Racial Abjection(s) 
 Social psychologists have insisted for many years that even the best-intentioned and most 
enlightened people can be susceptible to developing unconscious, socially and culturally 
conditioned biases. Citing research by Nosek et al.45, for example, Jennifer Joy-Gaba and Brian 
Nosek explain that “implicit social group biases such as associating positive concepts with White 
people more easily than with Black people. […] are pervasive and can exist even in those who 
espouse egalitarian values” (137). The mothers discussed in this chapter are no exception: despite 
all of their racial awareness and activism, each displays what seem to be racial prejudices at one 
time or another. Two of the three women—Liz O’Leary and Alice Walker—are self-aware 
enough to acknowledge these mindsets and try to combat them, while Sandy Lee, in her efforts 
to blend in with her overwhelmingly white community, appears to forget that black people (with 
                                                          
45Nosek, Brian A., et al. “Pervasiveness and correlates of implicit attitudes and stereotypes.” 
European Review of Social Psychology, vol. 18, 2007, pp. 36-88. Accessed 16 Mar 2017. 
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the possible exception of the long-absent Cole) exist at all, much less that her own “Jewish” 
daughter is one of them. 
Mama’s Child: A white mother rejects her own whiteness 
 In Mama’s Child, Liz does not recognize her daughter as a miniature version of herself. 
Rather, Ruby represents the black woman that Liz longs to be. Liz mentions more than once in 
the novel how important her own Irish-Jewish refugee family’s activism on behalf of labor 
unions had been in shaping her outlook as she was growing up. “I’d grown up on persecution 
stories,” she explains. “These tales, told so often they formed my cellular structure, had led me to 
believe that a wronged people was always right, forever cheered on, and that my place was by 
their side” (Lester 50). By the time Liz reaches adulthood, she is actively looking for a cause to 
embrace, herself. She separates from her family by choosing not labor unions, but civil rights and 
racial justice. In dropping out of college and traveling from Ohio to Mississippi, then leaving her 
white family to marry into a black one, she completes her shift from childhood Liz into her new 
adult self. 
 Liz is not black, a fact that she bemoans repeatedly in the early stages of the narrative, 
when Ruby is a young child living at home and being influenced by her parents’ racial activism. 
In one such passage, Liz recalls thinking “for the thousandth time, why am I so pale, the classic 
red-headed milky white? In a political crowd my skin always screamed white, white, white, like 
a neon light shining out from the earth tones around us” (Lester 17). The comparison between 
Liz’s whiteness and “neon light” here conveys more than the idea that Liz feels she stands out. 
This particular pairing emphasizes how artificial Liz feels among the natural “earth tones” of her 
fellow activists. The darker skin of the people she sees at the rallies makes them look as if they 
belong there; meanwhile, Liz imagines that her own skin looks fake and blindingly white to 
137 
those who see her. She and Solomon have manufactured her place among the black activists, and 
she knows she will never belong in the black community the way that her husband and children 
do. Just as a person in darkness instinctively turns away from bright neon light, in a move highly 
reminiscent of the recoiling of abjection, so Liz envisions the responses to her skin to be: she 
projects the abjection she herself feels towards her own whiteness onto onlookers, as well. 
 Liz is not the only Jordan parent who views her whiteness as a liability, however. A 
proud member of both the Black Power and the Black Arts Movements, Solomon starts to 
distance himself from his wife and eventually bars her from attending political meetings with 
him. At one rally the young family attends, he suddenly separates himself from Liz, taking Che 
and then-baby Ruby with him and leaving Liz, in her words, “on my own, a solo white woman 
bereft of my usual cover” (Lester 29). He tries to excuse his conduct after the fact with “I’m 
sorry […]. But you know how it is, honey. . . .,” to which Liz responds reproachfully, “I thought 
we didn’t settle for ‘how it is.’ We’re trying to make ‘how it is’ be different” (Lester 30). This 
pattern of behavior escalates until shortly before the divorce, when Solomon again refuses to be 
seen with Liz, this time dispensing with any apology and jeering, “Oh yeah, I can see strolling 
into the All-African People’s Revolutionary Party meeting with a paleface on my arm. Great” 
(Lester 33). Thus, after fifteen years, the activism that had once inspired Liz and Solomon’s 
transgressive transracial love also snuffs it out. 
 Both before and after the divorce, there are times when Liz identifies herself with 
blackness, but idealization of black identity seems her more common mindset. Sara Ahmed 
explains the complexity of identification and its relationship to love thus: “identification is a 
form of love; it is an active kind of loving, which moves or pulls the subject towards another. 
Identification involves the desire to get closer to others by becoming like them” (126). However, 
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as Ahmed points out, identification necessarily separates lover from beloved, since, if one is 
merely like another, one cannot actually be that other (126). When Liz identifies with black 
people and, in particular, with her black/biracial children, she also underscores her separation 
and difference from them. 
 Idealization requires a similar simultaneous yearning love for, and necessary distinction 
from, that which is idealized. Ahmed describes the phenomenon as a combination of “dis-
identification with […] and desire for,” also noting that it “is based on a relation of having rather 
than being” (126-127). Liz’s idealization—even sublimation—of blackness, foreshadowed by 
her childhood identification with the oppressed, explains her abjection of whiteness in general 
and of her own whiteness in particular. “Through sublimation,” Kristeva writes, “I keep [the 
abject] under control” (11). Feeling tremendous guilt over her white privilege and her 
complicity, voluntary or not, in the systems of oppression that enable white privilege to exist, Liz 
tries to cope with her feelings of shame by abjecting the whiteness that she feels shames her. 
This strategy takes on an extra urgency as she becomes less welcome among the black activists; 
if they no longer allow her to be (almost) one of them, that means that they are abandoning her to 
her whiteness. She will no longer be able to congratulate herself on being so immersed in her 
black community that she is practically black herself, and therefore exempt from the viscerally 
horrifying role of oppressor. Instead, her former community’s—and her own—condemnation of 
white oppressors will include condemnation of her. 
 Part of Liz’s method of abjecting whiteness is to sublimate what the narrative frames as 
the opposite of whiteness: blackness. Explaining the relationship between abjection and 
sublimation, Kristeva continues, “The abject is edged with the sublime. It is not the same 
moment on the journey, but the same subject and speech bring them into being” (11). In Liz’s 
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case, the subject who is abjecting and sublimating is Liz. The speech she wishes to convey is her 
guilt. In order to contain the whiteness she has chosen to abject, and in an effort to separate her 
abjected white identity from herself, she sublimates blackness and tries to identify with it instead. 
In this way, she hopes, the blackness she idealizes will come between her and the whiteness she 
hates.  
 In chapter 1 of this project, I discussed Norma’s race-based abjection of June as being in 
accordance with her possible narcissism. Ahmed, like Kristeva, draws a connection between 
abjection—in this case, abjection as a corollary of sublimation/idealization—and narcissism:  
The idealisation of the object is not ‘about’ the object, or even directed to the 
object, but is an effect of the ego. That is, the ideal object, as with the ego ideal, is 
an effect of the ideal image that the subject has of itself. […] 
 The ideal joins rather than separates the ego and the object; what one ‘has’ 
elevates what one ‘is.’ One consequence of this argument would be a redefinition 
of anaclitic love as a sublimated form of narcissism: […] exaltation of [the] 
beloved is a means of self-exaltation, in which the ‘object’ stands in for the 
subject, as a sign of its worth. […] Or, as Julia Kristeva suggests: ‘The lover is a 
narcissist with an object’ (Kristeva 1987: 33, emphasis Kristeva’s). (Ahmed 128) 
 
Whiteness shames Liz, so she abjects it. Idealizing blackness confirms her separation from 
whiteness. Idealizing blackness leads her to affiliate herself as much as possible with black 
people, which in turn allows her to replace her shame with righteous pride. Specifically, Liz uses 
her relationships with her black family and community, and her involvement in racial activism, 
to prove that she, unlike her white peers, is not a white oppressor. Her interracial marriage and 
mixed race children become her badge of innocence, and have the added bonus of leading some 
white people to include her in their racist abjections of black people—a secondary badge of 
innocence, as far as Liz is concerned. 
 Liz still idealizes blackness after Solomon and Che leave, but she flounders in her 
attempts to maintain her identification with black people. Years later, she would recall 
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establishing a routine after the divorce, in which she would meet at a bar with a group of friends 
and coworkers, only one of whom was white. At those gatherings, she “tried any trick not to sit 
by Molly, the other white regular. Desperate to blend in, as had been my habit for so many years, 
I needed to be buffered by at least one African American on either side. […] I’d casually grab a 
chair from another table to push in somewhere else, anywhere else, so long as I was surrounded 
by black. My people, I thought, only half ironically” (Lester 229). At this point, Liz is still trying 
to become black, but without Solomon’s cover, everyone but Liz herself reads her as wholly 
white again. Even Liz has trouble maintaining the illusion that she is really “black,” which is 
why she gravitates towards black bodies, so she can visually associate herself with them. Notice 
that Lester does not name specific people to whom Liz would go, an omission that undermines 
Liz’s carefully crafted identity as an activist and betrays her self-absorption: the identities of the 
bodies Liz seeks do not matter to her, as long as the skin covering those bodies is black.  
 Even as a child, Ruby realizes how her mother is using blackness and black people, 
including her. She deeply resents her mother’s racial manipulation, particularly as it pertains to 
her—thus laying the foundation for decades of bitterness between them. But Liz fails to 
acknowledge the damage she is doing to her daughter. Instead, after Solomon’s departure, Liz 
tries to find a black female role model to mentor Ruby. When she discovers Abi, a strong and 
successful career woman who is also of mixed race, Liz eagerly tries to force a friendship 
between the two. Neither Ruby nor Abi is interested in such a relationship, but Liz persists, 
congratulating herself on how she is caring for her daughter. Habiba Ibrahim reveals one of the 
potential problems with such a project: “If motherhood and parenthood more generally are not 
racially neutral contrivances, then the multiracial, parental concern for childhood self-esteem is 
not innocent as antiracist practice” (88). Liz thinks her goal is to foster a healthy racial 
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identification in Ruby, one that includes appropriate self-esteem; in reality, Liz wants to raise her 
own self-esteem as it relates to her mothering and activism. Ruby gives Liz continuing political 
justification and purpose: when “the multiracial child emerges as an important figure for 
devising an antiracism to which a politics of the interracial family can be tethered […] it also 
enables maternity to emerge as the new ground from which racial, particularly interracial, 
politics can be reconstructed” (Ibrahim 85). In racial terms, Ruby’s racially oppressed existence 
provides Liz with a cause to fight for and a significance that the singly raced, wholly racially 
liberated Liz does not have on her own. 
 Ironically, the way in which Liz goes about trying to help Ruby become a strong black 
woman actually depends upon and maintains a social weakening of black women as a group. 
Ibrahim continues, “The way in which the white mothers of multiracial children rely on the 
morality of maternal love or affect exploits, to a large degree, the manner in which black mothers 
have little purchase to this emotional connection when it comes to their own children” (89). 
When Liz reflects proudly upon the way in which she is taking pains to find the racial role model 
for Ruby that she cannot be herself, she fails to recognize that part of her pride comes from 
comparing herself to other mothers, including black mothers. Liz is white, but she is also loving 
and enlightened enough to give up part of her time with and control over Ruby in order to share 
Ruby with another mother-figure. This sacrifice does have elements of nobility to it, but Liz can 
only make it because she has the privilege of raising her daughter as she sees fit, accepted and 
unquestioned by society. Like many of the real-life mothers whom Liz represents, she would be 
mortified if she realized the harmful implications of her self-congratulation; her motivations 
might involve some selfishness, but they are not malicious or consciously racist. Ibrahim 
explains, “This is not to say that the white mothers who wish to describe or construct a politics 
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around the meaning of multiracial maternity are actively invested in devaluing black 
motherhood. However, the very project of creating either a moral framework or a politics 
through maternal affect requires a paradoxically unsettling critique of the (shaky) ground that 
makes this seem viable” (89). In Liz’s case, the negative critique of her handling of mothering a 
differently raced daughter would seem to be borne out by two important plot details. The first is 
that Abi, instead of being Ruby’s friend and mentor, becomes Liz’s first lesbian lover—a 
symbolic revelation of how easily Liz can change her focus from Ruby to herself. The second is 
that years later, when Ruby is in college and finds her own surrogate “black mother” to 
supplement her “white mother” (174), Liz struggles to respond with grace instead of hurt and 
indignation. Giving up her maternal supremacy in Ruby’s life proves to be much more difficult 
than she had anticipated. 
 Many years later, after Liz’s family have all left California for the East Coast, and after 
she and Ruby have become estranged, Liz finally stops trying to camouflage her own whiteness 
with her children’s blackness. She comes to this realization while working in her garden, a 
situation echoing the color comparison she had made in the novel’s beginning. As quoted 
previously, Liz had described her whiteness standing out “like a neon light […] from the earth 
tones around us” when she and Solomon gathered with fellow black activists (Lester 17). Now, 
in her garden, doing work she had once used as a coping mechanism and a bonding activity with 
her children, Liz again sees the stark difference between the color of her now-lone body and that 
of the earth, and this time she can no longer pretend the difference away. “Since I couldn’t see 
myself except in a mirror, it was easy to imagine I faded into the dark. But now, tamping down 
earth around my green beans, I had to acknowledge that I was irrefutably white” (229). 
Surprisingly, the embrace of whiteness that she has so long feared and avoided turns out to be an 
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uplifting move: “That’s my people. White folks, with all our ugly contradictions. From slavery to 
John Brown. That’s us. That’s me. What a relief to admit it, even for a second. I felt my body 
relax” (229). With these words, Liz stops abjecting whiteness—stops trying to defend the mental 
wall she has built between herself and the white oppressors—and allows white identity to fully 
permeate the bounds of her self. Reveling in this new self-acceptance, she laughs while 
marveling, “Had I truly forgiven myself the accident of my skin?” (229). It is at this point that 
she stops living in racial codependence on her children and can cease usurping Ruby’s place and 
trying to fight her (now adult) daughter’s battles for her. The estrangement had come about in 
large part due to Liz’s stifling of Ruby’s racial subjectivity; once Liz has achieved wholeness 
and peace in her own racial identification, she can at last step back and let Ruby negotiate race 
on her own behalf. 
Caucasia: A white activist mother fights for, then against, black identity 
 Like Liz, Caucasia’s Sandy becomes an advocate for civil rights in part as a way to 
establish her own adult identity and to rebel against her family of origin. Her parents, like author 
Danzy Senna’s mother in real life, come from long-established white New England families. 
Like Liz, again, Sandy becomes heavily involved in fighting for racial justice; unlike Liz, 
however, Sandy seems to be perfectly comfortable with supporting violence if necessary to win 
the fight for racial equality in the U.S. Her heavy involvement in resistance efforts puts a target 
on her back, in her own mind and possibly in the minds of many others. 
 Once Sandy goes into hiding, though, she asserts new ownership over the personal 
identity of her young daughter, Birdie. Like Liz, but with Birdie in tow, Sandy goes on a long 
journey of self-discovery and self-fulfillment—in Sandy’s case, as part of a physical journey—
during which she struggles in her role as Birdie’s sole provider. Both mothers, having held 
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traditional housewifely responsibilities pre-divorce, stop cooking. They experiment with 
lesbianism, Liz in a series of relationships and Sandy while living with Birdie on a women’s 
commune. 
 Mama’s Child and Caucasia take place on opposite U.S. coasts, but in the same general 
time period and much the same national context. Both Liz and Sandy have spent years as 
passionate white allies. To their mutual dismay, their participation in the fight for racial equality 
becomes less valued, even rejected, as the years go by. Whereas Liz reacts by abjecting 
whiteness, Sandy abjects blackness. Pre-flight, when Birdie complains that Deck’s new 
girlfriend, a black woman, openly prefers dark-skinned Cole to her, Sandy speaks bitterly of 
ingratitude and betrayal: “‘So, Miss Black and Beautiful doesn’t think you’re good enough, huh? 
You probably remind her of me, and that’s what they’re all trying to forget these days, you 
know—that they ever dabbled in the nitty-gritty land of miscegenation. Well, you can tell her 
and that righteous brotherman—your father—that it’s my white ass that’s going to end up in 
prison!’” (Senna, Caucasia 114). Liz holds fast to her activism, racial and otherwise, after her 
divorce from Solomon, but Sandy’s fear and resentment lead her to reject Deck and the entire 
African American community along with him. 
 The primary exception to Sandy’s animosity towards black people is Cole. Years into her 
flight with Birdie, Sandy stills gets a look in her eyes that Birdie recognizes as betraying when 
her mother is missing Cole. Sandy mourns her inability to be all things to her firstborn, an 
inability she blames in part on race. Her insecurity predates the family split but deepens and 
festers once mother and daughter are no longer in close physical proximity to one another. At 
that point, all Sandy has left of Cole are regrets and lamentations. For example, at one point, she 
tells Birdie, “‘I used to think that if I could just learn to cornrow, she would stay mine. 
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Remember the way her hair looked that first time she got it done, at Danny’s His and Hers, so 
tight and gold and pretty? She was a gorgeous child, wasn’t she?” (152) Birdie, whose hair lacks 
the texture that necessitated Cole’s cornrows, is not inextricably associated with blackness in her 
mother’s mind like Cole is; therefore, Birdie inspires no such lingering emotional attachment to 
blackness. 
 By the time Sandy and Birdie settle down in rural New Hampshire, Sandy’s mo(u)rning 
routine includes daily mantras in Cole’s honor that Birdie describes as being so pain-filled that 
they “sounded like a child crying or a cat in heat. Unpleasant. Pleading. […] The sound was 
grating, unsettling” (166). Sometimes, when Sandy “remembered what was missing, […] there 
was no cheering her up” according to Birdie (156), because “There was nothing I could say to 
make my mother feel better, nobody I could become” (152). Not only does Birdie not force an 
association with blackness on Sandy, she cannot even approximate it like the memory of Cole 
does. 
 In fact, for Birdie, Sandy seems not only to forget her daughter’s blackness, but to be 
trying to stamp out any last vestiges of black identity. Occasionally, Birdie remarks, Sandy 
“liked to remind me that I wasn’t really passing because Jews weren’t really white, more like an 
off-white. She said they were the closest I was going to get to black and still stay white. ‘Tragic 
history, kinky hair, good politics,’ she explained. ‘It’s all there’” (Senna, Caucasia 140). Despite 
these surface similarities, however, Sandy’s selection of Jewishness as Birdie’s non-white 
identity is neither automatic, nor random, nor solely occasioned by Birdie’s phenotype.  
Blackness and Jewishness in Caucasia and Mama’s Child 
 For many people, blackness and Jewishness exist in uneasy tension in the U.S. Citing 
sociologist Nathan Glazer, Lori Harrison-Kahan notes that Jewish and African American 
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communities fought side-by-side for civil rights; “In the 1970s, however, this alliance 
disintegrated […]. Glazer attributes this split to the slowing of African American economic 
progress (in relation to Jewish success) and to the related onset of the Black Power movement, 
with its segregationist impulse. Blacks also began to question the motivation behind Jewish 
involvement in civil rights” (23). Helena Meyers, on the other hand, writes provocatively of an 
“oppositional positioning of blackness and Jewishness” in U.S. culture, adding that “the two-
pronged mythology of a golden age of black-Jewish relations undone by black nationalism 
and/or Jewish neoconservatism reinforces this polarization” (125).46 The result of this false 
narrative, Meyers explains, is that “Too often, Jews come to represent the face of white racism, 
and anti-Semitism is associated with nonwhites, African Americans in particular” (125-126).  
 Harrison-Kahan is one of many scholars who read Sandy’s introduction of Jewishness 
into the black-white binary of Birdie’s identity as a complication of that binary: “Jewishness 
functions as a representation of multiplicity and ambivalence in contemporary multiracial 
literature. Adding a third term to the typically black-and-white schema of US race relations, 
[Caucasia] deploy[s] Jewishness to expose the social construction and plurality of whiteness as 
well as to challenge existing theories of mixed race identity that rely on binary configurations” 
(22). However, given the quotation from Sandy and the “oppositional positioning” cited by 
Meyers above, I read Sandy’s use of Jewishness not as an addition to a black-and-white identity, 
but as a replacement for the “black” element of such an identity. Characters throughout Caucasia 
suppose many ethnic identities for Birdie, including Puerto Rican (43), Italian, and Pakistani 
(130); Sandy chooses Jewishness—somewhat to Birdie’s dismay—as an ethnic identification 
that can replace Birdie’s blackness without negating her whiteness.  
                                                          
46It should be noted that both of these latter movements, like all three of the mother-daughter 
pairs covered in this chapter, come to prominence in the 1960s-1980s U.S. 
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 Since Sandy cannot completely erase Birdie’s non-whiteness, by claiming Jewishness she 
heightens Birdie’s ambiguity. As Harrison-Kahan explains, “Occupying more than one position 
at once, Jewishness simultaneously signifies whiteness and racial otherness; furthermore, the 
confusion over whether the label ‘Jewish’ refers to race, ethnicity, religion, or culture is 
emblematic of its complex meanings across categories of identity” (Harrison-Kahan 22). Sandy 
thus uses the label “Jewish” to blur the exact nature of Birdie’s non-whiteness and then to shift 
that non-whiteness as close to whiteness as possible. She further reduces Birdie’s non-whiteness 
by associating Birdie’s Jewish heritage solely with her supposedly dead father: not only does this 
fictitious family tree make Birdie only half-Jewish, but it also averts any notion that Sandy 
herself might be contaminated by Jewishness—or any non-whiteness. Like Norma in Secret 
Daughter, Sandy crafts her cover stories to emphasize her own supposed white racial purity. 
Unlike Norma, she does not deny that she and her daughter are biologically connected, if for no 
other reason than that being a lone woman traveling nomadically with someone else’s child 
might raise questions and suspicions, exactly the things Sandy wants to avoid. 
 In contrast to Sandy, Meyers argues that categorizing Jewish ethnic identity as “off-
white”47 instead of white creates a shift in perspective that can serve as a corrective to the 
popular but false narrative of opposition between Jewishness and blackness. Specifically, Meyers 
states, “embracing and resignifying the abjected status of not-quite white or choosing off-
whiteness as a post-assimilationist position facilitates a history of blacks and Jews that strives 
neither to mythologize nor to debunk intergroup relations” (127). For both Meyers and Harrison-
Kahan, removing the assumption that Jewishness is white does not place Jewishness and 
                                                          
47For an earlier use of this term in relation to race/ethnicity—specifically, in relation to Latinx 
positionality disrupting the black-white binary—see María DeGuzmán’s Spain’s Long Shadow: 
The Black Legend, Off-Whiteness, and Anglo-American Empire (2005). 
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blackness in “competition,” but rather “coalition,” for Jewish experiences of oppression do not 
detract from black experiences of oppression, but, when used in alliance, increase the power of 
both (Meyers 126). 
 Like Caucasia, Mama’s Child juxtaposes blackness and Jewishness, but Mama’s Child 
does so only briefly. Liz and Ruby are connected to Jewishness through Liz’s maternal family, 
who were Jewish refugee immigrants to the U.S.; however, this detail forms a rather minor and 
easily overlooked element of their joint history, at least as far as Mama’s Child is concerned. 
One might argue that Liz’s Jewish background is actually quite important to her character 
development and therefore to Lester’s overall narrative. Indeed, Liz herself claims that her 
Jewish mother’s family’s history of persecution was part of the oral tradition that “formed my 
cellular structure” (Lester 50), as quoted earlier. This Jewish influence is a silent and invisible 
one, though, as Liz and Ruby rarely mention their Jewish connections, interact with Jewish 
people, speak Yiddish, or engage in cultural practices that are distinctively Jewish. Sandy and 
Birdie, on the other hand, have no known biological connection to other people of Jewish 
heritage, but Senna gives more space to the off-whiteness of the ethnically Jewish than Lester 
does. 
Alice Walker’s complicated relationship with (white) Jewish (off-)whiteness 
 Alice Walker’s relationship with white, ethnically Jewish identity has been fraught with 
conflict over the years. Although she married a white, ethnically Jewish man, civil rights 
attorney Mel Leventhal, they divorced nine years later, in 1976. Race seems to have been an 
insurmountable barrier between Alice and her Leventhal in-laws. Recalling get-togethers with 
Mel’s side of the family, Rebecca notes, “I don’t remember my mother ever being at Aunt Lisa 
and Uncle Jackie’s house. […] I imagine that if my mother were there she would be unbearably 
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sensitive, masked, edgy. It would be too stressful for her to sit and pretend that she felt 
comfortable and embraced, welcomed like any other family member. As if race, and hers in 
particular, was not an issue” (Black White and Jewish 46). Rebecca writes of “the specter of my 
mother, of race, really, and the inability of my relatives to deal with it” (47), phrasing that 
suggests she blames the white Jewish-Italian relatives for the rift. The racial tension is so great 
that, even as a child, Rebecca can sense it: “That [race] is an issue is undeniable, her absence 
confirms it, and I am far from oblivious” (46). It should be noted that these childhood memories 
of perceived racial attitudes among numerous adult relatives might well have been incomplete or 
otherwise flawed; still, Rebecca’s recollections clearly indicate that Alice and the Leventhal in-
laws had dramatically different styles and outlooks. 
 Significantly, the rise of black nationalism and Jewish neoconservatism cited by Meyers 
above both took place near the height of Alice’s racial activism. Harrison-Kahan remarks that 
“the Jewish press has addressed Walker’s ‘anti-Semitism,’ linking it in particular to its negative 
portrayals of Jewish women (as JAPs [Jewish American Princesses] for example)” (39).48 
Meyers skewers Rebecca’s portrayal of Jewishness as a “willingness to trade in Jewish 
stereotypes” that “promotes the polarization of blackness and Jewishness” (134). This promotion 
of polarization is most evident in Black White and Jewish when Rebecca herself feels polarized 
                                                          
48Harrison-Kahan also references a book review by Jewish writer Charlotte Honigman-Smith, in 
which Honigman-Smith accuses Rebecca of “us[ing] ugly, unabashed stereotypes about Jewish 
life and, in particular, Jewish women” to paint a picture of Jewish identity that “is unexamined, 
irresponsible, and almost comically stereotypical.” Furthermore, Honigman-Smith claims, 
“Walker’s prepackaged anti-Semitic invocation of the JAP and the spoiled manipulative Jewish 
wife will have a profound impact on young American feminists. The common assumption that 
‘normal’ Jews are materialistic, conformist and uniformly wealthy has just been given new fuel 
by a woman Time magazine [sic] calls a leader of my generation. […] If this is the voice of the 
third wave, young Jewish women had better beware. We are not welcome here” (Honigman-
Smith). 
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by the two halves of her family that have split her very identity in two. She writes of legally 
changing her surname from her father’s “Leventhal” to her mother’s “Walker” at the age of 17:  
This comes as a shock to my father and stepmother, but in my mother’s house the 
shift feels completely normal, expected even. My mother and I have talked about 
giving me a different name for years, she pushing for more inclusion, more 
matrilineal bonding, and me open to it. […] I want to be closer to my mother, to 
have something run between us that cannot be denied. I want a marker that links 
us tangibly and forever as mother and daughter. That links me tangibly and 
forever with blackness. […] [My father] suggests that my choice has something to 
do with my own anti-Semitism, with wanting to distance myself from the Jewish 
in me. […] 
 When I change my name I do so because I do not feel an affinity with 
whiteness, with what Jewishness has become, and I do feel an affinity with 
blackness, with an experience of living in the world with non-white skin. (Black 
White and Jewish 312-313) 
 
Here Rebecca identifies “whiteness” as “what Jewishness has become,” and in direct opposition 
to “blackness.” When speaking of her white Jewish father, she defines all of these groupings in 
terms of skin color and socioeconomic class, criticizing her father for “settl[ing] into a 
comfortable routine commuting from Westchester and going to lily-white Little League games in 
pristine suburban ballparks. I do not see how I fit into his life, or that I want to” (313). 
Interestingly, these are not the definitions she uses in talking about her mother’s blackness; if 
they were, then all she would need to connect the two women would be one of the “poorly paid 
jobs in the service industry” that her friends have (313), along with her own non-white skin 
color. Instead, she legally changes her surname, which strengthens her connection with her 
mother, but at the cost of her connection with her father and with her Jewish heritage. 
 One wonders how much of a role Alice played, if any, in shaping Rebecca’s views of her 
own Jewish identity and/or its relationship to her black identity, and whether Alice, too, holds 
blackness and Jewishness naturally in opposition to one another. In recent years, Alice has 
increasingly come under attack for what critics like the Anti-Defamation League have deemed 
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her “extreme and hostile views […], revealing the depth of her hatred of Jews and Israel” (“Alice 
Walker Comes Under Fire”)—although this characterization, too, is contested.49 Alice has 
written that before the age of 17, she “had never encountered a white person, especially a white 
man who identified as white, who didn’t seem frightening” (A. Walker, “White fear”). She adds 
that this fear did not extend to “‘white looking’ people” of mixed racial heritage (A. Walker,  
“White fear”), but one might reasonably question this qualification, since Alice could not know 
the racial heritage of every “white-looking” person she encountered, particularly if any of these 
strangers were in fact of mixed heritage but successfully passing as white, or perhaps white and 
Jewish, like Birdie. 
 Kerry Ann Rockquemore and David L. Brunsma explain the general evolution of U.S. 
race relations from interracial alliance to defensive solidarity thus: “The result of the backlash [of 
white people against desegregation] was increased unity among the black population and the 
emergence of ‘black pride’ and ‘black power’ in the late 1960s” (8). Both Mama’s Child and 
Caucasia include families broken apart by this change, as has been noted. However, 
Rockquemore and Brunsma go on to explain that white people were not the only ones who 
seemed to lose acceptance in black communities; biracial children often found themselves at the 
opposite end of the infamous “one-drop rule,” with one drop of white “blood” making them 
almost wholly white in the eyes of some black people. “This intense period of group unity 
produced a strong sense of black identity and pride in African American culture. In this 
                                                          
49See, for example, a 2012 article in The Daily Beast titled, “Alice Walker Is Not An Anti-
Semite” (Goldberg). 
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emotional climate of racial polarization, mulattos, […] were stigmatized” (Rockquemore and 
Brunsma 8). If white was wrong,50 then so was its biracial offspring.51  
 In her narrative of changing her surname, Rebecca claims that she makes her decision for 
two reasons: first, Alice had long been advocating the change in the name of “matrilineal 
bonding,” which Rebecca, too, desires, particularly in public (Black White and Jewish 312). 
Second, Rebecca is asserting her “affinity with blackness, with an experience of living in the 
                                                          
50Whether Alice has ever believed that white was, in fact, wrong is arguable. Chela Sandoval 
cites a 1986 essay from Ms. in which Alice “asks U.S. black liberationists to recognize 
themselves as mestizos: ‘We are the African and the trader. We are the Indian and the Settler. 
We are oppressor and oppressed . . . we are the mestizos of North America. We are black, yes, 
but we are ‘white,’ too, and we are red” (Sandoval 170, emphases Sandoval’s). Similarly, 
whether Alice believed biracial identification to be somehow wrong or inferior or foreign also 
remains unclear. Sandoval continues her above quotation of Alice: “‘To attempt to function as 
only one, when you are really two or three, leads, I believe, to psychic illness: ‘white’ people 
have shown us the madness of that’” (A. Walker, “In the Closet of the Soul” 33, qtd. in Sandoval 
170). Sandoval interprets Alice’s statement thus: “The kind of radical mestizaje referred to in this 
passage and elsewhere can be understood as a complex kind of love in the postmodern world, 
where love is understood as affinity—alliance and affection across lines of difference that 
intersect both in and out of the body” (170). One should note that the context of Alice’s 
statement here, in a broad call to fellow U.S. feminists of color to participate in a transracial, 
coalition-building love and group identification, differs significantly from her later context of 
interacting with her own black and white and Jewish daughter. It might be fine to identify with 
whiteness as part of a group of black and white activists, yet destabilizing to try, as a black 
person, to identify with one’s white flesh and blood—particularly when that white family 
member is one’s biological daughter, and therefore a direct reflection of and upon oneself. It is 
therefore possible but not conclusive that Alice ever willingly identified herself with Rebecca’s 
whiteness. 
 
51This stigma and/or perception of such stigma against mixed race people has persisted. 
Describing awareness of and sensitivity to current and historical examples of racial 
discrimination as “stigma consciousness,” one recent study found that “minority/white biracial 
individuals who had elevated levels of stigma consciousness tended to feel less belonging around 
whites,” while “the presence of minorities was associated with decreases in white identification” 
and caused the biracial individuals to feel “greater white identity threat” (Wilton, Sanchez and 
Garcia 52). The authors of the study initially attribute the drop in white identification to biracial 
people “psychologically distanc[ing] themselves from the devalued [white] identity” (53); 
however, they later propose the alternative explanation that “Biracial people higher in stigma 
consciousness may assume that other minorities share their high levels of stigma consciousness. 
They may believe that other minorities hold a negative prototype for whiteness as a result of 
racism, and thus, they may experience negative attitudes about their own white heritage” (53). 
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world with non-white skin” (313).52 Years later, despite the name change, Rebecca would 
publicly attribute at least some of the ongoing tensions between herself and Alice to racial 
difference. In a 2007 interview, she states that Alice “‘once told me that because I am lighter-
skinned than her I would be treated better, and then the divorce from my father, I think she felt 
betrayed by whiteness in a certain kind of way, and I represent that whiteness’” (Krum). In her 
memoir Baby Love, also published in 2007, Rebecca notes that one of Alice’s responses to Black 
White and Jewish was “that because I wasn’t from the South and didn’t have the full memory of 
slavery (read: I am half white), that I don’t know what it feels like to be sold down the river, but 
that’s how she felt after reading my book” (80). Revealingly, Alice herself writes in her 
Foreword to Mama’s Child of “our early Movement fears: that ‘the white woman’ would run off 
with ‘our’ men. That she would then have ‘everything,’ as she seemed to have already. That she 
could not, would not, suffer, as we did, having been left with our empty arms. That her children, 
though brown, would adore her whiteness” (“Foreword” viii). Perhaps, rather than viewing 
Rebecca as a symbol of whiteness, Alice viewed her in those long-ago days as a symbol of black 
women losing their children to white women, such as the white stepmother who had taken 
Alice’s former place with her ex-husband in his home. In this case, the bitterness attributed to 
Alice by Rebecca, if it exists, could be due to fear of this impending enormous loss. After all, 
Rebecca is only half Alice’s, biologically and, after the divorce, geographically; the other half 
already belongs to and is regularly claimed and taken away by whiteness. Thus, some of the 
emotional distance between the women could result from Alice trying to preemptively push her 
daughter away. 
                                                          
52These motivations stand in stark contrast to those of Norma in Chapter 1, who spent four 
decades weakening her mother-daughter bond with June, primarily in order to avoid any 
association between herself and non-whiteness. (Sandoval) 
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 This latter scenario is hypothetical, yet evidence exists in its favor. In addition to the 
words of Alice’s Foreword, as quoted above, Rebecca has alluded to having felt pressure as a 
child to reject her racially white, but ethnically and culturally Jewish, stepmother. As a child, she 
writes, “I don’t know what to call her, this woman who mothers me, who introduces herself […] 
as my mother even though she is light and white and tall and thin and I am brown and curly-
haired; even though sometimes people ask if I am adopted” (Black White and Jewish 91). On 
those occasions when she calls her stepmother “Mom,” “I feel giddy and excited, like I am doing 
something new and fun and dangerous; and I feel duplicitous, shameful, and bad, like I am 
betraying my mother, like I am choosing this shiny white version over her” (92). By the time 
Rebecca publishes these words, it appears that Alice need not have feared losing Rebecca: in a 
2001 interview, Rebecca states, “‘I wanted to kill my white stepmother. I felt guilty, like I was 
being forced to choose between a white mother and a black one’” (Shelden). But by seven years 
later, Rebecca has revised her story: “At my father’s home I felt much more taken care of. But, if 
I told my mother that I’d had a good time with Judy [Rebecca’s stepmother], she’d look bereft – 
making me feel I was choosing this white, privileged woman above her” (R. Walker, “How my 
mother's”). Whichever of Rebecca’s portrayals of her relationship with her stepmother is true, 
the thing that stays consistent in both statements is Rebecca’s claim that she was made to choose 
between her black mother and her white stepmother. Knowingly or not, Alice managed to set up 
a racial binary of mothers for her daughter, at least in Rebecca’s mind at the time. 
 Gino Pellegrini presents an alternative explanation for the racial tensions between mother 
and daughter: he posits that Alice did not apprehend how much of an influence young Rebecca’s 
identification with whiteness had on her racial identity formation and, as a result, that Alice 
overlooked key differences in her and Rebecca’s racial experiences. Rebecca’s “multiracial 
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experiences and complexities,” says Pellegrini, “were not really in [Alice’s] purview, with the 
exception of those that could be easily referred back to black culture” (179). Describing a scene 
in Black White and Jewish in which Alice shows Rebecca a picture of her grandmother—
Rebecca’s great-grandmother—Pellegrini explains, “For Alice Walker, the image of 
Grandmother Poole both represents and confirms her commitment to black consciousness, 
history, culture, and identity. Moreover, she assumes that the picture signifies for her daughter 
what it does for her” (179). In this assumption, Pellegrini continues, Alice is partly correct; 
however, “For Rebecca Walker, the image also calls to mind her childhood perception of her 
[Jewish] great-grandmother Jennie’s white racist demeanor, as well as her then-current questions 
about racial claiming and belonging” (179). Pellegrini’s interpretation is that Rebecca was never 
really Alice’s to begin with, that Rebecca was/is of mixed race before being black or white.  
 Though not cited in Pellegrini’s article, another of Rebecca’s statements in her 2008 
piece could be read as support for his argument. Recalling the final emails exchanged between 
mother and daughter before their split, Rebecca states, “Devastated, I asked her to apologise [sic] 
and acknowledge how much she’d hurt me over the years with neglect, withholding affection 
and resenting me for things I had no control over – the fact that I am mixed-race, that I have a 
wealthy, white, professional father and that I was born at all” (R. Walker, “How my mother's”). 
Here, Rebecca accuses her mother of hurting her not because Rebecca is white or a symbol of 
whiteness per se, but because she is mixed and her father is white. In the years preceding this 
accusation, in fact, the now-adult Rebecca had specifically claimed and made a name for herself 
with a primarily mixed race identity, beginning with the very title of her 2001 Black White and 
Jewish: Autobiography of a Shifting Self. Rebecca’s having the ability and heritage to claim a 
black identity as her primary racial identity, deliberately choosing not to, and instead choosing 
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what in 2001 was a far less common way for someone with multiple racial ancestries to self-
identify, might well have felt like a slap in the face to her mother, long famed for her work in 
black activism and literature. Alice had built for Rebecca an unusually rich and prominent 
cultural heritage that many daughters would have cherished. Rebecca, though perfectly willing to 
trade on her mother’s name, had set herself up in rather public opposition to and rejection of 
much of that proffered heritage and identity. 
Daughter’s Feelings of Objectification 
Mama’s Child: “Her mocha doll” 
 Even as a child, Ruby feels that her primary role with Liz is that of an object, not a 
human being. “Sometimes,” she narrates, “I felt like an exhibit who was supposed to prove she 
was a perfect mother. Or how close we were. Who do you see when you look at me? I wondered. 
Am I the black version of you that you wish you could be? I wanted to say all this. A lot of it was 
stuff I’d heard Daddy say, but I knew it would only make her cry” (Lester 42). This 
psychological insight might seem profound, were it to originate from 11-year-old Ruby. Instead, 
the accusation is a learned behavior that Ruby has first observed in Solomon, with whom Liz is 
on the brink of divorce.  
 Twelve years later, the lesson has stuck. Ruby cuts her mother out of her life, imagining, 
as she does so, “Elizabeth’s […] fantasy of the perfect mixed family, where she starred as the 
archetypical white heroine out to save the colored of this world” (Lester 205). A few pages 
earlier, Ruby has explained the reason for her bitterness: “Elizabeth had separated me from my 
brother and father, my Black kin, and when they moved, she acted as if I were an exotic stuffed 
animal she could drag to events with no volition of my own. She paraded me as her mocha doll, 
her ticket to the inner circle at multiracial events” (200). Not only does Ruby hold Liz solely 
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responsible for the divorce and Solomon’s later cross-country move with Che, but she also 
refuses to allow her mother the grace of having possibly had a good or legitimate motive for the 
split. Complaining about Liz’s “selfish notion of liberation,” Ruby self-righteously contrasts the 
white privilege that facilitated Second Wave feminism with the racism that, in her mind, makes 
black mothers morally superior to her own. “For [Liz] it was ‘My liberation’ that mattered, not 
community or family,” she thinks (201). She then automatically aligns herself with these better 
mothers: “Women of color have always had to band together to make it. We’ve always nurtured 
not only our own young but each other’s. [Liz] never understood that and mistook leaping out of 
a solid marriage into a confused lesbian affair for true emancipation. Then she dragged me along 
on her adventures, using my skin as radical cover” (201). Never questioning whether her parents’ 
marriage was in fact as “solid” as it had seemed to her 11-year-old eyes, Ruby at this point 
cannot admit the idea that the divorce might have been due to, say, the social pressures operating 
against interracial marriages in the 1970s. After all, if her parents cannot sustain a union between 
the races, what hope does she have of preserving this same racial unity in her own person? 
 Ruby’s feelings of being objectified and turned into an accessory are not without merit. 
Much later in the novel, Liz describes being one of only two white people in a group of friends. 
She recalls being “[d]esperate to blend in, as had been my habit for so many years” and, when 
out with these friends, “need[ing] to be buffered by at least one African American on either side” 
(Lester 229). She would sometimes resort to extreme measures to accomplish this setup; for 
example, “I’d get up, saunter to the restroom, and upon my return I’d casually grab a chair from 
another table to push in somewhere else, anywhere else, so long as I was surrounded by black. 
My people, I thought, only half ironically. Since I couldn’t see myself except in a mirror, it was 
easy to imagine I faded into the dark” (229). After Solomon departs with Che, Ruby is not the 
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only person left behind who has lost two of the most important African American individuals in 
her life; Liz suddenly has only one person left in her household to be her much-desired buffer. 
She can no longer attend protests and imagine herself accepted as an honorary black person 
without Solomon’s presence nearby to legitimize her feeling, as noted earlier, so she does the 
next best thing and brings Solomon’s daughter. The fact that these events potentially offer prime 
mother-daughter bonding time does not negate Liz’s strong motivations to force Ruby to attend 
regardless of the bonds made or broken. 
Caucasia: “The key to our going incognito” 
 When Sandy goes on the run from the FBI, her primary survival strategy is to get as far 
away from blackness as she can, an effort that results in her racial abjection and objectification 
of her daughter. Gone are Sandy’s days of radical solidarity with black people. Casting aside the 
activist persona that she believes the FBI is hunting, she also casts blackness out of her family. 
Deck and Cole go to Brazil; Birdie’s black heritage is replaced with a Jewish one. Birdie recalls 
Sandy’s initial presentation of the plan to her: “The two bodies that had made her stand out in a 
crowd—made her more than just another white woman—were gone; now it was just the two of 
us. My body was the key to our going incognito” (Senna, Caucasia 128). Already, Sandy has 
emotionally detached from “the two bodies” formerly known as “Deck” and “Cole.” She has 
reduced the missing half of the family to a couple of nameless, faceless obstacles. They were 
things to be gotten past, and she has, accordingly, gotten past them.  
 Now, Sandy reduces Birdie, too, to a “body,” but one she intends to keep. The FBI is 
“looking for a white woman on the lam with her black child,” she announces (128). Deck’s and 
Cole’s bodies were read as black, so when she had abjected Deck’s and Cole’s blackness, it had 
meant abjecting their bodies, and thus the individuals themselves. In Birdie’s case, abjecting 
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Birdie’s blackness can plausibly leave her white/off-white body behind, and this body becomes 
Sandy’s “key” to freedom. Sandy is so desperate that she ceases in this moment to see Birdie as 
more than a (re-)racialized being. The FBI is definitely not looking for a white woman with her 
white/Jewish child, so abjecting Birdie’s blackness and allowing (off-)whiteness to take its place 
does more than remove or neutralize a threat; rather, Birdie’s body becomes an element of 
Sandy’s disguise. Harrison-Kahan writes, “Once a dangerous sign of difference, Jewishness has 
come to represent a means of survival. Just as Jews had to be able to adapt, to disguise at least a 
part of themselves, Birdie, too, takes on this trait of malleability” (30). Birdie’s body, 
specifically its “straight hair, pale skin, […] [and] general phenotypic resemblance to the 
Caucasoid race, would throw [the FBI] off our trail,” Sandy tells her daughter (Senna, Caucasia 
128). Cole’s and Deck’s bodies were twin dangers, but Birdie is Sandy’s ticket to safety in the 
white world.  
 At no point does Sandy ask Birdie, whose real name is Patrice and whom Sandy and 
Deck had raised with a black identity, how she feels about pretending not to be black anymore. 
Instead, Sandy chooses Birdie’s new, Jewish-white name, Jesse—“If it hadn’t been for that 
Patrice Lumumba fixation of your father’s, you’d have an ordinary name by now” (Senna, 
Caucasia 129)—her new racial and ethnic identities, and her new backstory. Any protest Birdie 
makes is cut off or overruled. By the time Sandy is done, her black-white daughter Patrice 
“Birdie” is dead, at least as far as Sandy is concerned, and in Birdie’s place sits Jesse, the 
invented child whose father is not black and whose sole reason for being is to get Sandy out of 
trouble. 
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Rebecca Walker: “Delightful distraction” 
 Throughout Rebecca Walker’s life, Alice has openly considered her to be important not 
only as Alice and Mel’s daughter, and therefore a symbol of them, but also as a symbol of the 
Civil Rights Movement. The extent to which Rebecca herself felt defined in her youth by her 
sociochronological positionality is reflected in one of the chapter titles in Black White and 
Jewish: “Who am I if not a Movement Child?”53 Alice’s fame meant that not only did Rebecca 
bear the weight of carrying on the Movement’s legacy from conception, but she experienced 
increasingly greater visibility and therefore greater pressure than most Movement Children to 
live up to her mother’s reputation and expectations. Rebecca wrote in 2007 about the enduring 
effects of that pressure. Discussing “children who manage to emerge from the shadow of well-
known parentage,” she laments, “So few make it. Then there’s the sobering truth that no matter 
what you go through, it’s like being the poor little rich kid: People just think you’re whining. No 
one wants to hear that adults who grew up in a rarefied world have serious issues. They just 
don’t. You’re supposed to shut up and take your last name to the bank” (Baby Love 113). The 
result is that Rebecca grows up highly conscious of her position as a Movement Child, the 
daughter of a famous feminist, and a Walker.  
 In Black White and Jewish Rebecca recalls an episode that demonstrated how thoroughly 
these various elements took over her identity at times. Attending one of Alice’s readings as a 
child, she is “the daughter of my mother. That is how people know me, that is what I am called, 
over and over. This is Alice’s daughter, this is Alice’s little girl. This is the speaker’s daughter” 
                                                          
53Senna, who occupied a somewhat similar socio-chronological position, claimed a similar 
burden in her 1995 essay “To Be Real,” the title essay for Rebecca’s groundbreaking third wave 
feminist anthology: “Being the daughter of both feminist and integrationist movements, a white 
socialist mother and a black intellectual father, it seemed that everyone and everything had come 
together for my conception” (5). 
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(102). At the time, the role is not unwelcome to the then-young Rebecca. “I do not mind being 
my mother’s daughter, I like it even. I like the attention, the way the people who love my 
mother’s writing dote on me and make me feel like I am special, too. […] They want to touch 
my mother, but mostly they want to look at me, to search my face for signs of her” (103). 
However, as Rebecca grows older and develops more of her own identity, it is no longer enough 
just to be “Alice’s daughter” to admiring fans. 
 Earlier in this chapter I referenced Alice’s 1979 statement in “One Child of One’s Own” 
that “We are together, my child and I. Mother and child, yes, but sisters really” (382). In Black 
White and Jewish, Rebecca offers her response. Despite being known to the public as “Alice’s 
daughter,” as a teenager she comes to feel that Alice herself is unwilling to see her that way. “In 
interviews my mother talks about how she and I are more like sisters than mother and daughter,” 
she writes. “I am game, letting her sit in my lap for a photo for the New York Times, playing the 
grown-up to my mother’s child for the camera. I feel strong when she says those things, like I am 
much older and wiser than I really am. It’s just that the strength doesn’t allow for weakness. 
Being my mother’s sister doesn’t allow me to be her daughter” (231). Rebecca then blames 
Alice’s philosophy of sisterhood for what she sees as parental neglect. 
 To make matters worse, Alice had made further statements in that same 1979 essay that, 
years later, would cause Rebecca to feel devalued as a daughter. Alice had revealed that 
Rebecca’s conception was not motivated by Alice’s or Mel’s desire to have children; instead, it 
was a strategy to keep Mel from being drafted for the Vietnam War. Alice had also been 
pleasantly surprised at how little attention Rebecca required, since that meant that Alice still had 
plenty of time for her writing. Rebecca later explained, “I was 16 when I found a now-famous 
poem she wrote comparing me to various calamities that struck and impeded the lives of other 
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women writers. […] My mother had me – a ‘delightful distraction’, but a calamity nevertheless. I 
found that a huge shock and very upsetting” (“How my mother's”). After all, distracting Alice 
meant possibly hurting black and women’s rights, the two causes held most dear by both women. 
Daughter’s Abjection of Mother 
Mama’s Child: From one mother to two 
 For all of Ruby Jordan’s charges against her mother of racism and hypocrisy, she remains 
blind to the fact that in matters of racial prejudice, she and Liz have more in common than not. 
Neither woman is comfortable with her own whiteness or with the privilege it entails. Liz 
cherishes her white Irish family but carries the proverbial white liberal guilt over being higher in 
the social hierarchy than people with darker skin. Ruby rejects all of her white ancestors, 
especially Liz, and cannot seem to reconcile herself to the fact that she, too, has white heritage 
and not African American only. 
 As noted previously, Ruby holds Liz responsible for the divorce and older brother Che’s 
departure with their father, which left her as the only person at home with black ancestry. To 
Ruby, who is only 11 years old when the family splits, the fact that Liz did not stop the other 
black people in the house from leaving her becomes, over time, the idea that Liz actually sent 
them away herself and forced Ruby to stay behind. Ruby constructs an idea of Liz as deliberately 
inserting herself as a barrier between Ruby and her birthright of black heritage. As soon as Ruby 
is able, she leaves Berkeley behind to attend college in New York City, putting an entire country 
of distance between her and her mother. This move also allows her to spend time reclaiming her 
relationship with Che and Solomon and Solomon’s second wife, Elaine. Now that Liz can be left 
behind, Ruby is finally able to paste together the all-black family she had longed for throughout 
her teenage years. 
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 As an adult, Ruby situates not only her home in her black community, but also her work, 
both literally and figuratively. She focuses first her undergraduate and then her graduate studies 
on blackness in the U.S., and she gleans her lessons not only from her academic classes, but from 
life experience. She ecstatically agrees to become an adopted daughter of sorts to one of her 
African American professors, as also mentioned previously. She also hires a black therapist who 
helps her to separate from and critique Liz. This latter endeavor culminates in first a temporary, 
and then a permanent, break from Liz. 
Caucasia: “I wanted her to remind me of who … we had been” 
 Without Deck and Cole, and without permission to be other than white, Birdie knows that 
she must safeguard her black identity from her mother, the woman who had originally sent that 
side of her into hiding. Once in New Hampshire, Sandy seems content to spend the rest of her 
life without ever again stepping outside her white community. Whereas Liz had sought to find 
black female role models for Ruby, Sandy actively works against Birdie retaining any affinity to 
blackness. She drills Birdie over and over again on the dangers of being associated with 
blackness, and becomes impatient with Birdie’s growing restlessness in her all-white world. 
 Birdie and Sandy never have a particularly close and loving relationship, but rather one 
of mutual dependency for survival. Birdie needs Sandy not only for physical survival, but also 
racial and familial. At first, Sandy has similar needs, and she and Birdie prove to be one 
another’s salvation as they remind each other of who they were before they changed names and 
identities. “During our first year on the run,” Birdie recalls, “back when everything still seemed 
temporary, she used to tell me stories about the years I didn’t remember” (Senna, Caucasia 287). 
More specifically, “My mother used to describe those days to me in great detail, how Cole and I 
had walked in that goose step, me four steps behind Cole, our lips moving in incomprehensible 
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babble. And she would recount the years when she and my father were so in love” (287). Since 
Birdie has no memory of these times, she relies on Sandy and her stories to supply these missing 
but foundational pieces of her history. 
 Out of all of these memories, perhaps the most important to Birdie is that of the 
“incomprehensible babble,” a secret language Birdie and Cole had developed and called 
“Elemeno.” Only the sisters understood Elemeno, just as only they experientially understood 
each other’s racial heritage. Gloria Anzaldúa famously wrote, “Ethnic identity is twin skin to 
linguistic identity” (81); this principle can apply even when one’s linguistic identity is built on a 
make-believe language known by just two people. To Birdie, Elemeno symbolizes her full racial 
identity, including her invisible blackness, and as long as she remembers how to speak it, she 
feels secure in the link between herself and Cole.  
 As long as Sandy continues to verbally link Birdie to her past, particularly to Cole and 
Elemeno, she functions as an ally in Birdie’s quest to form her own identity.  In telling Birdie 
these stories, Sandy reinforces to both herself and Birdie their relationships with the missing: 
Birdie with her other half, her racial reciprocal, Cole; Sandy with the man whom she had once 
loved, and out of whose love both Birdie and Cole came to be. Seen another way, Sandy is 
helping Birdie build her personal oral tradition, beginning with the girls’ origin stories, their 
literal raisons d’être, in the history of their parents’ love, followed by the stories of how Cole—
and thus indirectly Sandy and Deck—had shaped Birdie into Birdie. Years later, creeping quietly 
into her mother’s room for one last look before running away from home in search of Cole, 
Birdie would feel “a sob rising to my chest. I wanted to sleep with [Sandy] in the big bed once 
again. I wanted her to be my mother right then, the mother she had been. […] I wanted those 
stories. I wanted her to remind me of who I had been, who we had been” (287). Here, Birdie 
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equates “be[ing] my mother” with identity formation through storytelling. These stories, in 
Birdie’s mind, reinforce Sandy’s motherhood of her, and without them, Birdie no longer sees in 
Sandy the mother she had once loved and trusted to take care of her. Furthermore, once the 
stories stop, the link to the past weakens, and Birdie realizes she is forgetting Elemeno. Sandy 
cannot help her hold onto the language, nor has she ever sympathized with Birdie’s attachment to 
it, which is why Birdie whispers in Elemeno only to herself after Cole’s departure. Similarly, 
Birdie has a carefully guarded box of “negrobilia,” given to her by Cole and Deck. The whispers 
prove insufficient for Birdie to retain her linguistic identity; the hidden box fails to sustain her 
pre-Jesse racial identity. Sandy then stops being an ally in Birdie’s mind and becomes another of 
the many impediments separating Birdie from the person Birdie wants to be. 
 As Birdie becomes more independent and Sandy becomes more settled, their desires 
seem to lie in opposite directions, with one exception: they both desperately miss Cole. 
Unfortunately, Sandy’s yearning for Cole causes her to overlook Cole’s equally—though less 
visibly—black sister, as when Birdie recalls Sandy lamenting, “‘Having a black child made me 
see things differently. Made it all the more personal. It hurts to see your baby come into a world 
like this, so you want to change it.’ My mother did that sometimes, spoke of Cole as if she had 
been her only black child. It was as if my mother believed that Cole and I were so different. As if 
she believed I was white, believed I was Jesse” (Senna, Caucasia 275). As far as Sandy is 
concerned, Birdie’s blackness is out of sight and therefore out of mind. Badia Ahad points out 
that “In Caucasia, the protagonist’s challenge is to make an interior blackness legible through a 
body that reads as white” (134). To this point I would add that Birdie wants her blackness to be 
not just legible, but validated and valued. With Sandy, she no longer receives any of these things, 
and so, with little misgiving or regret, she runs away from Sandy’s white world and goes in 
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search of her black identity, seeking the one person she is most confident shares in and will 
therefore affirm her half-white blackness: Cole. 
Rebecca and Alice Walker 
 In 1989, Marianne Hirsch published what would prove to be a prescient reading of 
maternal anger in Alice Walker’s “One Child of One’s Own.” According to Hirsch, the mother-
daughter sisterhood claimed by Walker’s speaker, mentioned earlier in this chapter, demonstrates 
an “unquestioned alliance” and an “unproblematic bond with [Rebecca]” that mask her “refusal 
or inability to acknowledge her anger at her child” (194-195). Hirsch argues that “the possessive 
in the title [of Walker’s essay] is in itself disturbing. And so is, finally, the erasure of the child, 
as person, as subject, from the entire body of the essay” (195). Rebecca appears prominently and 
positively throughout the essay; however, Hirsch explains, “When the daughter becomes ‘the 
sister’ in political struggle, I worry that she disappears as daughter, as child, as person” (195)—a 
concern with which Ruby Jordan, resenting every moment of her teenage participation in Liz’s 
political protests, would undoubtedly agree. Hirsch continues, “As [Rebecca] loves her mother’s 
face and would have it on every page, I worry that her own face disappears from the pages of the 
essay. Could this perhaps be the form that the speaker’s unacknowledged anger at Rebecca 
takes—the form of erasure?” (195). Rebecca is very much present in Walker’s essay, but in a 
one-dimensional, symbolic role, her subjectivity and voice appropriated and mediated by her 
mother, with even her quoted statements made to have the meaning Alice chooses to find. 
Unfortunately, writes Hirsch, “in suppressing her anger at her child, in leaving it in the realm of 
the unnarratable, Walker runs the risk of idealizing motherhood, of idealizing her child, and 
thereby of erasing her” (195). This strategy is problematic not only because it thwarts Rebecca’s 
agency, but, worse, Alice “runs the risk of simply reversing an all too familiar relationship, that 
167 
is, of turning the child into an adoring nurturing ‘maternal’ figure, the object who enables the 
growth of her [that is, Alice’s] subjectivity” (Hirsch 195-196). Indeed, in the decades to come, 
Rebecca’s grievances with Alice would include exactly this erasure, objectification, idealization, 
and premature adulthood she felt had been forced upon her by Alice. 
 Both Alice and Rebecca Walker have spoken publicly many times about the difficulties 
of their relationship. In May 1995, Essence magazine published “The Two of Us,” a group of 
articles that included one column each from Alice and Rebecca, both of them reflecting on their 
mother-daughter bond. In her column, Alice recalled her own defensiveness when, “More than a 
decade after [Rebecca’s] father and I separated she confronted me with the hurt, confusion, deep 
sorrow and depression she experienced losing the safety and warmth of our marriage, intolerable 
for us but a sanctuary for her, and how she’d kept that side of herself hidden, especially her grief, 
for fear I would not be able to accept it. Accept her” (Walker and Walker 252). The fact that 
Alice claims to have responded so negatively at the time to these revelations from her daughter 
would seem to have justified this fear. Rebecca, for her part, wrote that the mother-daughter 
relationship “has been a tough road, full of long silences and angry confrontations, teary reunions 
and sometimes frightening insights into the limits of the daughter-mother bond,” but that “[a]t 
25, I have come full out to my mother as myself, cursing sometimes, having widely divergent 
points of view, making choices I know she wouldn’t make, even allowing myself to get angry 
with her to the point of yelling!” (256). Whereas Alice’s column focuses on the similarities, even 
sameness, between herself and her daughter, much as she had with the previously mentioned 
“sisters, really” characterization of their relationship (In Search of Our Mother's Gardens 382), 
Rebecca is at this point fully caught up in her struggle for individuation and adult independence. 
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Almost ten years later, she would describe “absolute autonomy” as having been her “religion” 
(R. Walker, Baby Love 156). 
 Six years after “The Two of Us,” in 2001, Rebecca published her memoir, Black White 
and Jewish: Autobiography of a Shifting Self. The book’s portrayal of Alice was less than 
flattering, with distance, absence, and neglect being some of the key attributes Rebecca chose to 
emphasize. Critics have deemed Rebecca’s characterization of her mother to be “a very 
unattractive portrait of Alice Walker as a remote and self-absorbed woman who disappeared 
from her daughter’s life for months at a time” (Shelden), and an “accus[ation] […] of being a 
cold, selfish, child-hating feminist” and “a neglectful, overly permissive and mainly absent 
mother” (Chesler). In an interview that year, Rebecca herself was quoted as saying, “‘I’m not 
going to say that my mother is unhappy that I wrote this book. Let’s just say that it’s caused her 
to reflect on some of the choices that she made for my life. We’re still trying to come to some 
understanding, but we need to heal wounds that go back 20 years’” (Shelden). The interviewer in 
this case described Rebecca as “reluctant to be too critical of her famous mother” at the time, but 
rather “claim[ing] that they are still on good terms, and that a recent series of therapy sessions 
has been helpful. But she doesn’t sound very convincing” (Shelden). Both Rebecca’s and the 
interviewer’s assessments of the situation echo what Rebecca had said about her relationship 
with Alice in “The Two of Us,” suggesting that little progress had been made in the six years 
between publications, at least as far as Rebecca is concerned. 
 In Black White and Jewish, Rebecca clearly identifies Alice not just with blackness, but 
with Rebecca’s blackness, specifically. As a child, she allows her abjection of her black identity 
to manifest as a rejection of Alice. In elementary school, when the boy Rebecca likes declares 
that he does not like black girls, she embarks on a silent campaign to convince him that she is not 
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black. Part of her strategy is to downplay or deny her association with blackness, particularly in 
the person of her mother. She persuades Alice not to attend the school play, The Wizard of Oz, in 
which Rebecca is starring as the Wicked Witch of the West. This strategy requires a delicate 
touch: “I don’t want to hurt her,” Rebecca recalls. “I don’t want to lie, either, but how else am I 
going to convince her not to come to see me on Play Night? How else can I explain that Bryan 
Katon doesn’t like black girls and if she comes he will definitely know that I am, in fact, a black 
girl, and all of my other efforts to be a not black girl will be washed away? How else can I stay 
with her and still leave?” (Black White and Jewish 71). Young as she is, Rebecca, torn between 
clinging to and separating from her mother, abjects her mother in order to abject her blackness. 
Given her way, Rebecca would jettison her black identity, betraying both her mother and herself 
for the sake of a boy who, like Rebecca’s own father, lacks blackness and has a wholly white 
self-identification. Yet even childhood Rebecca senses how empty the loss of her blackness 
would leave her, describing “an unexpected sadness” when she realizes at the end of the play that 
she has missed out on an experience she can never get back: “Even though everyone says I was 
good, my mama, the one with the most important voice, can never say this to me” (Black White 
and Jewish 76-77). As in the other instances of abjection thus far examined, here abjection 
causes a perpetual, unresolvable conflict for Rebecca between holding onto her blackness while 
pushing it away.  
 Such abjective conflicts continue into Rebecca’s adulthood, as indicated in some of her 
opening words in Black White and Jewish. As noted previously, Kristeva argues that one abjects 
that which threatens the boundaries of the self; Rebecca effectively states that her multiracial self 
has no boundaries and was never given any, thanks to her parents. She muses, “without a 
memory that can remind me at all times of who I definitively am, I feel amorphous, missing the 
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unbroken black outline around my body that everyone else seems to have” (Black White and 
Jewish 2). Rebecca lacks this sense of consistent, externally imposed definition because she was 
intentionally raised not to be defined by others. As parents, Alice Walker and Mel Leventhal 
define her only as undefined, whether by circumstance (R. Walker, Black White and Jewish 4-5), 
by racial stereotypes (24), or by gender (46). Instead of growing up with rules and expectations, 
Rebecca writes, “I was mostly left alone to discover the world and my place in it” (5). By the 
time she writes Black White and Jewish, she has come to both appreciate her childhood freedom 
and struggle with its consequences: “Freedom can feel overwhelming. I would not trade it, but 
sometimes […] I want to know constraints, boundaries. […] Without these, I feel vast, out of 
control. Like I can too easily step outside of my own life and into someone else’s. Like if I am 
not careful, I could, […] close my eyes and disappear” (4). Rebecca seems to associate her 
historical lack of boundaries more with Alice than with Mel, who, as indicated earlier, had long 
ago traded his idealism and civil rights work for a more conventional suburban white existence. 
During her years under Alice’s care, Rebecca starts smoking while still in elementary school, for 
example, and has an abortion at the age of 14. In this light, Rebecca’s abjection of Alice makes a 
sort of anachronistic sense: if Alice is the party primarily responsible for Rebecca growing up 
with an internal sense that any outside boundaries set for her are weak, imperiled, or absent, then 
abjecting Alice is the way to preserve the boundaries that remain and perhaps restore those that 
have gone missing.  
 Unfortunately, this strategy of abjection is refused Rebecca while she is a minor and too 
late to do much good by the time she obtains the status and power of adulthood and can put it 
into effect. When she acts out as a teenager, Alice “says I must have picked up these bad habits 
from my stepmother. Maybe she was too permissive. She suggests I get myself together, 
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stressing that I won’t be indulged the way that I have been” (R. Walker, Black White and Jewish 
230-31). Rebecca feels silenced by Alice’s assumptions that her white Jewish family—
particularly her stepmother—have corrupted her, that Alice has found something objectionable in 
Rebecca and blamed it on her whiteness. Rebecca recalls her reaction to Alice’s words: “Is she 
making a distinction between black and white parenting? Between the suburbs and the city? One 
morning she ventures that perhaps I have anger at my stepmother that I am directing at her. I 
can’t say, Maybe I have anger at you that I am directing at you” (231). By the time she reaches 
adulthood, Rebecca’s public and private narratives of her self are one of the few opportunities 
she has left in which to abject Alice, which explains the conflicted but largely negative portrayals 
of Alice that she renders.  
 The relationship between Alice and Rebecca deteriorated after Black White and Jewish. 
Phyllis Chesler, writing in 2008 about “The mother-daughter wars” between Alice and Rebecca, 
explains, “Exposing your mother’s nakedness in public, breaking publicly with the only woman 
who ever gave birth to you, is a tabooed, ungrateful, desperate, perhaps dangerous and always 
complicated act.” The two women eventually stopped speaking directly to one another and spent 
several years waging a war of words through publications and interviews. Rebecca details her 
version of what happened leading up to these years in her 2007 memoir, Baby Love: Choosing 
Motherhood After a Lifetime of Ambivalence.54 After a major argument, Rebecca claims, she had 
emailed Alice and blamed her again for “neglect, withholding, and the ambivalence she seems to 
                                                          
54The “ambivalence” in the book’s subtitle indicates not only Rebecca’s own ambivalence 
towards motherhood, but Alice’s, as well. A 2001 interviewer wrote that “As a comment on her 
mother’s strangely aloof approach to parenting, Rebecca will say only that she laments Alice’s 
‘ambivalence about motherhood,’” which Rebecca then attributed to 1960s feminist pressure to 
forego homemaking and motherhood in favor of a career (Shelden). In childhood, Rebecca 
seems to be arguing, she experienced Alice’s ambivalence about motherhood before growing up 
and experiencing—to a much lesser degree—her own. 
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have about my race, relative privilege, and birth itself” (167). Alice “writes back that she has 
apologized enough and that children should forgive their parents and move on,” at which point 
Rebecca threatens to cut off all contact because Alice is “too emotionally dangerous to me and 
my unborn son” (167). According to Rebecca, Alice responds “that she won’t miss what we 
don’t have and that to her our relationship has been inconsequential for years. She writes that she 
has been my mother for thirty years and is no longer interested in the job” (167-68). Rebecca, 
despite having initiated this latter turn of events by her threat, is devastated by Alice’s response. 
According to Elizabeth Brown-Guillory, “Women learn to mother from their mothers, either 
biological or surrogate, and when that learning process is obstructed, feelings of hopelessness 
and powerlessness are transferred from mothers to daughters” (200). Rebecca had tried to exert 
power over Alice by insisting on an apology and claiming control of their interactions. When 
Alice takes some of that power back and agrees not only to cut off contact, but also to disown her 
daughter and cut off the entire relationship, Rebecca feels the loss of power keenly. She is 
especially distraught that this deepening of the rift between mother and daughter is happening 
just as she herself is about to become a mother, and throughout Baby Love, she questions 
whether she can possibly be a good mother, given her history with Alice. 
 Alice has, in general, been more circumspect in her few statements about what happened, 
but in 2013, she offered a rare explanation of her standpoint on her official blog. The blog entry, 
titled, “Taking Care of the Truth – Embedded Slander: A Meditation on the Complicity of 
Wikipedia,” opens in the years between Rebecca’s publication of To Be Real and Black White 
and Jewish:  
Beginning in the late 1990s I became aware that my daughter, Rebecca Grant 
Walker Leventhal, aka Rebecca Walker, was, for her own purposes, making 
wildly untrue comments, in private talks, lectures, and in the media, about her 
childhood experiences with her father and me. As years passed, these charges 
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grew in variety and intensity and centered primarily on my deficiencies as a 
mother. I was not a perfect mother, whatever that means, but I was good enough. 
The pain of being unfairly and publicly accused of willful harm, by someone I 
gave birth to, and raised, to the limits of my ability, someone I’ve deeply loved, 
has been at times almost unbearable. (A. Walker, “Taking Care”) 
 
That same year, as part of the publicity surrounding the release of Pratibha Parmar’s 
documentary Alice Walker: Beauty in Truth, Alice told an interviewer for The Globe and Mail 
that she and Rebecca “had some nice exchanges since Mother’s Day” (Posner). Rebecca, 
however, has continued to give interviews about her estrangement from Alice in the years since; 
if the two women have achieved any measure of reconciliation, it has been well hidden. 
Intersections of Mixed Race Mother-Daughter Racial and Feminist Abjections 
 As adults, Rebecca, Danzy Senna, and several other early figures in third wave feminism 
find their mothers’ binary systems of race and gender to be too confining. Astrid Henry shows 
how members of this younger generation would conflate race with gender and sexuality in their 
early texts and use certain transgressive aspects of their identities to explain others: “biraciality is 
frequently used as an example of the kind of complexity that this generation brings to feminism. 
Frequently linked to biraciality is bisexuality which, like its racial counterpart, is typically 
described as an identity beyond the simplistic categories of the past with their limiting binaries: 
black or white, straight or gay” (158). Refusing to find their places automatically in the 
preexisting system, these feminists instead create new places for themselves, sometimes inside 
the system, sometimes outside. Henry continues, “it is not just truth which is no longer black and 
white in the same way it was for second-wave feminists but feminists themselves that can no 
longer be put into such clear-cut categories” (159). According to Henry, this change is so 
significant as to mark an advance in the evolution of feminism.  
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 Analyzing a passage from To Be Real, Henry writes, “[Rebecca] Walker suggests that 
this new feminism involves more than just a shift in philosophy or ideology; rather, it represents 
a demographic shift. […] [R]acial, sexual, and gender identities have become more complex and 
so, correspondingly, must feminism” (159). For Rebecca, Alice’s perceived preference for 
Rebecca’s black identity translates to a perceived rejection of the entirety of Rebecca’s biracial 
identity, which happens in tandem with Rebecca’s rejection of Alice’s feminism as being, as the 
title To Be Real suggests, implicitly artificial or inauthentic. In Henry’s analysis of the title, 
Rebecca “relies on the association of being real with honesty. Doing so, however, would seem to 
imply that what will distinguish this new generation is their refusal to live a lie—‘a feminist ideal 
not of their own making.’ […] [T]he claim of realness is posed as the third wave’s challenge to 
the second wave: our generation will tell the truth about our lives” (151, emphasis original). 
Though embracing what Sika Dagbovie-Mullins calls a “black-sentient mixed-race identity”55 
(2), Senna makes a similar critique of her own (less famous) mother’s feminism in the title essay 
of To Be Real.  
 In setting up the third wave to be, as Henry says, a “challenge” focused on “rejecting the 
previous generation’s definition of feminism when it doesn’t fit with our experience” (151), 
Rebecca and Senna further lock themselves into abjective conflict with their mothers. To define 
                                                          
55In her 2013 work Crossing B(l)ack: Mixed-Race Identity in Modern American Fiction and 
Culture, Dagbovie-Mullins develops the concept of black-sentient mixed-race identity thus: 
“Black sentience intimates a mixed-race subjectivity that includes a particular awareness of the 
world, a perception rooted in blackness. It suggests a connection to a black consciousness that 
does not overdetermine one’s racial identification but still plays a large role in it” (2-3). Hoping 
to address political oppositions sometimes set up between black and black-white mixed race 
communities, Dagbovie-Mullins continues, “Many black/white mixed-race people who reject 
multiracial classification advance a black subjectivity—a black-sentient consciousness, skeptical 
of what they see as elitism associated with projecting a biracial identity. […] A black-sentient 
identity is not a separate racial category, nor does it advance an additional classification for 
forms and documents. Instead, it merges one’s multiracial personal outlook with a black vista” 
(3). 
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oneself (or one’s movement) against another makes permanent both the existential struggle to 
separate from the other and the existential necessity of remaining in relationship (albeit a 
relationship of opposition) with that other. Ironically, their efforts to separate the third wave from 
its second wave predecessor require the third wave to maintain a measure of dependence on the 
second wave in order to be fully understood. This process is similar to a child’s normal years-
long abjection of their mother, from birth through the teenage years and into adulthood, in order 
to become their own autonomous, individual self. It especially parallels a mixed race child’s 
struggle to separate from their differently raced mother, in order to form a racialized self more in 
keeping with what they feel their true and complete racial identification to be. Yet in each of 
these cases, the daughter’s/child’s identification tends to be so deeply rooted in their history with 
the mother who first helped them construct an identification, that the new, autonomous self 
cannot escape the mother’s influence. Nor can the separated escape feeling pain and grief over 










 In Celeste Ng’s 2017 novel, Little Fires Everywhere, one of Ng’s characters displays 
racial abjection towards her beloved, transracially adopted daughter. Part of the power of Ng’s 
writing is her ability to show that the woman’s attitude is born not of malice or insufficient care, 
but of ignorance, white privilege, and a society that has conditioned her not to prioritize the 
child’s ethnic Chinese heritage.  
 The girl’s biological mother, a struggling Chinese immigrant to the U.S., names her 
daughter “May Ling.” After running out of money to buy basic necessities like food and diapers, 
however, the desperate mother leaves May Ling at a fire station in hopes that the infant will be 
found by someone with the resources to care for her. Within a few months, the mother finds a 
new job and regains enough financial stability to care for May Ling again. She turns her attention 
to finding the daughter she left behind and getting her back. Meanwhile, the infant has been 
adopted by a rich white couple who had tried unsuccessfully for many years to have a child of 
their own. The couple loves the girl, whom they rename “Mirabelle,” deeply; a year after taking 
her in, there is no question that they intend to give Mirabelle the very best life they possibly can. 
In contrast, the baby’s biological mother will never be able to offer her the wealth and social 
advantages of the adoptive parents, but she, too, loves the girl with everything within her, and 
wants to raise the girl with a strong connection to her Chinese roots.  
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 As the novel unfolds, the parents go to court, and Ng presents the reader with a 
Solomonic dilemma: to which mother does the girl belong—the wealthy but racially different 
woman, or the poor woman whose ethnicity the child shares? The Chinese American lawyer who 
questions the adoptive mother in court reveals the complexity and stakes of the situation. He 
initially starts broadly with questions about the white mother’s knowledge. 
 “Have you studied Chinese culture at all?” Ed Lim asked. “Chinese 
history?” 
 “Of course we’re going to learn all about that,” Mrs. McCullough said. 
“It’s very important to us that Mirabelle stay connected to her birth culture. But 
we think the most important thing is that she has a loving home, with two loving 
parents.” (260) 
 
After agreeing that the McCulloughs love the girl, the attorney refocuses the questioning to 
explore how they intend to help her develop her Chinese identity, given that Mrs. McCullough’s 
previous answer suggests she has not yet and only vaguely intends someday to study anything 
Chinese. 
 “May Ling has been with you for fourteen months now? What have you 
done, in the time she’s been with you, to connect her to her Chinese culture?” 
 “Well.” Another pause, a very long one this time. […] “Pearl of the Orient 
is one of our very favorite restaurants. We try to take her there once a month. I 
think it’s good for her to hear some Chinese, to get it into her ears. To grow up 
feeling this is natural. And of course I’m sure she’ll love the food once she’s 
older.” Yawning silence in the courtroom. Mrs. McCullough felt the need to fill it. 
“Perhaps we could take a Chinese cooking class at the rec center and learn 
together. When she’s older.” (260-261) 
 
Through his silence, Ed Lim highlights the utter insufficiency of the McCulloughs’ current 
efforts. Since Pearl of the Orient was already a McCullough favorite, and since they merely “try” 
for a monthly visit there—suggesting that they do not always meet this goal—it seems that the 
McCulloughs have yet to go out of their way to encounter anything Chinese. Mr. Lim waits for 
Mrs. McCullough to list something more significant, and the fact that Mrs. McCullough cannot 
makes even her uncomfortable. 
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 Ed Lim said nothing, and Mrs. McCullough prattled nervously on. “We try 
to be very sensitive to these issues wherever we can. […] Like for her first 
birthday, we wanted to get her a teddy bear. One she could keep as an heirloom. 
There was a brown bear, a polar bear, and a panda, and we thought about it and 
decided on the panda. We thought perhaps she’d feel more of a connection to it.” 
(261) 
 
Note that Mrs. McCullough expects this Chinese baby to automatically feel some sort of magical 
“connection” to this Chinese animal, again with no effort on Mrs. McCullough’s part. She has no 
intention of actively cultivating her daughter’s Chinese identity; not realizing her own white 
privilege or how strongly U.S. society is built upon white ubiquity and power, she believes that a 
Chinese girl can unconsciously absorb how to be Chinese from a wholly white world, just as she 
herself unwittingly learned to be white from that same white world.  
 The courtroom discussion of stuffed bears evolves into a discussion of dolls, and here 
Mrs. McCullough finds herself forced to face how little consideration she gives to the racial 
differences between herself and her Chinese child. She has bought the girl many dolls, all of 
them white and most of them blond. Still on the witness stand, she protests, “But that doesn’t 
mean anything. You look at the toy aisle—most dolls are blond with blue eyes. I mean, that’s 
just the default. […] It’s not anything racist, […]. They just want to make a generic little girl. 
You know, one that will appeal to everyone” (Ng 261-262). To this, Ed Lim responds, “But it 
doesn’t look like everyone, does it? It doesn’t look like May Ling” (262), a point that Mrs. 
McCullough cannot deny. 
 Mrs. McCullough has abjected little May Ling/Mirabelle’s racial identity, but not as the 
result of active malice. Wrapped in a lifetime of white privilege, she simply does not 
comprehend that May Ling’s racial difference matters. She does not see her own privilege, and 
she does not yet realize that May Ling cannot directly share in it. So she ignores the difference 
between them, except on the shallowest, Chinese-food-once-a-month level, and she implicitly 
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denies its significance. She loves the girl deeply, but has no idea of the harm she risks 
inflicting—nor is she thoughtful or aware enough to seek out the knowledge she lacks. 
 Ng resolves the problem of Mrs. McCullough’s maternal race-based abjection by 
awarding her custody of May Ling and then allowing the girl’s biological mother to kidnap her 
and vanish, never to be seen again by the McCulloughs. Rather than watching the abjection play 
out and untangling its effects, Ng returns the Chinese girl to her Chinese mother, thereby 
removing the racial difference that had laid the groundwork for Mrs. McCullough’s abjection in 
the first place. Most mixed race mother-daughter pairs have no such option, however. For those 
mothers and daughters whose racial identifications differ permanently, what is to be done? 
How Not To Reject Race-Based Abjection 
 This study has explicated several situations, both fictional and nonfictional, in which 
mothers and daughters treat one another with a form of race-based abjection. Norma Storch, 
fearing the loss of her white privilege by association, chooses to reject the association with her 
mixed race daughter instead. Yet she also chooses to remain in June’s life, taking care that the 
world does not know their true relationship, even though June does. These decisions cause June a 
great deal of pain and trauma; she grows up knowing that her mother loves her, but only 
privately. June feels keenly the continuous loss of her mother to whiteness and white privilege. 
The Secret Daughter documentary and book narrate her love for Norma, a love that struggles to 
overcome the immense barrier that Norma and twentieth-century U.S. society allowed race to be. 
Angry and wounded, June embraces a wholly black racial identification that excludes both 
Norma and her whiteness. 
 Although the Secret Daughter situation provides a strong example of mother and 
daughter abjecting one another based on race, it is by no means the only example. Pauline “Sister 
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Leopolda” Puyat’s life is defined by her quest for whiteness and consequent rejection of her 
associations with Indianness. Her community knows her heritage, so she will never be officially 
designated white, but by rejecting both her mother and her daughter and replacing them with the 
nuns at the otherwise all-white convent, Pauline becomes as white as a non-passing, white-
appearing, white-performing mixed blood Indian in her circumstances can be. She remains 
physically in but not of the reservation, keeping watch over her people and especially her 
daughter. Known throughout her life as a strange, tortured, possibly dangerous soul, she 
demonstrates both deeply repressed grief for her Indian identity and racial melancholia56 for the 
whiteness she can never completely attain. On the surface, her rejection of her own Indianness—
and of her mother and daughter, because they tie her to an Indian identity—seems strong, but 
upon further examination proves ambivalent enough to be read as abjection instead. 
 These two case studies demonstrate some of the worst effects of race-based abjection; all 
of the parties involved suffer great pain and trauma from their ruptured but still-present 
relationships. Norma and June see the fact of their racial difference clearly, but Norma’s 
probable narcissism and the poisonous racial hierarchy of mainstream U.S. society in the mid-
1900s create enormous pressure for them to remain mostly—but not quite wholly—apart. 
Pauline, meanwhile, magnifies the racial differences between herself and her mother and 
daughter. There is little evidence that the women grapple deeply, openly, or cooperatively to 
                                                          
56Noting Freud’s concept of melancholia as “a mourning without end,” David L. Eng and 
Shinhee Han explain that “[t]o the extent that ideals of whiteness for Asian Americans (and other 
groups of color) remain unattainable, processes of assimilation are suspended, conflicted, and 
unresolved. […] This suspended assimilation—this inability to blend into the ‘melting pot’ of 
America—suggests that, for Asian Americans, ideals of whiteness are continually estranged. 
They remain at an unattainable distance, at once a compelling fantasy and a lost ideal” (345). 
This endless mourning of a lost racial ideal of whiteness is what Eng and Han designate as 
“racial melancholia.” Forever known in her community as a mixed blood Indian, Pauline 
similarly experiences a mourning without end of her white ideal that she can approach through 
her appearance and her vocation as a nun, but will never actually reach.  
181 
address the difference and its effects; instead, Pauline fights to preserve and increase it, and, 
whereas June had fought for Norma’s acknowledgement, Marie does little to link herself publicly 
to Pauline. Not surprisingly, then, it is Pauline and Marie’s relationship that suffers the most 
severe permanent damage. 
 Ruby Jordan, Birdie Lee, and Rebecca Walker have the privilege of growing up in a post-
Loving v. Virginia world and never suffer abandonment to the extent that June Cross and Marie 
Lazarre had, but they still lash out at their mothers for what they feel to be dehumanizing 
objectifications of them. Liz O’Leary, Sandy Lee, and Alice Walker can and do safely and 
publicly claim their daughters, yet they demonstrate abjective preoccupations with their 
daughters’ racial identifications. Liz’s and Sandy’s abjections of Ruby’s and Birdie’s blackness, 
and Alice’s abjection of Rebecca’s Jewish white/off-whiteness, are so strong as to lead these race 
activists to objectify their daughters. The daughters resent being so defined by their non-white—
or, in Rebecca’s case, non-black—racial identifications that their mothers have at times reduced 
them to racial symbols. The daughters, in turn, abject the non-mixed racial identifications of their 
mothers and objectify their mothers as representations of racial lack and non-understanding. 
Rebecca Walker and Danzy Senna have gone so far as to publicly reject their mothers’ race and 
feminist activism as outdated, overly simplistic, and false/inauthentic. For Ruby, Birdie, and 
Rebecca, the racial conflicts with their mothers prove so deep as to result in physical separations 
and emotional impasses. Ruby and Rebecca ultimately cut off contact with their mothers for 
several years, perhaps forever, with Rebecca demonstrating through her frequent public 
discussion of the rift between her and Alice that she cannot cut her mother out of her life 
entirely, even if she refuses to speak to her. 
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 These post-1967 abjections, all occurring in families that have cultivated a tradition of 
bold racial activism, show that awareness of racial difference, its formation in a racially stratified 
society, and its ramifications might not be enough to prevent race-based abjection. These 
abjections are arguably less harmful and less enduring than our pre-1967 examples. At least part 
of that mitigation of harm can be traced to the parties’ deep racial awareness. But knowledge 
alone can only alleviate—not fix, even in the short term—the problem. Were these women to 
have focused on accepting and embracing each other as they were/are, instead of making 
assumptions and projections and trying to force one another to fit certain ideas of what they 
should be, their race-based abjections, conflicts, and pain might have been reduced even further. 
In the cases in which they did start to venture down this path, such as Liz’s eventual resolve to 
go beyond recognizing Ruby’s difference, to stop trying to narrate Ruby’s racial realities and 
instead to bear witness to Ruby’s experience, however Ruby might choose to frame it, we see the 
glimmerings of hope for future reconciliation.  
Implications 
 The idea of racial/ethnic difference being such a barrier in a mother-daughter relationship 
as to cause even long-term race and feminist activists to abject and objectify their daughters, and 
vice versa, disturbs the popular narrative of mixed race identity leading to racial understanding 
and harmony. It is important to note once more that the relationships studied in this project are 
notably dysfunctional, and many mixed race mother-daughter relationships are healthy, happy, 
and indeed harmonious. Also, race-based abjection is only one of many possible causes of 
conflict between a mother and her differently raced daughter; it should not be blamed as an 
automatic culprit if and when tensions between them surface. Deep conflicts have deep and 
widespread roots, including in the examples cited here. 
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 These case studies underscore my contention that the popular contemporary narrative of 
mixed race identity being somehow particularly desirable for individuals and for the world 
should be disturbed. Michelle Mahtani points out that “mixing between racialized groups is not 
novel, despite the plethora of news media accounts that seem to herald the dawning of a new 
mixed race or postracial era. […] For mixed race to be seen as an exciting and progressive racial 
category, a strategic forgetting has to take place – a forgetting of our parents’ past and of our 
grandparents’ past” (16). Despite much of the current rhetoric, including in Critical Mixed Race 
Studies, “Mixed race people do not possess special talents or abilities simply because they call 
themselves racially mixed” (6). Nevertheless, the appeal of such rhetoric is clear: “It can be 
seductive to see oneself as part of that bright, raceless new future and simply identify as 
multiracial. […] But by doing so, [one is] participating in a form of racial epistemological 
violence that is enacted when we wilfully [sic] and not so wilfully [sic] discard the complex 
trajectories of our families’ histories – stories that inform and influence who all of us are” by 
preserving the colonialist legacies that have often led to racial mixing (16). Disrupting the 
narrative and the forgetting that forms its foundation, and particularly disrupting the narrative of 
white mothers heroically loving their mixed race children,57 enables us to have more realistic 
expectations of the mothers, their children, and the society in which both operate. It undoes 
contemporary U.S. society’s cruel (multi-)racial optimism. 
Domination as a Technique of Race-Based Abjection 
 Race-based abjection between mothers and daughters can take less overt forms than 
outright physical separations. As we have seen, subtle abjections, such as the objectification 
                                                          
57Habiba Ibrahim highlights two of these narratives, Maureen Reddy’s Crossing the Line: Race 
Parenting and Culture and Jane Lazarre’s Beyond the Whiteness of Whiteness, and analyzes both 
in great and incisive detail in Troubling the Family. 
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explored in Chapter 4, have become more feasible in the late twentieth century and early twenty-
first century, as mixed race identifications and associations have become more socially 
acceptable, even desirable, in the U.S. One variation of objectification is domination, a common 
site of conflict in mother-daughter relationships. Domination is not an automatic sign of race-
based abjection—plenty of singly raced mother-daughter dyads struggle with it—but tendencies 
towards domination can be exacerbated by race-based abjection. For example, a mother might 
endeavor to raise her daughter according to certain culturally informed gender norms without 
evaluating whether these traditional norms require modification for a daughter who will be 
racialized differently from her mother by the outside world. Alternatively, the mother might feel 
such fear and horror for her daughter’s differing racial identification that she overcompensates 
for that difference and effectively punishes her daughter for her race. 
 Gloria Anzaldúa writes in “La Prieta” about how her dark skin directly influenced the 
way her mother raised her. “‘Don’t go out in the sun,’ my mother would tell me when I wanted 
to play outside. ‘If you get any darker, they’ll mistake you for an Indian.’ […] It never dawned 
on her that, though sixth-generation American, we were still Mexican and that all Mexicans are 
part Indian” (198). Based on Anzaldúa’s account of these interactions, it seems likely that her 
mother had responded to her own Indianness with denial and/or abjection. Pauline “Sister 
Leopolda,” facing a similar situation of unwanted Indian identity and a daughter who connected 
her to Indianness, had abandoned the newborn girl. For Anzaldúa’s mother, it was Anzaldúa’s 
dark skin, not her paternity, that could offer a potential marker of Indianness. Not only did it 
visually connect Anzaldúa herself to Indian heritage, but, by extension, it connected Anzaldúa’s 
biological mother to a dreaded Indian ancestry and identity as well. 
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 Rather than reject her daughter outright, Anzaldúa’s mother abjects her Indianness and 
works to control the girl’s behavior in hopes of minimizing her Indian identification. Staying out 
of the sun could not bleach Anzaldúa’s skin, but might protect it (and thus Anzaldúa and her 
mother) from darkening further. Anzaldúa continues, “‘Machona – india ladina’ (masculine – 
wild Indian), she would call me because I did not act like a nice little Chicanita is supposed to 
act” (201). Not only did Anzaldúa’s mother try to abject her daughter’s Indianness by making it 
less visible; she also cultivated a mindset in which “Indian,” whether in appearance or behavior, 
was clearly the antithesis of what she wanted her dark-skinned daughter Gloria to be. This 
training was effective, attests Anzaldúa: “it’s taken over thirty years to unlearn the belief instilled 
in me that white is better than brown – something that some people of color never will unlearn. 
And it is only now that the hatred of myself, which I spent the greater part of my adolescence 
cultivating, is turning to love” (202). The abjection of Indian identity leads Anzaldúa’s mother to 
overemphasize Anzaldúa’s Indian heritage, as indicated by her skin and, in the mother’s mind, 
temperament, leading the mother to dominate the daughter through strict, explicitly race-related 
behavioral guidelines in order to root out the objectionable race, thereby leading the daughter to 
view herself with hatred and shame. 
 Cherríe Moraga writes in Loving in the War Years of a similar but opposite experience, in 
which Moraga’s mother sublimates her whiteness, overemphasizing it in order to abject her 
brownness. Unlike Anzaldúa, “la prieta,” Moraga is descended from an Anglo father. As she 
grows up, she is considered “‘la güera,’—fair-skinned” and therefore receives “the knowledge, 
from my [Chicana] mother, that my life would be easier than hers” (43). This knowledge and 
privilege come with a burden, however: Moraga is raised to be white, and only white. Whiteness, 
for young Moraga, is more than a skin color or even a culture: it is an ideal reinforced by her 
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mother’s stories of how much she should not want to be brown, because “to [Moraga’s mother], 
on a basic economic level, being Chicana meant being ‘less’” (43). Moraga’s mother views 
whiteness as an ability to leave poverty behind. Therefore, rather than abject Moraga’s whiteness 
and try to cast the foreignness out, as in the race-based abjections discussed in this project, she 
sublimates it. Viewing whiteness as an almost sacred opportunity for social mobility, and 
knowing she herself can never attain it, Moraga’s mother clings to it for her daughter.  
 As with Anzaldúa, the domination by Moraga’s mother, based on race-based 
abjection/sublimation, focuses on controlling Moraga’s behavior and leaves deep psychological 
scars. According to Moraga, “everything about my upbringing, at least what occurred on a 
conscious level, attempted to bleach me of what color I did have. […] It was through my 
mother’s desire to protect her children from poverty and illiteracy that we became ‘anglocized’” 
(43). As an adult, Moraga grapples with her Chicana identity, which she seems to feel is at times 
threatened or even masked by her light skin and her ability to pass. Having grown up with an 
emotionally distant Anglo father, and having observed the oppression of her fellow Chicanx by 
Anglos, Moraga writes, “I sometimes hate the white in me so viciously that I long to forget the 
obligation my skin has imposed upon my life. To speak two tongues, one of privilege, one of 
oppression. I must” (xiii). Throughout Loving, she repeatedly tries to justify or prove her 
authentic claim to the label “Chicana,” including by performing, despite her strong feminist 
ideological stances, the traditional Chicana behaviors passed on to her by her Chicana mother, 
including patriarchy, because “You are a traitor to your race if you do not put the man first” (95). 
“It’s the daughters who remain loyal to the mother” (xiii), she explains, because “the daughter 
must constantly earn the mother’s love, prove her fidelity to her” (94). Reversing her mother’s 
abjection of brownness and sublimation of whiteness, Moraga abjects the whiteness she and her 
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father share, instead58 seeking out the acceptance of her Chicanx community and the love of her 
Chicana mother, and taking neither for granted. 
Further Avenues of Inquiry 
 Having studied the power and pervasiveness of race-based matrilineal abjection, a logical 
next step would be to examine race-based abjection in other relationships. For example, it seems 
likely that race-based patrilineal abjection exists, but the cultural dynamics surrounding father-
son relationships in the U.S. might change its mechanisms and lessen or increase its power. In 
both matrilineal and patrilineal relationships, heteronormative sociocultural norms dictate that 
the child should closely resemble their parent of the same gender; often, shared gender identities, 
roles, expectations, and expressions result in added parental training of and identification with 
one’s child/ren of the same gender, increasing opportunities for emotional intimacy between 
them, and added pressure to conform not only to any prescribed race performativity, but gender 
performativity, as well. Race-based abjection also takes place in parent-child relationships that 
are not singly gendered, but it is unknown what effects gender difference has on the mechanisms 
and power of such abjections. 
 The vertical power structure and formative timing of a parent-child relationship make it 
an ideal setting for studying the effects of race-based abjection on intimate relationships. Less 
clear are the existence, potential operations, and potential effects of race-based abjection in other 
relationships. For example, most sibling relationships are based on a somewhat horizontal power 
structure, and many mixed-race siblings share the same racial/ethnic identifications—although 
racial sameness does not preclude race-based abjection. Sometimes, even siblings who share the 
                                                          
58Critical Mixed Race Studies holds that Anglo and Chicanx identifications need not be an 
either-or situation, and Moraga acknowledges that she embodies both to some extent. However, 
her association of whiteness with oppression and with physical and psychological harm results in 
a marked reluctance to identify herself with her white heritage. 
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same genetics and racial identifications are racialized differently by the outside world and 
occupy different social positions in the U.S. due to colorism, potentially introducing inequalities 
in power, social standing, etc. into the relationship and opening up additional opportunity for 
race-based abjection to interfere. Extended family, depending on the depth of their involvement 
in a mixed race person’s life, might abject that person’s race without the person suffering any 
serious adverse effects. Alternatively, one or more extended family members can occupy the 
position of parent, sibling, or mentor in a mixed race child’s life, thereby lending any race-based 
abjection greater power and consequence.  
 Non-familial relationships, too, might possibly be influenced by race-based abjection, 
but, as with family, social locations and norms would dramatically affect the potential power of 
such abjection. Friendships are generally understood to be at least somewhat horizontal and 
voluntary, making techniques of objectification like domination more difficult to implement. 
Teacher-student and employer-employee relationships involve vertical power structures, but 
rarely would one expect a mixed race person’s racial identification to have any relevance to the 
racial identifications of those who are empowered over that person, and thus, the various racial 
identifications do not present the threat to identity that they would in a parent-child relationship. 
Final Thought 
 Race-based abjection wreaks havoc on important relationships, such as the mixed race 
mother-daughter relationships covered in this project. Understanding this phenomenon presents 
us with a means of understanding and framing similar mother-daughter conflicts in numerous 
mixed race memoirs, works of fiction, and other literary texts. It also suggests possible factors at 
work in real-life conflicts between mixed race mothers and daughters today.  
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 As Kelly Oliver and other proponents of (radical) love have shown, however, 
understanding the facts is a strong but incomplete solution. We reach our deepest, most healing 
level of understanding when we understand that we can never fully experientially understand, 
never completely empathize with, a differently raced mother or daughter’s racial realities. 
Accepting this reality shatters the cruel optimism of our fantasized postracial families in a 
postracial U.S., freeing us to instead do the important but difficult work of decolonizing our 
minds and relationships. Knowing that racism exists in a multitude of forms will not, on its own, 
dismantle the negative racial frameworks left in place by racist colonizers; we must also actively 
choose racial humility in order to enjoy true community with our racial others. To fail to 
decolonize in this way is to risk implementing abjections like those studied in these chapters. As 
we have seen, race-based abjection does not negate love for the other, nor are all race-based 
abjections of equal consequence, but race-based abjection does render one’s love imperfect and 
weaken its power. In the introduction, I urged acceptance, respect, and alliance as indicators of 
radical love across racial differences between a mother and daughter. If we accept our ultimate 
lack of understanding and respond with an open and respectful mind, a gracious heart, and a 
listening ear, and if we then ally ourselves with our others—bear witness to their otherness—we 




APPENDIX 1: KEY DEFINITIONS 
 
 Rather than following a more traditional alphabetical order for the following terms and 
definitions, I have chosen to arrange them according to a logical progression of ideas. The 
definitions build upon one another; hence my decision to begin with the broad concept of 
“identity,” which is followed by “race,” then “ethnicity,” then “mixed race,” etc. For quick 
reference, an alphabetical listing of the terms and definitions can be found in the front material 
for this study. 
Identity/Identification/Subjectivity 
 This project is built on a post-positivist or critical realist approach to identity. Critical 
realism defines identity as a way of understanding a person’s place and position in society, now 
and/or in the past; the function of identity in this framework is simultaneously to describe and to 
effect a person’s social standing (Alcoff and Mohanty 6). Staunchly anti-essentialist, critical 
realist theory holds that identities are individually and socially constructed, but it avoids idealism 
by tempering this constructionist viewpoint with a heavy dose of pragmatism. Specifically, 
proponents of critical realism argue that the dramatic effects of identity and identification upon 
an individual’s lived experience demonstrate that their constructed nature does not negate their 
reality. Identity and identification might be artificial, but they still matter. 
 Critical realist Rosaura Sánchez emphasizes the relationship between an individual 
identity and the society in which it operates: “A critical realist politics of identity, […] provides a 
materialist account of identity formation that meets explanatory adequacy by examining identity 
in direct relation to social structures, noting how social structures configure, condition, limit, and 
constrain agency and never forgetting that agency has the potential to transform social 
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structures” (32). Critical realism thus holds that in the process of creating and re-creating 
identity, a person must operate within the bounds of his or her society, but even this captivity 
offers some freedom. Not so with identification, Sánchez notes: “Identity, unlike identification, 
is agentially formed” (32). In a critical realist framework, identity is something an individual 
chooses to adopt, whereas identification is something that is received, either from society or from 
the individual’s own unconscious self. 
 Sánchez’s fellow critical realist Paula M. L. Moya similarly emphasizes the give and take 
of identity formation. For Moya, identities are “the nonessential and evolving products that 
emerge from the dialectic between how subjects of consciousness identify themselves and how 
they are identified by others” (Moya 96-97). Identities are sites of continual negotiation between 
individuals and the people with whom they come into contact. Moya further divides identity into 
two components: subjectivity, or the individual’s consciousness as mediated through his or her 
self-identification; and ascriptive identities, the identities projected onto the individual by the 
outside world, with or without the individual’s consent. In describing subjectivity, or “subjective 
identity,” Moya emphasizes continuity and agency: “Subjectivity refers to our individual sense 
of self, our interior existence, our lived experience of being a more-or-less coherent self across 
time. The term also implies our various acts of self-identification, and thus necessarily 
incorporates our understanding of ourselves in relation to others” (Moya 98). What Moya calls 
“ascriptive identities,” meanwhile, overlaps somewhat with Sánchez’s formulation of 
identification: Moya states that ascriptive identities “are inescapably historical and collective, 
and generally operate through the logic of visibility. […] [They] come to us from outside the 
self, from society, and are highly implicated in the way we are treated by others” (97). Moya 
clarifies that subjectivity and ascriptive identity are so tightly interwoven that they cannot be 
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truly separated from each other; still, the distinction between the two becomes relevant when 
they are incongruent with each other, as happens often in mixed race identity studies. 
 Critical realist theory originated from the work of philosopher Satya Mohanty and takes a 
primarily philosophical approach to understanding identity. It echoes sociological definitions of 
identity, though, such as that of Rockquemore and Brunsma: “identity refers to a validated self-
understanding that situates and defines an individual,” as well as “a process by which individuals 
understand themselves and others, as well as evaluate their self in relation to others” (23). In all 
of these definitions, identity involves both place/positionality and time/process. The self plays a 
key role, but cannot work in a vacuum. Individual identity is impossible without a surrounding 
society. 
Race 
As with identity, there are three major paradigms that scholars use to explain what race 
is. The essentialist paradigm holds that every race has its own distinct, essential characteristic(s). 
Anyone who shares a certain race’s characteristics is a member of that race, and anyone who 
does not is automatically excluded. This way of thinking held sway in Western nations into the 
mid-1900s and still has many proponents outside of academia and to some extent within, 
particularly, as sociologist Ann Morning has found, in the natural sciences, though it no longer 
dominates the humanities and social sciences in the U.S. (The Nature of Race). On the other end 
of the racial conceptualization spectrum is essentialism’s opposite, idealism, the idea that race is 
an illusion that has no effect or impact on society or on the individual lives of which society 
consists.59 The problem with this seemingly utopian view is that, as Naomi Zack writes, “To 
                                                          
59Many scholars agree that theoretically, at least, race is indeed an illusion, because it has no 
absolute categories and no biological or otherwise objective basis in reality. Idealism can take 
this position to an extreme, however, in arguing that the illusion has no meaning, apparently 
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argue, in effect, that races do not exist, in the face of powerful belief structures that presuppose 
the existence of races and that posit racial identities for individuals, is something like tilting at 
windmills” (Race and Mixed Race 4). Race and racial categories permeate U.S. history, cultures, 
and social structure so deeply that to deny them completely is impractical. 
According to Morning, scholars in the social sciences and humanities seem to hold 
overwhelmingly to what Morning calls the “constructivist” or “constructionist” viewpoint, and 
what Alcoff and Mohanty claim as the postpositivist or critical realist paradigm of identity—in 
this case, racial identity. Constructionists contend that race is a matter not of some essential, non-
universal quality, but of social beliefs. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, whose racial formation 
work takes this approach, define race as “a concept which signifies and symbolizes social 
conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies” (55). They further explain 
that “race is a matter of both social structure and cultural representation” (56) and “not a 
biologically given but rather a socially constructed way of differentiating human beings” (65). 
For them, race is primarily a system of categorization that both regulates and is regulated by 
society. The bodies that simultaneously occupy the places of both subject and object in this 
system have relevance because of the roles they fulfill and what they represent, not because of 
what they, in themselves, are. Following this line of thinking, Morning reveals her personal 
belief that “race is not an individual trait but rather a characteristic of a relationship or social 
setting. In other words, individuals do not carry race within them; instead, race is a label that is 
imposed on them (or a container into which they are put) depending on the society in which they 
find themselves” (18). Race is contextual and relative, not absolute. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
suggesting that no one ever sees or experiences anything connected to any illusory concept of 
“race,” however that concept might be defined. See, for example, the character of Deck in 
Senna’s Caucasia. 
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 My project supports constructionist theories of race. Few things challenge essentialist 
racial theory and demonstrate changing social constructions of race more quickly and easily than 
mixed race identity and the history of mixed race individuals in the U.S. This project does not 
take a constructionist definition of race as its starting point, however. In order to maximize its 
academic reach, the project follows the neutral definition of race suggested by Morning—a 
definition designed to accommodate both essentialist and constructionist racial paradigms: “race 
is a system for classifying human beings that is grounded in the belief that they embody inherited 
and fixed biological characteristics that identify them as members of racial groups” (21).60 In 
addition to its broad appeal, using this definition pays tribute to the essentialism and essentialist 
systems by which many mixed race individuals have historically been judged, claimed, and 
excluded. It thereby acknowledges not only the constructionist paradigms that race mixture 
supports, but also the essentialist paradigms in which race mixture often originates.  
 This project follows the racial schema of the 1990 U.S. Census Bureau: “White; Black; 
American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut; Asian and Pacific Islander; and Other race” (Gibson and 
Jung 1).61 The racial categories of the 1990 U.S. census exemplify the legal and political realities 
                                                          
60Morning does not claim perfection for this definition; she goes on to note, “Where essentialists 
and constructionists would differ is on whether the belief in biological racial difference is 
accurate. But this definition is in itself agnostic on that matter, and so I offer it as a starting 
point” (21). 
 
61In the U.S., “Latina/o/x” is still legally classified as an ethnic identity and technically 
independent of racial identity, although it is generally treated and discussed as a racial identity in 
its own right, and often a mixed and/or minority race. The 2010 U.S. Census found that 47% of 
self-identified U.S. Latinx individuals claimed a mixed race or non-white racial identity (Humes, 
Jones and Ramirez 6), and a 2013 USA Today article reported that 95% of people whose race 
was recorded in the census as “Some other race” were of Hispanic origin (El Nasser). For the 
purposes of this project, I will consider Latinx to be a (minority) racial identity when referring to 
Latinx people as a single group; at the individual level, “Latinx” will be treated as a minority 
racial identity only when the individual in question claims some sort of non-white racial 
ancestry. 
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of race in the U.S. in the late 1900s, after the Supreme Court legalized interracial marriage 
throughout the nation in the 1967 Loving v. Virginia decision, thereby paving the way for an 
increase in such unions and their mixed race offspring as the 20th century drew to a close. 
Furthermore, the 1990 U.S. census is of particular importance in Critical Mixed Race Studies, 
because of its status as the last census that allowed only monoracial identification. The ensuing 
decade would see the number and influence of mixed race Americans grow to such an extent 
that, after much debate, the U.S. government began to recognize mixed race identifications 
explicitly by allowing individuals to claim more than one racial identity for themselves in the 
2000 census. Thus, the 1990 census offers unique insight into the context and conditions in 
which many of the texts used in this project were inspired, planned, written, and/or published. 
Ethnicity 
 “Ethnicity” refers to a type of individual affiliation and group categorization based on 
some sort of common culture. In contemporary race theory, more ethnic categories exist than 
racial categories, and ethnicities usually designate smaller, more specific groups than races. 
Suzanne Oboler cautions, “It is important to note that ethnic labels, like all names, are by their 
very nature abstractions of a reality. […] [T]heir usage perhaps inevitably includes singling out 
particular socially constructed attributes, whether related to race, gender, class, or language. The 
attributes are imputed to be common to the group’s members and are used to homogenize the 
group” in ways that are sometimes unwarranted (xv). 
Mixed Race 
 Defining “race” is crucial in order to define “mixed race,” one of the most important 
terms used in this project, and no less contested a term than the “race” that makes up half of its 
name. A major problem within mixed race studies is that of being forced to rely on both the term 
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and the idea of “race” in order to then deconstruct “race” via “mixed race.”62 This conflict is 
routinely and explicitly recognized by scholars of mixed race studies, even though these same 
scholars typically go on to use both the term and the concept. Kimberly DaCosta, for example, 
includes this disclaimer in her introduction to her research: “Many scholars argue that terms like 
multiracial, interracial, and mixed race threaten to reify biologistic understandings of race. 
Moreover, they point out that such terms are imprecise, for ‘who is multiracial’ depends largely 
upon how race is defined” (19). DaCosta’s solution is to use many terms, highlighting the 
constructed nature of race and racial terminology. She writes that she “opted to use several 
terms, including multiracial, mixed, and persons of mixed descent when referring to the people 
who are the subjects of this research. That racial distinctions are ideological and slippery makes 
no less true the fact that we recognize them” (DaCosta 19). DaCosta’s strategy is creative, and 
her explicit recognition of the intentionality behind her rotating rhetoric unusual; however, I have 
chosen in this project not to bounce among several terms without ever settling on one, both for 
the sake of clarity and because using many terms does not resolve the issue. The problem of 
                                                          
62A number of alternatives to “mixed race” have been employed, though none has been 
universally accepted. I chart several of the most common of these alternatives in the attached 
appendix. My reasoning in choosing to use “mixed race” over these other terms is similar to that 
of Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe. She points out that “mixed parentage” and “mixed heritage” could 
both apply to “someone with white Scottish and white Welsh parents” (xxi). Not only does this 
rhetorical move collapse the difference between “multiracial” and “multiethnic,” but it 
dramatically changes the collective racial makeup and race-related experiences of the people 
being discussed. Additionally, “‘mixed race’ is a term that is part and parcel of the English 
vernacular” (Ifekwunigwe xxi). “Multiply raced” is a strong alternative, preserving the racial 
criterion, recognizing the often-imposed nature of racial identities, and not suggesting that any of 
the racial identities involved are deficient by virtue of their being mixed; however, it leaves open 
the implied possibility of removing or disregarding one or more of the races. “Mixed race,” on 
the other hand, better indicates the entanglement of the races with one another, acknowledging 
that, depending on the circumstances, a person may not be able to distinguish between his/her 
races or extricate one from the other(s). 
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accepting “race” in order to talk about “mixed race” is a problem with the concept itself; the 
terminology merely reflects this dilemma. 
Choosing to use the term “mixed race” is just a small piece of the tangled politics of 
mixed race studies terminology. Deciding what “mixed race” means is an even knottier question. 
Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe offers a fairly standard definition, explaining that she “use[s] the term 
‘mixed race’ to describe individuals who according to popular folk concepts of ‘race’ and by 
known birth parentage embody two or more worldviews or, in genealogical terms, descent 
groups” (Ifekwunigwe xxi). DaCosta’s sociological research similarly demonstrates the 
prevalence of mixed race referring specifically to first-generation mixed race individuals: “When 
respondents spoke of ‘multiracials’ (‘mixed people,’ ‘biracials’) they were almost always 
referring to people whose parents were of different racial categories. … One was monoracial if 
both of the person’s biological parents were of the same racial category” (126). These definitions 
put forth by Ifekwunigwe and by DaCosta and her (mixed race) research subjects prioritize 
biological ancestry in determining mixed race status, but suggest that individual mixed race 
identity is a quality that cannot be inherited.  
At the same time, though, the mixed race identity of groups can transcend generations, 
bestowing the moniker of “mixed”—for better or worse—upon individuals whose original race-
mixing ancestors might be so far removed from memory that their existence is no longer known, 
but assumed. DaCosta references “groups [that] were understood to have ‘mixed’ origins (such 
as African Americans or Latinos)” and states that, in her research, “most respondents qualified 
their definitions of who is mixed with statements like, ‘well, everyone is mixed depending on 
how you define race’” (126). On a smaller scale, certain populations claim a common mixed race 
individual identity, such as the Métis Indians, Amerindian descendants of French fur traders and 
198 
American Indian women. In these cases, claiming what might seem to be a singly raced identity 
can mean automatically claiming an identity that is inherently mixed race.  
The reverse can be true, as well: claiming a mixed race identity does not necessarily 
preclude claiming identity as a “full” member of a certain racial group. Sika Dagbovie-Mullins 
proposes recognition of a “black-sentient mixed-race identity,” for example: a mixed race 
identity that claims blackness first and mixed race second. “Black sentience,” Dagbovie-Mullins 
explains, “intimates a mixed-race subjectivity that includes a particular awareness of the world, a 
perception rooted in blackness. It suggests a connection to a black consciousness that does not 
overdetermine one’s racial identification but still plays a large role in it” (2-3). In naming this 
identity, Dagbovie-Mullins criticizes mixed race identity politics that “diminish blackness” and 
notes that “[m]any black/white mixed-race people who reject multiracial classification advance a 
black subjectivity—a black-sentient consciousness, skeptical of what they see as elitism 
associated with projecting a biracial identity” (3).63 All of these identities can claim mixed race 
identity to whatever extent they wish, all are fully valid, and all are as legitimately “mixed race” 
as the first-generation mixed race individual. 
I view these mixed race identities are equivalent—though not the same—because my 
definition of “mixed race” is qualitative instead of quantitative. I base my definition on lived 
experiences and their effect on the identities and identifications of the individual, not on blood 
                                                          
63Jonathan Brennan cites the example of Jean Toomer, who “refused to observe established racial 
categories, […] and insisted on […] a complex identity, yet this complexity does not deny 
African American heritage; in fact, Toomer […] claims his Negro soul quite openly. An 
assertion of multiple identities does not entail a destruction of all identities, but an insistence on 
the right to claim one’s true self” (3). Self-definition, not self-erasure, is the goal of many mixed 
race activists. 
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percentages, which are an outdated and scientifically inaccurate measure.64 Specifically, I argue 
that in order to claim a mixed race identity, an individual must fit one or more of the following 
three criteria:  
1. Has experienced being racially differentiated from one or both parents 
2. Has been identified as racially ambiguous (primarily, but not exclusively, 
determined by phenotype—as well as names, language, attitudes, and behaviors) 
3. Is known or believed (though not necessarily by the subject him-/herself) to have 
more than one race in his or her ancestry 
This definition is intentionally broad. A common (though not essential) element of mixed race 
experience is exclusion from all races and a lack of a feeling of belonging. The pain of such 
exclusion underlies the emphasis many scholars and theorists place on a mixed race politic being 
one in which anyone who suffers identity-based marginalization will be welcomed and can find a 
home. In the same spirit, the criteria I have outlined above ultimately exclude only those 
individuals who have never self-identified as being of mixed race nor been identified as such by 
anyone else. 
 This nearly-all-inclusiveness is both a strength of the definition, and perhaps its greatest 
weakness. For example, unlike the initial first-generation mixed race criterion of DaCosta’s 
research subjects, it accounts for ethnic groups in which all of the members self-identify as being 
of mixed race, such as the Métis Indians. Children born to such groups may be classified as 
having the same racial makeup of their parents, but that should not mean that these children 
cannot be of mixed race simply because both of their parents already are. However, my 
                                                          
64Quantitative definitions dominate both popular and scholarly mixed race discourses. See the 
“Terms of Multiplicity” and “Terms of Division” sections of Appendix 2: Common Alternatives 
to “Mixed Race” for examples of quantitatively-based mixed race designations, particularly “-
blood” terms. 
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definition is not an exact equation, but a set of criteria into which anyone who is of mixed race 
will fit.65 To assume that anyone who fits the criteria is automatically of mixed race would be to 
commit the logical fallacy of asserting the consequent (all dogs are mammals, but not all 
mammals are dogs, etc.). The degree to which one will likely be considered to have a mixed race 
identity roughly reflects the degree to which one meets the criteria; individuals who frequently, 
consciously, and deliberately pass, for example, may have a stronger claim to mixed race identity 
and experience than someone who was once mistaken by a stranger as having a different racial 
identity than the s/he claimed.  
It should also be noted that my definition relies entirely on perceptions—especially visual 
perceptions of body and phenotype—which depend on their perceivers and can easily conflict. 
 A further complication—as much an advantage as a disadvantage—to this definition is 
that it includes some people who are not popularly considered to be of mixed race. Transracial 
adoptees, for example, frequently do not have a known history of mixed race in their biological 
ancestry, yet are often clearly racially differentiated from their adoptive parents.66 People who do 
                                                          
65Carol Roh Spaulding employs a similarly descriptive but non-exclusive framework in her 1995 
survey of “the mixed blood as a literary trope,” noting, “Although the literary portrayals have 
many variables, they share several important common denominators” (98): 
1. “mixed race is founded in the experience of marginality” (98) 
2. “mixed-race characters are always negatively defined (neither ‘white’ nor ‘raced’)” (98) 
3. “the characters serve a kind of barometric function, revealing the racial tensions 
embedded in the text” (98) 
4. “mixed-race protagonists come to a crisis point in the narrative when they are forced to 
confront in some manner their indeterminate racial status” (98) 
Spaulding’s criteria encompass many, if not most, of the canonical twentieth-century American 
literary fiction dealing with mixed race, such as the nameless narrator in The Autobiography of 
an Ex-Coloured Man (Johnson), Clare and Irene in Passing and Helga in Quicksand (Larsen), 
Tayo in Ceremony (Silko), Birdie in Caucasia (Senna), and others. 
 
66There is significant precedent for including transracial adoptees in discussions of mixed race. 
The MAVIN Foundation, the Association of MultiEthnic Americans, and a number of their 
partners explicitly support transracial adoptees as part of their mixed race/mixed-heritage 
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not self-identify as being of mixed race and may or may not be ascribed a mixed race identity by 
others could also qualify—though it should be noted that self-identifications can and do change 
over time in mixed race contexts.67 On the other end of the identification spectrum, people who 
self-identify as being of mixed race but lack any sort of traditional, generally phenotypical, 
characteristics popularly associated with mixed race identity could qualify as well. Depending on 
how important self-perceptions of mixed race identity are to such people’s identity formation 
and/or development, they can have a degree of mixed race experience even if no one aside from 
themselves ascribes mixed race identity to them. These fuzzy boundaries of mixed race identity, 
though confusing and sometimes frustrating, are at the same time appropriate, in that they 
exemplify the border-crossing ambiguity that has been a primary theme in mixed race studies, 
particularly after Gloria Anzaldúa’s 1987 publication of Borderlands. 
Critical Mixed Race Studies 
 Critical Mixed Race Studies is a young but rapidly growing interdisciplinary field. 
Explorations of mixed race identity are certainly not new, but the context and paradigm within 
which Critical Mixed Race Studies treats mixed race identity are relatively so, especially with 
such widespread visibility. Critical Mixed Race Studies combines not only standard academic 
disciplines, but also the scholarship of what have traditionally been separate racial and ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
activism. Likewise, the first full article in the inaugural issue of the Journal of Critical Mixed 
Race Studies includes transracial adoption within the purview of Critical Mixed Race Studies 
(Daniel, Kina and Dariotis 7). 
 
67See, for example, Bliss Broyard, who learned as an adult that her father, author and New York 
Times literary critic Anatole Broyard, had been a “black” man passing as “white” throughout his 
adult life. Bliss Broyard subsequently wrote One Drop: My Father’s Hidden Life—A Story of 
Race and Family Secrets (2007) and, although raised as a monoracial white girl, was one of 
twelve individuals featured on Henry Louis Gates, Jr.’s PBS series African American Lives 2. In 
One Drop, she wrestles with the question of her racial identity, given her newly discovered 
ancestry. 
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studies fields. It frames mixed race identity as a distinct and legitimate racial identity in its own 
right, rather than a subtype of another (usually minority) racial identity and community. It then 
draws upon and synthesizes the mixed race scholarship of all of these fields and disciplines in 
order to create pan-racial mixed race scholarship.  
Sex/Gender/Woman 
 The distinction between “sex” and “gender” is generally understood to be that of biology 
vs. culturally influenced performativity.68 “Sex” connotes male, female, and other naturally 
occurring and physically based sexual identities, while “gender” describes men/masculine, 
women/feminine, and other gender identities and expressions. Judith Butler explains, “Originally 
intended to dispute the biology-is-destiny formulation, the distinction between sex and gender 
serves the argument that whatever biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is 
culturally constructed” (Gender Trouble 9). According to Butler, this distinction quickly turns 
into a complete separation between the two concepts: “If gender is the cultural meanings that the 
sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way” (10). 
The nature of gender as a sociocultural construct, Butler theorizes, destabilizes not only any 
objective notion of gender, but also any objective notion of sex: “Taken to its logical limit, the 
sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally 
constructed genders. […] And what is ‘sex’ anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or 
hormonal, and how is a feminist critic to assess the scientific discourses which purport to 
establish such ‘facts’ for us?” (10). Despite these questions, however, Butler continues to refer to 
sex as a primarily biological concept and gender as a primarily cultural one, and my project will 
conform to these definitions. 
                                                          
68See, for example, definitions put forth by the American Psychological Association ("Definition 
of Terms") and by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mikkola). 
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 Not surprisingly, perhaps, the definition of “woman” is similarly contested. In popular 
culture, and even among many academics, the meaning of the word seems straightforward. Upon 
further scrutiny, however, “woman” eventually collapses in upon itself much as “sex” and 
“gender” do. Butler writes in Gender Trouble, “For the most part, feminist theory has assumed 
that there is some existing identity, understood through the category of women, who not only 
initiates feminist interests and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom 
political representation is pursued” (3). Butler originally published Gender Trouble in 1990, with 
a second edition arriving in 1999. During the decade leading up to each of these editions, Third 
World feminisms and Third Wave feminisms, both of which emphasized acceptance and 
representation of a multiplicity of female identities, as will be discussed later, saw the 
publication of many of their most influential theoretical works. With Third World feminism 
particularly in mind, and Third Wave feminism soon to emerge, Butler states, “The very subject 
of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms” (4) and “there is the political 
problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a common 
identity. Rather than a stable signifier that commands the assent of those whom it purports to 
describe and represent, women, even in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of 
contest, a cause for anxiety” (6). Butler blames feminism (which she invokes as a singular entity) 
itself for this pronounced lack of unity: “Is there some commonality among ‘women’ that 
preexists their oppression, or do ‘women’ have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone? … 
Indeed, the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless 
category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category” (7). Like “sex” 
and “gender,” “woman” ultimately has no set, simple, and universally agreed-upon definition. 
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Like “race,” though, it indicates a category of identity whose effects are clear and powerful, 
worthy of continued exploration, even if its exact definition is somewhat hazy. 
Feminism/Third World Feminisms/Third Wave Feminism 
 “Feminism” can mean many different things, depending on who is using—and hearing—
the word. It is generally understood to have a political component of some sort and to be 
centered on the project of representing and supporting women. The vast variety of feminisms in 
existence today makes a single, all-encompassing, universally accepted definition of the word 
highly elusive, if not impossible. For the purposes of this project, I define “feminism” as an 
attitude or approach that prioritizes the needs and values of women, promotes women’s agency, 
and celebrates women’s worth. 
 There is no single Third World feminism, but rather a number of feminisms that call 
themselves “Third World” or in some other way fall into the “Third World feminism” category. 
In her introduction to Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty writes that “what provisionally holds the essays in this text […] together: [is] imagined 
communities of women with divergent histories and social locations, woven together by the 
political threads of opposition to forms of domination that are not only pervasive but also 
systemic” (4).69 For some writers and activists, Mohanty explains, these desired communities 
look like “international coalitions among third world women in contemporary capitalist societies, 
particularly on the basis of a socialist-feminist vision,” while others envision “the empowerment 
                                                          
69Mohanty subsequently remarks that “Geographically, the nation-states of Latin America, the 
Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, China, South Africa, and Oceania 
constitute the parameters of the non-European third world. In addition, black, Latino, Asian, and 
indigenous peoples in the U.S., Europe, and Australia, some of whom have historic links with the 
geographically defined third world, also refer to themselves as third world peoples” (5). The 
Third World is neither solely geographic nor solely based on race and class, but allows for all 
three, a recognition of the difference encompassed among the many Third World populations. 
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of third world women based on the demystification of ideologies of gender and sexuality that 
affect women’s daily lives” (5). Both visions—and many others—qualify as versions of Third 
World feminism. 
 “Third World feminism” can include feminisms associated with a certain race, such as 
Black (American) feminism. Writing as a self-identified Black feminist, Gina Dent explains that 
“Black feminism, or ‘womanism,’ […] has never based itself on a self-conscious description of 
particular movements or strategies. It intersects with and embraces ways of existing in the world 
that claim nothing to do with women’s emancipation, and it charts these stories as evidence of 
‘womanish’ wisdom and struggle” (62). In this paradigm, women are not limited or forced by 
their gender into certain philosophies, goals, and tactics. Women do not just fight for agency; 
they recognize and exercise it.  
 Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake define Third Wave feminism, on the other hand, as 
“a movement that contains elements of second wave critique of beauty culture, sexual abuse, and 
power structures while it also acknowledges and makes use of the pleasure, danger, and defining 
power of those structures” (3). Despite both identifying as responses and/or correctives to 
Second Wave feminism, Third World and Third Wave feminisms have an uneasy relationship 
with one another. The extent of the tensions between self-identified members of these 
movements can vary from nothing noticeable to passionate disavowal, depending on the 
individual. In general, Third Wave feminists—if they address Third World feminisms at all—
tend to claim that the Third Wave movement was inspired by and/or includes Third World 
feminisms. Heywood and Drake fall into this latter category, identifying themselves as members 
of a particular Third Wave feminist subgroup: 
young feminists who grew up with equity feminism, got gender feminism in 
college, along with poststructuralism, and are now hard at work on a feminism 
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that strategically combines elements of these feminisms, along with black 
feminism, women-of-color feminism, working-class feminism, pro-sex feminism, 
and so on. A third wave goal that comes directly out of learning from these 
histories and working among these traditions is the development of modes of 
thinking that can come to terms with the multiple, constantly shifting bases of 
oppression in relation to the multiple, interpenetrating axes of identity, and the 
creation of a coalition politics based on these understandings. […] Even as 
different strains of feminism and activism sometimes directly contradict each 
other, they are all part of our third wave lives, our thinking, and our praxes. (3) 
 
 In this latter model, “Third Wave feminism” is an overarching umbrella, under which Third 
World feminisms are just some of the many varieties of feminism that have taken shape. 
 Numerous Third World feminists object to this subsuming of Third World feminisms into 
another largely white, privileged “wave” of feminism, this one simply labeled “Third” instead of 
“Second.” Kimberly Springer argues that “the ‘wave’ model […] obscures the historical role of 
race in feminist organizing. If we consider the first wave as that moment of organizing 
encompassing woman suffrage and the second wave as the women’s liberation/women’s rights 
activism of the late 1960s, we effectively disregard the race-based movements before them that 
served as precursors, […] for gender activism” (1061). In addition to devaluing and forgetting 
race activists’ contributions to feminist achievements in the U.S., Third Wave feminism has what 
many Third World feminists believe to be an overly narrow focus. In order to promote gender 
visibility and gender empowerment, these Third World feminists argue, Third Wave feminism 
obscures and silences other important dimensions of identity. Third Wave feminism can be seen 
as stifling or confining when compared to Third World feminisms, as Andrew Jolivétte notes: 
“In a womanist approach one continues to be female, of color, queer, differently abled, 
immigrant—she can hold all these identities. In a feminist approach, historically, it was but one 
or two: class oppression based on gender or sex” (154-155).  To privilege Third Wave feminism 
over Third World feminisms by saying that the latter are merely a subset of the former can be 
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read as an arrogant marginalization of Third World feminists based on their race(s), sexual 
orientation or sexuality(-ies), ability(-ies), and/or nationality(-ies). Therefore, although Third 
Wave feminists can position themselves as accepting and inclusive of Third World feminisms, 
they do so while remaining secure in their own “wave model” dominance. Third World 
feminists, meanwhile, tend to place greater priority on differentiating themselves from Third 
Wave feminism, since, for the Third World feminists, the struggles and resistances of 
marginalization continue, even—or especially—in what is portrayed as the safe haven of Third 
Wave feminism. 
 As with “race” and many other systems of classification, the categories of feminisms 
describe real phenomena and are helpful to a point, but are artificially imposed. Although not the 
point of her article “Mixed Race and Third Wave Feminism,” Felicity Schaeffer-Grabiel 
demonstrates the slipperiness of these labels as she describes what we might consider to be 
several feminisms coexisting and flowing together organically in a single individual.  
 Schaeffer-Grabiel claims a Third Wave feminism that seems to have begun as Second 
Wave feminism and evolved into Third Wave feminism by way of Third World feminism. At the 
beginning of her article, she identifies herself “As a mixed race Chicana of the third feminist 
generation, [who] was provided the foundation for my political feminist consciousness by 
women of color feminists of the 1980s” (211). Responding to the cultural burdens that were 
placed upon her Mexican mother, Schaeffer-Grabiel recalls, “I promised myself that I would 
never do what my mother did, to think of myself as the woman who must sacrifice herself for her 
husband and family. […] That is what feminism was when I was young—refusing to be 
dependent on a man, following your dreams, leaving the ‘Virgen complex’ and most of my 
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Mexican culture behind, and definitely never marrying” (214). This colorless focus on women’s 
independence and empowerment aligns with Second Wave feminism.  
 Then, however, Schaeffer-Grabiel “learned to understand my mother’s world through the 
stories written by women of color about the generational conflicts that arose between mothers 
and daughters, from the old and new worlds” (214). Schaeffer-Grabiel cites Cherríe Moraga and 
mestizaje, both strongly associated with Third World feminism, as having significantly 
influenced this portion of her journey. Like Moraga, Anzaldúa, and many other Chicana 
feminists who embraced Third World feminisms, Schaeffer-Grabiel discovered a new 
appreciation for her mother as a result: “I learned to be a woman, a feminist, and Mexican 
through and against her, a woman I fiercely loved and from whom I also felt estranged” (215). 
Later, in graduate school, Schaeffer-Grabiel further expanded her Third World feminism by 
studying feminism as practiced in the literal Third World beyond the U.S. borders:  
While I was only marginally aware of the schism between ‘official’ middle-class 
feminism and a more diffuse idea of how women enacted their own version of 
feminist activism and survival tactics, I delved into the lives of early feminists in 
Mexico: La Malinche, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, las madres de la Plaza del Mayo, 
and indigenous Zapatista women. Feminism could be using your power as a 
mother to demand justice for the disappeared, it could be entering the nunnery to 
escape marriage (and/or sex with men), it could be starting a soup kitchen for 
people in the community, or it could be selling your body to feed your kids. (222)  
 
Chela Sandoval had a similarly broadening effect: “I realized that as my identity changed in 
different places and in relation to different people, I would have to creatively navigate each 
situation with different tools, defenses, and tactics, a strategy that, women of color feminists 
reminded me, did not mean I was less of a feminist” (Schaeffer-Grabiel 223). Next terming 
herself “a mestiza feminist,” Schaeffer-Grabiel writes that in this variety of feminism she 
“learned a new world of women’s theorizing, resistance, and politics from across the border and 
through new mediums. […] [F]eminism was not only lived differently by women but 
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institutionalized unevenly through popular culture and social expectations” (224). Ultimately, 
however, Schaeffer-Grabiel concludes, the labels do not matter: “I will not be confined by 
someone else’s version of feminism and will continue to critically question what it means in 
different places, times, and situations” (230). This rejection of others’ labels and feminisms, 
choosing instead to follow one’s own feminist path, might best be labeled a form of Third Wave 
feminism. 
Mother/Daughter 
 Andrea O’Reilly, a leading scholar in maternal studies, provides this definition of 
“mother”: “When I use the term ‘mothers,’ I refer to individuals who engage in motherwork or 
[…] maternal practice. Such a term is not limited to biological mothers but to all people who do 
the work of mothering as a central part of their life” (1). A daughter, meanwhile, is the female 
recipient of motherwork. 
Abjection 
 Abjection is a powerful mixture of simultaneous horror and fascination, triggered by 
something that represents an existential threat to the person or people in an abjective state. 
Abjection has been theorized extensively by feminist psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva, most 
famously in her 1982 work Powers of Horror. Drawing on Kristeva, Kelly Oliver describes the 
abject as “something both repellant and fascinating” from which a person “desires separation and 
feels separation impossible” (Subjectivity without Subjects 104). Oliver highlights the external 
and internal dimensions of this threat, particularly in the process of childbirth. She also notes 
Kristeva’s emphasis on the intertwinement of abjection and identity formation: Kristeva 
“maintains that the abject corresponds to the attempt to clearly delineate borders. To delineate 
borders, a line must be drawn between the inside and the outside, between the clean and proper 
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self and the abject other. That which threatens identity must be jettisoned from the borders and 
placed outside. In this sense, identity is constituted through a process of abjection” (Oliver, 
Subjectivity without Subjects 141).  
 Regarding abjection between mothers and daughters, specifically, many people have held 
that daughters must abject their mothers in order to become fully separate, whole, adult 
individuals. O’Reilly categorizes this stance as belonging primarily to 1970s Anglo-American 
feminists, and being based largely on the ideas of Nancy Chodorow and Nancy Friday. In this 
paradigm, O’Reilly explains, the mother-daughter “relationship, particularly in the daughter’s 
adolescent years, is one of antagonism and animosity. The daughter must distance and 
differentiate herself from her mother if she is to assume an autonomous identity as an adult. The 
mother represents for the daughter, […] the epitome of patriarchal oppression that she seeks to 
transcend as she comes to womanhood” (“I come...” 144). Thus, for the daughter, becoming an 
empowered, independent woman means becoming empowered and independent of her mother.70  
 Further explanation and theorization of “abjection,” particularly in relation to race, takes 
place in the chapters of this project. 
 
                                                          
70O’Reilly notes that this 1970s view was largely replaced by one that “regard[ed] mother-
daughter connection and closeness as essential for female empowerment” (“I come...” 144). 
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APPENDIX 2: SELECTED COMMON ALTERNATIVES TO “MIXED RACE” 
 
Table 1 – General Terms 
Terms of Multiplicity Terms of Division 
Multiracial Biracial/Triracial Half-breed ’breed 
Multiethnic Multicultural Half-blood Halfblood 
Multiply raced Multi-breed Half-[insert race] Half-caste 
 
Terms of Biology and/or Combination 
Mixed-blood Mixedblood Mixed breed ’breed 
Cross-blood Crossblood Mongrel Mutt 
Mixed parentage Mixed heritage71 Mixed race Fusion72 
Mixblood Mixed Hybrid  
 
Table 2 – Terms Associated with Specific Races or Ethnicities 









in past 50 
years 
Mixedblood Hapa/Happa73 Mixed race74 Mestiza/o 
Mixed blood Amerasian Mulatta/o  
Métis75  Eurasian   
                                                          
71Used most often by Asian American writers and scholars. 
 
72See Fernandez (America Beyond Black and White: How Immigrants and Fusions Are Helping 
Us Overcome the Racial Divide). 
 
73An abbreviation of the Hawai’ian hapa haole, meaning “half foreigner” or “half white,” a term 
originally applied only to mixed race Asians in Hawai’i but subsequently (and controversially) 
adopted by mixed race Asian Canadians and Asian Americans outside of Hawai’i. See Bernstein 
and De la Cruz (“‘What are You?’: Explaining Identity as a Goal of the Multiracial Hapa 
Movement”); Dariotis (“Hapa: The Word of Power”). 
 
74When used in this sense, “mixed race” and “biracial” refer exclusively to black/white mixes, 
and all other races and combinations are ignored or summarily dismissed. See, for example, 
Dagbovie-Mullins, who acknowledges in an endnote that “the ‘multiracial movement’ and 
multiracial organizations include a diverse group of mixed-race advocates who represent an array 
of racial blending, [including] […] many others who do not have black as a part of their identity 
makeup. For the purposes of this book’s focus, unless specified, my discussion of mixed race 
particularly speaks to black/white mixed-race identity” (129). 
 
75The name of an American Indian people group, primarily in the Northern and Northwestern 





Mixed breed Eurasian76 Mulatta/o  
Half-breed  Quadroon  







 Hafu/Hāfu/Haafu77  Chicana/o/x 
 Ainoko/Konketsuji78  Mexipina/o79 





 Hapa/Happa Mulatta/o  
  Quadroon  




Griffe80 Mexipina/o Afroasian Mexipina/o 
  Griffe  
Food terms81 
Apple Banana Oreo Coconut 
 Twinkie   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
women. Also used to describe mixed race American Indians in general, with this usage being 
more common in the North, and “mestiza/o” being roughly its equivalent in the Southern and 
Southwestern U.S. Occasionally used to represent any mixed race identity. 
 
76Terms listed in both the “Most common in the past 50 years” and “More common historically 
than now” categories have waned in popularity, but still have a strong presence in mixed race 






79Half Mexican and half Filipina/o/x. 
 
80Black and American Indian. 
 
81Nearly always pejorative. Used to suggest deception or disloyalty by implying that the person 
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